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ABSTRACT

The proceedings consist of the presidential address, papers, summary reviews of papers, responses, and minutes presented at the annual meeting of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society. Papers emphasize several themes: (1) areas of educational theory and practice in which philosophers could be helpful, (2) suiting educational efforts to the particular learning characteristics of individuals, (3) clarifying the objectives and functions of measurement and testing, and (4) differentiating between intrinsic and symbolic values and value theory in education. In the presidential address, David E. Engel of the University of Pittsburgh considered the question of educational purpose. Engel focused on the four contrasting themes of purpose--academic discipline, social efficiency, individual development, and vocational competence--and explored how each of these claims of purpose have influenced students at various periods throughout history. Other papers focused on the descriptive adequacy of the four claims of purpose discussed by Engel, reasons why philosophers of education should not cede the affective domain to educational psychologists, various perspectives on the whole person and educational methods and procedures relevant to them, the current crisis of grade inflation, the transformation of collegiate education from academic elitism to an extension of common schooling, the relationship of athletic programs and sports to the general good, problems of labeling students as learning disabled, and the pertinence of philosophical endeavor to special education. (DB)

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philosophical studies in education

PROCEEDINGS OF THE ANNUAL MEETING OF THE OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY-1979

Stouffer's Towers Hotel
November 9-10, 1979

Xavier University
Host Institution

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The Society accepts papers which treat philosophically a topic that is clearly related to an educational question. Papers read at the annual meeting are reviewed for publication by the program committee. Papers must follow style guidelines published by the University of Chicago, Turabian, or the proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society, *Philosophy of Education, 1973*, pp. 356ff. Papers should not exceed 15 pages in length. They are submitted to the program committee for consideration during the summer preceding an October or November meeting. Inquiries concerning submission guidelines, deadlines, and meeting dates may be addressed to the editors.

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PROGRAM
OF THE
OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
1979 ANNUAL MEETING

November 9-10, 1979

Stouffer's Towers Hotel
Cincinnati, Ohio

Host Institution
Xavier University

FRIDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 9

REGISTRATION: 9:00-10:00, Ivory Room

OPENING SESSION: 10:00-12:00

Chair: Richard LaBrecque (University of Kentucky)

Welcoming Remarks: Francis Brennan, Academic Vice President (Xavier University)

Presidential Address: David Engel (University of Pittsburgh) "Claims of Educational Purpose"

Response: John E. Carter (Indiana State University)

Discussion

Lunch: 12:00-1:30

FRIDAY AFTERNOON, NOVEMBER 9

CONCURRENT SESSION I: 1:30-4:30

SESSION A: (Ivory A)
Current Work in Educational Theory

Chair: Robert Wilhoyte (University of Toledo)

1:30 Paper: Philip G. Smith (Indiana University) "Forms of Extrinsic Value: A Report of Work in Progress"

Response: Jerome Popp (University of Southern Illinois)

Discussion

3:00 Paper: William E. Andersen (University of Sydney, Australia) "The Education of the Whole Person"

Response: Karen Hanson (Indiana University)

Discussion

SESSION B: (Ivory B)
Contemporary Issues in the Schools

Chair: William A. McKenney (Eastern Kentucky University)

1:30 Paper: Bernard A. Gendreau (Xavier University) "Academic Evaluation and the Current Crisis of Grade Inflation and Competency Testing"

Response: Samuel R. Snyder (University of Toledo)

Discussion

3:00 Paper: Eleanor K. Roemer (Bowling Green State University)
"And Some Are More Equal Than Others: The Exemption of Revenue Producing Sports from Title IX"

Response: Keith L. Raitz (University of Louisville)

Discussion

Dinner: 4:30-8:00

FRIDAY EVENING, NOVEMBER 9

GENERAL SESSION: 8:00-10:30 (Ivory Room)

Chair: Dennis M. Senchuk (Indiana University)

Paper: D. Burnham Terrell (University of Minnesota)
"The Logic and Morals of Labeling"

Responses: Wietse de Hoop (Eastern Kentucky University)
Ira S. Steinberg (Oberlin College)

PRESIDENT'S RECEPTION: ROOM 1126

SATURDAY MORNING, NOVEMBER 10

COFFEE HOUR: 8:30 (Bamboo Room)
(Provided by host institution, Xavier University)

CONCURRENT SESSION II: 9:00-11:00

SESSION A: (Bamboo A)
Logic and Education

Chair: Gerald M. Reagan (Ohio State University)

9:00 Paper: Bonnie Hume (Eastern Kentucky University)
"Logic in Children's Literature"

Discussion

10:00 Paper: Tomis Kapitan (Indiana State University)
"Symbolic Logic in Education"

Discussion

SESSION B: (Bamboo B)
Perspectives on Dewey

Chair: Robert J. Skovira (Greensburg, Pennsylvania)

9:00 Paper: Pyong Gap Min (Forest Park, Georgia)
"John Dewey's Alleged Support of Expertism"

Discussion

10:00 Paper: Jo Ann Freiberg (Ohio State University)
"A Questionable Presence: Is Values Clarification Really Deweyan?"

Discussion

GENERAL BUSINESS MEETING: 11:15-12:00 (Bamboo A)

INTRODUCTION

I

The annual meetings of the Ohio Valley Philosophy of Education Society do not customarily go forward under the banner of an announced theme. The 1979 meeting was no exception. But perhaps not surprisingly, when we consider the papers in retrospect and as a group, we find them huddling about a particular topic or two nevertheless. Last year, for example, professionalism served as the focus for several pieces--one declared at the outset in both the title and the substance of Gerald Reagan's Presidential Address, "Peers, Experts, and Fair Judges." Reagan's interests on that occasion were intramural and collegial, specifically concerned with the circumstances of faculty evaluation and promotion. Of course there are other circumstances in which we feel the vexing bite of questions which bear on the nature and proper limits of expert or professional authority, and these circumstances are bound to affect the specific ways in which questions about expertise are construed, as well as the spirit and the emphasis of the replies we offer. We might deem the pertinence of questions of this sort in making pedagogic and curricular recommendations on a sensitive topic such as ethics and values, for example, to be an intramural matter which easily spills over into analytically distinct but related considerations about the broad educational or miseducational effects of civic life. Sometimes, when used to assess the quality and moral direction of institutional life, questions about the justification and the desirable scale of professional interventions become explicit objects of historical research and interpretation. Following Keith Raitz's reply to Reagan, questions peculiar to these additional and sometimes overlapping argumentative circumstances--the pedagogic, the civic, and the historical--were addressed in a brisk and lively series of papers by three authors: Bernard Rosen ("Obligations of the Teacher of Ethics"), Clinton Collins ("We Can't Leave Morality to the Experts"), and Joe Burnett ("John Dewey and the Ploys of Revisionism").

This year, to borrow once again the title of the Presidential Address, the emphasis is on "Claims of Educational Purpose." That is, virtually all of the papers read at this year's meeting anatomize the sorts of pinches and tugs that almost inevitably result when we claim that certain politics and practices are likely to advance the educational ends we prize. There are substantial differences of sensibility, method, and claim to be found here, however. As one might expect, these differences are in part attributable to the fact that each paper tends to emphasize one of these elements more than the others. In some papers it is the ways in which the end itself is conceptualized which is center stage; in others, it is the sources or effects of a particular policy or practice; in others still, it is a more precise understanding of the nature of the connection between the two which is pursued. Other differences originate in what *sort* of problem the author takes his particular question of purpose to be--what circumstances *establish* it as a problem. Is it political or legislative, for example, or pedagogic? Is it instead "theoretical" or "academic" in the best sense of those terms?

In "Claims of Educational Purpose," his presidential address, David Engel works with an appropriately broad brush on the largest canvases, considering these matters in terms of their civic and historical import. Following the lead of R. Freeman Butts, Engel begins by laying out what that historian has described as "the four contrasting themes of purpose" inscribed in our nation's educational history--"academic discipline," "social efficiency," "individual development," and "vocational competence." What interests Engel most is how these different themes or claims of purpose are to be assessed. Assessed they must be, he is convinced, for while each of these can be shown to have issued from different historical circumstances, each persists with more than a measure of real vitality in our day; and further, each implies a larger claim--i.e., "this is what *all* education should be about." Indeed it is precisely what we might think of as the imperialism implicit in each of

these claims which undercuts, in Engel's view, an initial and otherwise plausible assessment of their significance--namely, that each one is "valid for some one or some group." Thus "the four strains of purpose . . . may theoretically coexist," he writes, "but in their present state, with partisan followers, they compete. An evaluation of their relative worth or potential power will not resolve the competition," he continues, "but it may tell us what is at stake in our struggle for educational purpose."

Engel's assessment is in two parts. In the first, he tries to show that the four claims of purpose reduce to two, concluding that "the competing claims of academic discipline and vocationalism describe the center of the debate . . . ." He manages this distillation by first exploiting what he takes to be the historical antipathies at the heart of social efficiency: "Should schools sort students into useful slots in the social/industrial machinery? Or should schools develop competent citizens?" For some who were a part of the social efficiency movement, he explains, individual satisfaction was presumed, or at any rate subsidiary to, an explicitly enunciated social end, and thus fitting the learner into a niche was emphasized. For others, however, it was usefulness to the learner that was preeminent, and the socially beneficent result that was presumed. In a second step, Engel then shows that the former branch of social efficiency can be usefully subsumed under "vocational competence." As for "efficiency's" later branch, that together with the emphasis upon "individual development" he groups under the heading "academic discipline."

The second part of Engel's assessment begins with a question designed to bring out the force of the normative competition between these two conflicting views of purpose: "Toward what end or in what way are individuals empowered either by academic discipline or vocationalism?" "At the risk of oversimplification," he replies, "education for academic discipline aims to teach one to think about doing, and education for vocational competence aims to teach one to do." The rub is that "academic discipline" so construed, though it is "empowering" in a superior way in Engel's judgment, "is neither a creditable nor a tenable goal for those who cannot afford it." "If what [Thomas F.] Green calls 'the best' principle is to be broadly operational," he concludes--that is, if the education that the rich buy for their children is indeed to become the operational standard of education to which everyone is entitled--then "support of academic discipline beyond anything we now experience is required." What worries Engel is that "at present . . . vocationalism is the prevalent mood, perhaps most significantly in higher education," and "this could mean an increase in social participants who possess no clear educational basis for independent judgment."

In his reply, "Differing Claims of Educational Purpose," John Carter expresses reservations about two distinct but related matters which are central to Engel's argument, and about one minor matter. Most seriously, Carter questions first the descriptive adequacy of the four claims of purpose. The plausibility of accepting these four, and these four alone, he argues, is contingent on confining our attention to a particular historical period--Post-Civil War America--and to certain kinds of people--"academia or the professional educational establishment." "Are there alternative or additional claims" that have been overlooked as a result, he wonders, and offers two candidates for our consideration: "the claim of equality," one which has enjoyed a vigorous life "from the time of Jefferson through the compensatory programs of the 1960s," and "the claim of religious development." The recto side of this objection is that Carter remains unpersuaded by Engel's effort to reduce to two the four claims of purpose with which he began, particularly his attempt to reduce without remainder the "two prongs" of social efficiency into "academic discipline" and "vocationalism." In conclusion, Carter registers some relatively minor reservations about what it means for these claims to be said to "compete," as well as what it means to say they "empower." Central as these notions are to Engel's argument, Carter finds them insufficiently developed. He suggests also that while Engel's claim that "at present, vocationalism is the prevalent mood" may very well be true, it suffers here for want of adequate supporting evidence.

II

If Engel's paper and Carter's reply explore what can be thought of as the historical and civic superstructure of claims of educational purpose, then the next two papers along with their replies look to the infrastructure of claims of this sort. Probing beneath the level of immediate articulation, the touch here is necessarily more delicate and more fastidious, in keeping with an explanatory purpose which is more intimate. Moreover, just as the problems addressed here are provoked by different kinds of considerations, the audience presumed by this sort of work is constituted in a different way than it would be for Engel's paper. In his "Forms of Extrinsic Value" Philip Smith gives us a brief but pointed progress report on his investigations at the intersection of value theory and educational decision-making. William Andersen, on the other hand, examines a variety of conceptions of "the whole person"--at once the object and explicitly cherished aim of formal educational endeavor for at least four generations.

Smith's interest in value theory was provoked by the recognition that "over the years . . . philosophers have operated with too small a catalogue of forms or types of value," and the attendant worry that to the extent that this catalogue was improverished, so too was our understanding of educational evaluation. Retaining the classical distinction between "intrinsic" and "extrinsic" value then, and "following Dewey's lead that value is basically a verb rather than a noun," Smith set out some years ago to map "the logical structure of some of the ways or forms that the valuing activity takes." In the first part of his paper, Smith sketches quickly for us the contours of his theory as developed thus far. Here he reviews three forms that extrinsic value may take (what he calls "exemplified," "instrumental," and "contributory")--what amounts to a classification of the different kinds of contingent relationships that emerge when we "value something *because* of its actual or potential relations to other valued things." Precisely because these relationships are contingent, they can "in principle be supported or refuted by observation and empirical inquiry," Smith argues, and it is in this domain of extrinsic value only that we can speak of "evaluation" per se. He explains why he thinks speaking of "evaluating intrinsic value" is a "category mistake," and goes on to distinguish "two more or less critical activities that can be engaged in while valuing intrinsically" which are sometimes confused with evaluation--namely, "phenomenological description" and "introspection."

In the second part of his paper, Smith briefly indicates what progress he has made in delineating "sub-categories and species of extrinsic value" within each genus he has studied so far. What is of most interest to him currently, however, is whether there are additional major categories of extrinsic value, and he turns to this matter in the third and final section. Smith believes there are other major categories, and the one he considers here he terms "symbolic value." Contrary to his initial expectations, however, Smith has been forced to conclude that objects of symbolic value cannot be evaluated directly because "the relationship between symbol and what is symbolized" is "analytic and hence, the value it bestows on an object follows logically from this relationship." That is not to say that objects of symbolic value cannot be evaluated *at all*, Smith hastens to point out. But it is to say that possessing no evaluational structure of their own, such objects can be evaluated only if we "shift the mode to one or more of the three forms of extrinsic value" he has identified already. Although pleased that he has found another genus of extrinsic value, to date Smith has not yet uncovered a "new evaluative structure," and that, as he informs us in conclusion, is what he is really looking for.

In his reply, Jerome Popp applauds Smith and offers a major consideration for further work of this sort under each one of the headings of his title, "Intrinsic and Symbolic Value." After posing a question about the success of R.S. Peters's effort to show, contrary to Smith, that "evaluation" of what is cherished "intrinsically" is possible, Popp goes on to ask: Does intrinsic valuing "exist through deference to the nonreflective state of some

persons, or does it constitute an affective-cognitive state on a par with the 'because' of extrinsic valuing?" If we are willing to assume that they are both equally reflective, this suggests a number of provocative possibilities in Popp's view. Hedonism comes to mind as an example of valuing intrinsically, one on a cognitive par with extrinsic valuing, but one in which there is no "because." If the hedonistic conception of intrinsic valuing has substance, Popp suggests, then its implications and consequences for educational theory remain to be set out. As for the matter of "symbolic value," Popp sees "no difficulty for [Smith's] theory or problem for value theorists in the fact that symbols are open to three types of evaluation . . . and do not possess their own evaluation structure." What worries him is that philosophers of education have ceded "the 'affective domain' to educational psychology and, what is worse, to the plethora of hack 'humanists' who seek to humanize education." Not only does symbolic value provide a clear entry point into the "affective domain" for philosophers of education, Popp thinks it would undoubtedly yield a more profound appreciation of "Dewey's conception of the aesthetic as the 'incomparable organ of instruction.'"

Rich and ambitious as it is, William Andersen's exploration of "The Education of the Whole Person" is less a report on work in progress than it is a piece of the work itself. If the whole is more than the sum of the parts, as the adage would have it, "What is the nature of the 'more'?" he asks, and "How can ordinary as distinct from, say, poetic people or mystics discern it?" It is the nature of the whole and the relevance of the adage to our thinking about persons which Andersen aims to display in the first part of his paper. He begins with the straightforward recognition that "the person is caught up or implicated in many relations with elements in the universe, whether these be external or internal to himself." After classifying these relations, he invites us to think of the person as comprising at least three wholes. That is, we can conceive of the person as "personality," first of all, where it is a coherence of "internal relations" that we have in view. Second, there is the person as "agent" where, by contrast with the first, the coherence of "external relations" comes to the fore. Finally there is the person "inter-subjectively" or "inter-personally" understood--what Andersen terms a "special case" because it involves relations which are at once internal *and* external. Being faced with a conception of the person as comprising at least three wholes in this fashion is hardly an embarrassment, Andersen points out, so long as we resist construing notions of wholeness "architecturally." What the architectural conception hinges on is the presumption that "all elements dovetail within one pattern." *Orchestrally* conceived, however, the notion poses no difficulty: Like the orchestra, the person is (a) capable of "an almost endless variety of internal relationships as determined by the musical score; (b) still a whole when some members are silent; and (c) able to function within wider wholes such as ballet or opera." Both the theoretical punch and educational significance of this three-fold conception of the person, as well as that of the orchestral metaphor, are driven home in the remainder of the paper in several ways. What follows, first, is a recognition of the multiple "epistemological stances" available to us for scrutinizing any one of these wholes theoretically and empirically; three criteria for appraising the adequacy of models of whole person functioning based on the recognition of those stances; a review of some influential models in light of the criteria of adequacy he has proposed (viz., Freud and Lewin on "Personality," Marx on "Agency," and Carl Rogers's and Hebraic conceptions of "The Self"); and, in conclusion, an effort to display "linkages of a normative kind" between these various perspectives on the whole person and "educational procedures relevant to them."

In reply to Andersen, Karen Hanson directs our attention to the metaphor of the orchestra. In Andersen's view, you will recall, the metaphor asserts that the orchestra "can function within wider wholes such as ballet and opera"; that it is still a whole, notwithstanding the fact that some members often remain silent; and finally that it is "capable of a variety of internal relationships as determined by the musical score." "Appealing and initially

plausible" as Hanson finds it, however, she judges Andersen's use of the metaphor to be seriously deficient and suggests that the metaphor itself is, at bottom, symptomatic of an aim she would reject as ill-conceived, or worse, pernicious. What is deficient about Andersen's use of the metaphor is that his subsequent account fails to "distinguish any basic elements of persons" comparable to those in the orchestra which are indeed capable of that "variety of internal relationships." What at first glance might appear to satisfy our request for a delineation of those elements--that is, Andersen's three-fold "personality," "agency," and "inter-subjectivity"--fails to cohere, she charges, and it fails to cohere precisely because some "solid sense of the elements" in these internal relationships is missing. In staking out her "larger worry about the direction of the enterprise," what draws Hanson's critical fire is the notion of a "positive account" of whole person functioning, one metaphorically equivalent to the musical score. She takes Andersen to be of the conviction that "we must say what a person is, say fully and completely, through 'positive formulations' [one of Andersen's three criteria for the adequacy of models of whole person functioning] if we are to know how to develop, how to educate, persons." "The musical score is prescriptive," she observes: "Do we really think there is a comparable, a full and complete, prescriptive account of the person?" Moreover, "there is no antecendently fixed 'positive account' of a musical work," only "rules of composition" and compositional forms instead. Thus "there can be no really useful antecedent judgments about, or useful antecedent statements of, what counts as a good composition," she reasons, and the same is true of persons. In each case, "if we find fault, if we point to defects or shortcomings, we don't imply that there is some perfect or ideal type which this piece [or person] has failed to instantiate. Our criticisms cannot be cast in these terms, for there is no such ideal type." This is not to say that the slogan "We must educate the whole person" makes no sense, or to endorse some non-holistic view of persons, however. It is to recognize instead, as Hanson explains, that "the appeal of some goal of 'wholeness' gains its specific sense" only in a context of problems when there is "some more or less specific point" in making abstractions of this sort.

III

When we turn to the papers by Bernard Gendreau and Eleanor Roemer, we hear claims of educational purpose in yet another register. Unlike Engel, neither Gendreau nor Roemer speaks as a civic intellectual; nor do their papers seek to amend deficiencies of a theoretical tradition like Smith and Andersen's do. Addressing his fellow teachers, Gendreau is candidly prescriptive on a specific intramural matter: "Academic Evaluation and the Current Crisis of Grade Inflation." After a detailed consideration of arguments over an equally pressing extramural and legislative matter--"The Exemption of Revenue Producing Sports from Title IX"--Eleanor Roemer files an *amicus curie* brief in opposition to exemption.

Worry over the phenomenon of grade inflation is not particularly misplaced in Gendreau's view. What is ill-conceived, he thinks, is the usual remedy that seeks to lower the grades students receive through the introduction of competency testing. Tantamount to insisting that "the pattern fit the cloth," Gendreau proposes by way of solution that we "consider refashioning the cloth being measured," instead, by expanding the categories with which we appraise what is educationally significant in a student's effort. This would "prevent placing on the shoulders of the student the full burdens of grading and testing reforms," and as a practical result, it would mean that we could "keep the level of grades and have a fair grade at the same time." Gendreau illustrates the point by instancing "four basic levels" of appraisal and evaluation which, though not recognized by the competency tests, are nevertheless an essential part of the student's academic experience. Two of these levels are concerned with "the student as he finds himself in the

process of learning . . . or will find himself at work and alive in society." The "last two levels are concerned with the discipline as it affects the performance of the student as a person . . . and as learned in the . . . discipline or art."

In reply, Sam Snyder endorses Gendreau's proposal and augments it with an account of the three functions of grading ("sorting mechanism," "reward mechanism," and "certification"), as well as a schematic historical explanation of the phenomenon of grade inflation itself. In Snyder's view, grade inflation is in large measure "a product of the transformation of collegiate education from academic elitism to an extension of common schooling." As "mass education, including collegiate education, became a product," one "capable of being packaged, advertised, and sold in competition with other consumer goods," he explains, "the test of academic excellence becomes increasingly irrelevant as the test of marketability." Community, not the bureaucrats' committee, he concludes, is what we need if we are to mitigate the trend--an academic community at once expressed and encouraged by Gendreau's proposal.

Title IX of the Educational Amendments (1972) states that "No person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." Eleanor Roemer begins her paper here, sketching for us, first, both the legislative intent and the exemptions already attached to the statute, and then pointing to the recent efforts of "a lobby of approximately 300 universities and colleges" to argue that "revenue producing sports should [also] be excluded from Title IX policy considerations." In its simplest and most general form, the "exemption argument" runs something like this: "If an equal spending formula is applied, the level of competition for revenue producing sports, such as football and basketball, would decrease. This decrease would contribute to a reduction of interest in these sports, which would cause a decline in the earnings, which not only help to promote these particular sports but also support the rest of the athletic programs for women as well as men."

Roemer offers us a critical examination of this position and of the one lodged in opposition to it by organizations like the Project on Equal Educational Rights and the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women. These groups and others opposed to exemption argue that not only would "the removal of revenue producing sports from Title IX . . . perpetuate discrimination on the basis of sex" in this particular sphere, but that such an exemption would also threaten to erode the "equal opportunity concept" more generally. Formalizing the exemption argument for us first, Roemer concentrates her attention on the major premise, namely the prediction that applying the Title IX standard "would result in the destruction of sports." She isolates "two ways in which this prediction can be supported," and after considering each of these "sub-arguments" in turn, finds them wanting on both empirical and logical grounds. The "competition sub-argument" asserts that in the face of Title IX's application, "a decline in the level of competition" would result--one that "would translate into a reduction of interest in spectator sports and thus a drop in revenue which helps pay" for the entire athletic program. But only ten percent of the nation's colleges and universities have major sports programs which are revenue producing, Roemer points out, and even for that ten percent it is unlikely that the "level of competition" will be reduced because all schools would be affected similarly. Besides "it has not been shown that revenue producing sports are the only way of generating funds for athletic programs," as the experience of the vast majority of institutions makes clear. As for the remaining "erosion sub-argument" which voices fears that a "decline of interest in manliness, discipline, and character building related to the American way of life" would eventuate if Title IX standards were applied, Roemer is unimpressed. The fact that in the past we "justified differences in the provisions of athletic opportunity on the basis of sex," she points out, "does not support the claim that we should continue similarly."

The parties on either side of this issue "do not deny that there are differences in athletic opportunities for men and women," of course. What separates them is "the justifiability of those differences." In the second part of her paper, Roemer scrutinizes with equal care the two "sub-arguments" necessary to support the opposing "retention argument." Finding those arguments compelling, but recognizing also that "there are no absolute criteria to which one might appeal" to decide the matter, Roemer opts for the principle of utility and concludes with the question: "Is the possible destruction of revenue producing sports, as they have traditionally been defined in 20th century America, the *greater harm*?"

In response to Roemer, Keith Raitz asks, "Is There a Good Argument for Exempting Revenue-Producing Sports from Title IX?" a question he poses as one who favors exemption. He agrees that neither the "competition" nor "the erosion" sub-arguments as she sets them out will fill the bill, but goes on to wonder if the best argument for exemption might be found as yet unformulated "within" the competition sub-argument as it applies to big time schools. In Raitz's view, Roemer's "claims that funding cuts will not lessen levels of competition" are empirical ones, and (at least as she offers them to us here) they remain unsubstantiated. He concludes with the additional observation that "*all* arguments in behalf of Title IX exemption" will fail "if they incorporate a premise that defines the general good as 'athletic programs and sports and the beneficial results which participating in, as well as following, brings.'" Raitz would reject such a conception as woefully circumscribed because it "overvalues sports" and at the same time succeeds in undervaluing "equal opportunity for women."

IV

In virtually all of the exchanges we have reviewed thus far, we find the respondents accepting the problems defined by the papers they comment upon as bonafide problems correctly identified. They also accept the explanatory ideals at work in the papers as adequate to those problems. Thus Carter does not reject per se Engel's search for "claims of purpose" on the order of "academic discipline" and the rest, or the appropriateness of the historical and civic context in which Engel seeks them. Accepting both, and thereby leaving Engel's image of his own endeavor intact, Carter interrogates Engel's formulations only to see if they represent the matter of purpose so construed in the most compelling way possible. The same is true, *mutatis mutandis*, of Popp's reply to Smith, Snyder's to Gendreau, and Raitz's to Roemer. To be sure, these exchanges are paradigmatic of a spirit which commonly but usefully animates our intellectual life. But sometimes we find ourselves in other, perhaps more vexing circumstances. We sometimes find ourselves, that is, not merely disagreeing about this or that against the background of a problem reasonably well-understood, but disagreeing in substantial ways about the nature of the problem itself. Hanson's worry about the direction of Andersen's theoretical endeavor--a worry so throughgoing that she could wonder in conclusion if perhaps Andersen failed to "have enough confidence in the utter simplicity, the plainness, of the truth that persons are wholes"--exemplifies disagreement of this sort. The replies by Wietse de Hoop and Ira Steinberg to Burnham Terrell's "Logic and Morals of Labeling," afford us other examples.

Terrell's investigation of the quarrels over the evils of "Labeling" begins with P.L. 94-142 and a brief legislative history of the term "learning disabilities," noting first the efforts by some to gloss this term in psychological ways in opposition to those who understood it medically. But as significant as that dispute was, this psychological understanding of learning disabilities was itself challenged as the 60s wore on. Those who challenged a psychological understanding of learning disabilities used a sociological or ecological model instead, and it is this latter dispute that Terrell judges to be the most interesting and the one he explores in his paper.

All of the advocates of an "ecological strategy" see themselves as providing a "new and morally unobjectionable direction free of the moral, and even the logical vices of labeling," Terrell observes, but there are at least three distinguishable orientations among the ecologists which are worth recognizing. There is, first of all, what Terrell calls "the diagnostic." The least radical of the three, it is a cousin to the psychological emphasis which initially took the ground against organic, or medical explanations of difficulties in learning. The "source of the child's problem" still lies "within the child" from this viewpoint then, but the explanations offered typically "ascribe the . . . problems to interaction with something in his or her surroundings." The second orientation within the ecological movement is, by contrast, "programmatic" in its emphasis. As its name suggests, the distinctiveness here lies in seeking a classification scheme for children with difficulties which is based, not on a clinical *diagnosis* of their problem (ecologically understood), but on the basis of the kinds of *services* they require. The third and final orientation that Terrell distinguishes for us is typically conflated with one of the other two, he thinks. He dubs this position "presentative" because here the effort is "to consider problems as they present themselves without tying them immediately to a diagnostic or a programmatic approach to classification." Curiously enough, however, when pressed to its limit, what this presentative position yields is not so much a diagnostic claim as a logical one: "the child . . . does not present problems to the school," but "the school imposes problems on the child." Put another way, in the most radical interpretation of the "presentative" position, as Terrell characterizes it, "all of the problematic features of the child's performance are 'schoologenic.'"

Once this spectrum of "ecologist" reaction to the evils of labeling is clearly before us, Terrell goes on to offer three major points. The first is a kind of cultural-linguistic one. Provoked by looking closely at the radical ecologists' position, and illustrating with a J. Abner Peddiwell-like anecdote, Terrell tries to show that "what is 'schoologenic' is not so much the problem or problems presented by a child, but the systematic practice of educators (responding to the cultural imperatives of their society as reflected in the school's curriculum) . . . ." Thus "it is not that a learning *disability* . . . is in a peculiar sense 'schoologenic,'" in Terrell's view, but that "the *expressions*" 'learning disability,' 'dyslexia,' and the rest are schoologenic--i.e., "products of the school and its curricular emphases." Terrell takes these emphases and imperatives to be constitutive of the life we lead together, constitutive in such a way that they cannot be evaded or dispensed with any more than the language itself which, after all, allows us to classify coherently. It is against the background of these irresistible necessities that Terrell offers a second, diagnostic point: The people who argue from "the unique individuality of the student . . . to the conclusion that classification and category labels must be renounced" are obviously mistaken, but theirs is "not really a [conceptual or logical] error about individuals and classes," he thinks, but "a fallacy of accent." They "read the conclusion as 'The child, a unique individual, should not be treated as a member of a *class*,'" in the same way as those who seek to correct them on logical grounds. "Read it differently," Terrell suggests, and what we find is an imperative which is educationally and morally unimpeachable: "'The child, a unique individual, should not be treated as a member of *a* class.'" Terrell's third point is offered as a practical one. The tendency to reify classification schemes is just one of the unwanted and unhappy "psychological consequences" which befall teachers whose work requires use of them. To combat this tendency, Terrell urges a "closer cooperation between practical educators engaged in the delivery of education services and philosophers of education." These psychological consequences are but one example of "how, on occasion, we permit our intelligence to be bewitched by language"; and thus as a remedy, Terrell calls upon philosophers to be close at hand, ready when needed to break the spell.

Wietse de Hoop speaks in reply to Terrell as one who has devoted his career to the problems of Special Education. Long convinced of "the need for philosophical analysis of our discipline, its language, purpose, and methods," de Hoop greets Terrell's efforts at the outset as "most welcome." But de Hoop goes on to express his "frustration" in the face of Terrell's presentation, a frustration he summarizes "in a brief sentence: You just don't know me!" Part of de Hoop's difficulty with Terrell centers on the "presentative approach." Because he takes Terrell to be *proposing* that "the ecological approach be extended to include . . . a 'presentative'" one, he goes on to point out that ecological strategies of whatever stripe are "internally inconsistent," and further, "notwithstanding the good intentions" of those who have promoted them, these strategies have shown themselves in practice to provide "relatively little instructionally relevant information" for the average teacher. In de Hopp's view, it is here that the philosopher's help is needed, not in order to break the spells language casts over our intelligence, but to provide a "reformulation" of "the present diagnostic process" which would be useful to the teacher in an "instructional context."

While de Hoop has a different view than Terrell does of the pertinence of philosophical endeavor to Special Education and its difficulties, he also has a different view of what constitutes the problem of labeling and how it ought to be addressed, offering his own twist on Terrell's Peddiwell-like anecdote to make the point. Not only would our imaginary "ecosystem" devise ways to formally instruct the young--a vocabulary with which to explain success and failure and the rest--"it would neglect to question the appropriateness of its own assumptions." We have a "labeling problem," schoologenic in its origin, not because we've confalted logical and psychological matters or because we are otherwise bewitched by language, but because of the practical and moral constraints created by assumptions governing school practice. Unlike Terrell, de Hoop thinks these assumptions can and ought to be brought to light, and if need be, rejected. He instances several of these (e.g., "the curriculum offers adequate preparation for adult survival"; "placement of pupils on the basis of chronological age represents the best means of grouping"; "opportunity for all means equal time and money for all"; and concludes that we are faced with "two alternatives." We might "create a different school system for those labeled" as some European countries have done, presumably giving us some room to maneuver outside of "special" students' limitations, or we can continue to integrate them into the school as we know it. But if we cleave to our present course, we cannot integrate those students properly, de Hoop predicts, without provoking "a redefinition of our entire practice of schooling."

Ira Steinberg takes another tack in his brief reply to Terrell. He begins by disposing quickly of "the literal interpretation of the general injunction against labeling people." "To say that one should not label people . . . is to say something that is virtually unintelligible," he observes, since the only way in which we might "classify" without resorting to what we call "labels" is to give up "describing"--i.e., give up *speaking about* "classification" altogether. Steinberg moves with equal dispatch when he turns to the specific question of difficulties over labeling in Special Education. What is unavoidable here, in his judgment, are not the cultural imperatives that Terrell emphasizes (those "assumptions" which, in de Hoop's hands, might usefully be brought to light and possibly rejected) but controversy itself. Because this controversy depends on considerations other than the linguistic or logical ones of "classifying and labeling," he argues, it is not likely to be tamed by philosophers making useful distinctions. What fuels the controversy is that "some people construe educational difficulties as deficiencies in human worth and some people construe educational superiority as a claim . . . to social preference."

"Given the philosopher's special talent for raising the dust," he concludes ironically, we might extinguish the controversy by putting philosophers to work devising "a means for the educational classification of

students that defies description even by those so classified or by their parents." Failing that, "what is needed," he insists, is "not so much the special knowledge of the philosopher but a critical eye . . . a sense for the difference between substance and semblance in educational research, sensitivity . . . and luck."

V

The four papers which concluded the program are compatible, though in different ways, with the general theme of "claims of educational purpose." Grouped in two concurrent sessions, the first of these was devoted, not so much to the analysis of claims of purpose, but to making some claims on behalf of the study of logic. Convinced that "children are far more logical and appreciative of the rules of logic than they have been credited as being . . . following the work of Piaget," Bonnie Hume displays in "Logic and Children's Literature" some ways in which "the rudiments of formal logic . . . might be comprehended by preschoolers and early elementary school children" if teachers capitalize on age-appropriate reading materials and ordinary conversation.

In a companion essay, Tomis Kapitan looks at the place of symbolic logic in the curriculum for older students, arguing against those who "have disparaged the use of formalism at the introductory level." "Because the utilization of formal techniques is not only compatible with a broader approach to logic but actually enriches this study," Kapitan reasons, "and since such techniques are becoming more and more important in developments outside the sphere of logico-mathematical inquiry, symbolic logic should remain a permanent feature in beginning logic courses."

Pyong Gap Min inaugurated the other session devoted to "Perspectives on Dewey" with a paper which irons out some remaining wrinkles in arguments over "John Dewey's Alleged Support of Expertism," and in conclusion, Jo Ann Freiberg asks, "Is Values Clarification Really Deweyan?"

Sometimes explicit, but more usually implicit, there is at work in each of these papers a kind of enabling conception of the audience for philosophy. But whether philosophical endeavor ultimately proves pertinent to civic circumstances in the way Engel hopes; to questions of curricular evaluation in the way that Smith plumbs for; or perhaps to more immediate instructional circumstances in the way that Terrell and de Hoop, in different ways, would like to see; we can say in conclusion with Stanley Cavell that for any individual, all of this cognitive effort is probably irrelevant and worthless until it becomes necessary for one to know these things--until one *wants* to know such things. Glossing the oracle's declaration that "no man is wiser than Socrates," Cavell observes: "What I take Socrates to have seen" is not so much that "he did not know," but that "he knew he did not know what no man can know, and that any man could learn what he wanted to learn." "And this discovery about himself," Cavell continues, "is the same as the discovery of philosophy, when it is the effort to find answers, and permit questions, which nobody knows the way to nor the answer to any better than you yourself . . . ." There is the audience for philosophy; but there also, while it lasts, is its performance."*

THE EDITORS

*Stanley Cavell, *Must We Mean What We Say?* (London: Cambridge University Press edition, 1976), pp. xxviii-xxix.

PART I

PRESIDENTIAL ADDRESS

CLAIMS OF EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE

David E. Engel
University of Pittsburgh

My purpose is to consider the question of educational purpose.

Debates over the purpose of education in our society have persisted in each major era of national development. At some times one position or another has gained a following. Issues, sometimes in the form of slogans, have been framed in a way to generate partisan advocates of such views of educational purpose.

Historians, better than philosophers of education, can plot the course of these events. One historian who has cared to do so is Freeman Butts. Although I do not share all of his interpretations of events, I am nevertheless appreciative of his breakdown of four major stands of educational purpose through our nation's social development. He suggests that our educational system has been dominated by four themes: the call for academic discipline, the call for social efficiency, the call for individual development, and the call for vocational competence.[1]

Philosophers of education can well note in passing that each theme is a normative claim. Our educational system, however you might define that (as schools, or as the whole range of educational forces that Lawrence Cremin and others like Douglas Sloan are concerned to explicate), has been subject to value judgments derived from some normative position.

Tom Green has insightfully shown how notions of best and equal (implicit purposes, I would note here) have frustrated our developing a clear view of either educational policy or purpose.[2] He asserts, that "the issue . . . is the question as to whether the education that the rich buy for their sons [i.e., the "best" principle] is, indeed the *operational* standard of the education to which everyone is entitled."[3] In short, the principle of "best" is in competition with the notion of "equal" distribution. Given limited resources and despite rhetoric giving lip service to equality of access to education, unequal distribution not only of educational benefits but also of educational resources prevails.[4] So the task of clarifying educational purpose is not an easy one. It has political and economic dimensions.

One might presume that the matter reduces to power politics. We can construct all manner of rhetorical purposes; but who gets what educationally and how it is gotten is dominantly a question of the advantage one has walking into formal education not what is secured there. And, further, if you can buy more, you will probably preserve or increase your advantage.

Cynical? So some would say. For such a position would suggest that education (not merely schooling, but all educative forces, e.g., television, museums, families, work) reinforces the existing class structure. That begins to sound like more than cynicism. it approaches the claim that education, as we experience, witness, and practice it, is aimed at preserving or reinforcing the *status quo*. Although we might wish that formal education would change social behavior or, more ambitiously, lead to systemic social change, it does not. It does not not because it will not, but because it cannot. When seen in terms of raw power, formal education does not mitigate perceived injustices in the social order.

That is where I start (or in the awful phrase of the last decade: "That is where I'm coming from"). Cynical? I am not cynical about the function of education. I am trying to be realistic about it, to describe it, before moving to a consideration of what it might be or ought to be.

And what have all of these random thoughts to do with the purpose of education? Simply this: what we wish education to be must take account of present constraints, what it is or seems to be.

With that in mind I will first consider what Freeman Butts describes as the search for purpose in education in our society. Although I find Green's paper on the "best" and "equal" principles to be provocative, I think Butts's explication of four contrasting themes of purpose in American education more clearly exposes the kind of normative choices the philosophy of education might consider. Secondly, I will attempt to assess how the several constrasting and competing purposes of American education relate to the question of one's place in the social order. Thirdly, I shall be so bold (and nonanalytic) as to make some recommendations.

The Search for Purpose in Education

Freeman Butts, you will recall, sees four dominant themes of purpose for education arising through American social development--themes of academic discipline, social efficiency, individual development, and vocational competence.

The call for academic discipline in American society was articulated in 1893 in the report of the Committee of Ten of the National Education Association. The report recognized that high school was the terminal educational institution for a majority of students in that day, and it recommended that the four high school years should be "strong and effective mental training," functional both for practical life and further college studies.[5]

Just six years later the Committee on College Entrance Requirements recommended what they called "constants" in education which were seen as the standards for college admission: four units in foreign language, two in mathematics, two in English, one in history, one in natural science, and six elective studies.[6] Here was the embodiment of the mental training or academic discipline envisioned by the Committee of Ten. By the 1930s, the call for academic discipline as the purpose of formal education had undergone some modifications, such as dropping the staunch defense of classical studies (i.e., Greek and Latin). But the advocates of academic discipline continued to assert that vocational training was antithetical to the purpose of secondary education and college studies. Robert Maynard Hutchins was a prime spokesman:

> If education is rightly understood, it will be understood as the cultivation of the intellect . . . . In general education . . . we may wisely leave experience to life and set about our job of intellectual training."[7]

Although it has been claimed that such purposes for American education are hopelessly elitist, some who were not of the elite have found them useful. Whether or not you agree with their motivations or their life objectives, you cannot deny that academic discipline led them to a life that would not otherwise have been possible. Theodore H. White competed his way through the Boston Public Latin School and Harvard, and it changed his life. He strove for academic discipline because that is what those schools valued. As he puts it: "I had come to Harvard as an adolescent Socialist and Zionist. I had helped organize a boycott of German goods in Boston, and been driven off by cops for picketing Woolworth's. But somewhere between my junior and senior years, I had been lured to other interests. Harvard and History had intervened."[8] Being a social activist had not been a bad thing for White. But the call for academic discipline persuaded him to understand the basis of social causes. That was more important. Looking back on it, White recollects it this way:

> Harvard had the keys to the gates; what lay behind the gates I could not guess, but all that lay there was to be looted. Not only were there required courses to be

> attended, but there were courses given by famous men, lectures open to all, where no one guarded the entry. I could listen. There were museums to be seen, libraries and poetry rooms of all kinds to tarry in--and stacks and stacks and stacks of books. It was a place to grab ideas and facts, and I grabbed at history.[9]

In later years, faced with the conundrum of reporting political events, White came to realize once again that chronicling them was not enough. To interpret them meaningfully requires the construction of a cogent argument. Such an argument stems from a disciplined mind, so the call for academic discipline still can be seen as vital.

So can the call for social efficiency as an educational purpose. This movement parallels the notion of academic discipline and yet in some significant respects is antithetical to it. In general, the purpose of education from this standpoint is seen as making persons more socially efficient.

But efficient in what way and to what end? The movement for social efficiency has had two prongs. One concentrates on fitting the learner into some niche in the larger social and industrial machinery. The other focuses on development of those skills and values that would be socially useful to learners, rendering them responsible citizens.

Typical of the former purpose is the intellectual framework which stemmed, around the turn of the century, from the sociology of William Graham Summer at Yale and E.A. Ross at Stanford. According to this view, education can be a significant device for controlling the social order. In turn, the primary purpose of schooling is not the acquisition of knowledge but preparation for a role in society. Furthermore, it is assumed that individuals differ with respect to talent, need, and interest, and therefore they should be differentially prepared for different social roles.

Early in this century, the majority of students in public schools did not go to college. Accordingly, secondary schools, it was thought, could be called upon to provide training for different occupational lines. The subjects to be studied in that time were justified on the basis of how directly useful they were for daily life immediately and in the future--in the home, on the farm, in offices, and factories. The curriculum, in many instances, was seen in anything but classical academic terms that would dictate inclusion of traditional subjects (e.g., Latin, Greek, and mathematics) and so-called modern subjects (e.g., English, French, German, history, and the sciences). After all, Greek didn't help you milk a cow or plant a field; history was of little immediate use in a factory; and the sciences didn't prepare you to type or file in an office or even to manage one.

There is, however, a much different view of the social purpose of education. It rests on the notion (somewhat reminiscent of Jefferson) that schools should prepare one for the responsibilities of democratic living, that the point of education is not to provide a mechanism for social control but to instrument an individual's growth toward increasing social responsibility.

The framework for this view of educational purpose stemmed from the sociology of Albion Small and Lester Frank Ward and the social history of James Harvey Robinson and Charles A. Beard. Philosophically it was informed by John Dewey's educational writings more than by any other. Prior to World War I this side of the movement for social efficiency through education influenced several commissions of the N.E.A., most notably the Commission on the Reorganization of Secondary Education which in 1918 published what it viewed as the Seven Cardinal Principles of education: Health, Command of Fundamental Processes (you can take that to be intellectual rather than biological), Worthy Home Membership, Vocation, Citizenship, Worthy Use of Leisure, Ethical Character.

What this thrust of ideas about educational purpose did was to shift emphasis to social needs and the function of schools in developing adequate, sensitive, responsible citizens. Although it would be a mistake to claim that this movement did not value the intellect (don't forget they did value what was referred to as a command of fundamental processes), it placed it within a broad humane social context.

What is most noteworthy for my purpose here is that a fundamental tension growing out of the two sides of this movement for social efficiency remains today. We can see it in the form of two questions which imply competing purposes, variant values, and different educational agendas. Should schools sort students into useful slots in the social/industrial machinery? Or should schools develop socially competent citizens?

The third general area of educational purpose, Freeman Butts refers to as the call for individual development. In some measure, this notion overlaps with theories viewing the social purpose of education as the development of competent citizens. Yet its emphasis was strikingly different at the core: not society, not the academic tradition, but the child should be the center of education's purpose. By 1919 the Progressive Education Association had developed a set of principles which asserted a new claim. "The aim of Progressive Education is the freest and fullest development of the individual, based on the scientific study of his mental, physical, spiritual and social characteristics and needs."[10] The program went on to advocate such values as the "Freedom to Develop Naturally," "Interest as the Motive of All Work," "The Teacher a Guide, Not a Task Master," "Scientific Study of Pupil Development," "Greater Attention to All that Affects the Child's Physical Development."[11] In this view, progressive education was to value the student's freedom, interest, physical development. The progressive teacher was to be a guide not an authority and, at the same time, to study the development process scientifically.

Some of the previous studies which focused on individuals had emphasized their differences. The psychology of Edward L. Thorndike, for example (which devised instruments for identifying individual differences), did not lead, however, to child-centered schools. Instead social engineers used Thorndike's tests (with no objections from Thorndike, by the way) to rank, track, and classify students as well as laborers and military personnel into social and vocational niches. This was an expression of the movement to use schools for the purpose of social control.

The progressives sought to use the notion of individual difference in a different way. The ideal was to free the individual to find his place, not to have it determined by some external manager. Some striking successes were recorded. The eight-year study under Ralph Tyler's guidance showed that youth from progressive schools fared as well academically in college as those from traditional schools and excelled them in social skills and group leadership.

Following World War II, however, the national hunger for economic development and the ascendency of the United States to super-power status brought with it burgeoning bureaucracies in government and industry and the need for organization men to populate them. Even before Sputnik stimulated an increased technocratic educational emphasis, the Progressive Education Association simply disappeared in 1955 not with a bang and with scarcely a whimper. The mood of educational emphasis had shifted to providing training for the proliferating careers in technical fields.

So a fourth claim of educational purpose became accepted--what Butts refers to as the call for vocational competence. Of course, there had been vocational education prior to the mid-1950s. Now it began to assume a normative weight. If education does not prepare one for a job--or you might inflate the term "jobs" to "careers"--then what good is it? And for the last 20 years we have seen vocationalism increase in significance, most importantly

in higher education. One recent study sponsored by the Carnegie Commission describes this new dimension of educational purpose. Earl F. Cheit argues:

> In contrast to the 1960s, the view in the mid-1970s is that the best way to be humanitarian is to be utilitarian . . . . Now colleges and universities are no longer defined by liberal education. Liberal education lacks the power to define. It lacks coherence; it lacks definition itself. Liberal education has become splintered, specialized, and to some extent, eroded . . . . Many liberal arts colleges have so adjusted their curricula that they are now seen by students as essentially preprofessional institutions.[12]

While there are some who truculently wish it were not so, one cannot help feeling that the driving force in much secondary and undergraduate education is indeed vocational preparation or preprofessional training. Isn't that the case in teacher education? And at the graduate level vocationalism becomes more rife. Surely you have met those eager students in special education who can almost recite 94-142 from beginning to end yet who never heard of W.H. Auden or Sacco and Vanzetti and who may believe Casals was a French impressionist painter or, worse, a wordy sports broadcaster. They are trained for a job, not for social, cultural, or historical understanding.

Yet with the rise of such practical purposes, the articulation of more traditional goals has not died. Even though we no longer see much expression of the child-centered notion as the main feature of educational purpose, the idea lingers on and has gained a following and periodic expression in the "alternatives" literature. The point is that even though each expression of educational purpose has seen another appear on the horizon and gain a following, none of them has died. In overall terms, they have become competing normative claims of what education should be.

Relation of Competing Educational Purposes to One's Place in the Social Order

There are many ways claims of educational purpose could be assessed. The easiest would be to accept them all as valid for some one or some group. Perhaps that is all that we can do.

Still, one is impressed that each assertion of purpose implies a larger claim: that is what all education should be about. The talk of a return to the basics today is symptomatic of such a claim. It *is* saying: this is what all education should be about. Still, such talk, when it comes to an articulation of educational purpose, is fraught with vagueness and confusion. It might seem that a re-emphasis on the 3-R's signals a return to a call for academic discipline. But such is not clearly the case. For some would re-emphasize the so-called basics not to promote academic discipline so much as social efficiency and the development of a controlled work force.

The tensions within the movement for social efficiency still have not been resolved by any means. Should education be the means for sorting students into slots and providing workers for the social/industrial machinery? Or should schools develop competent citizens--informed and critical democratic participants? Still others who would place their efforts behind purposes not extrinsic to the learner may ironically also fall into an implicit vocationalism, on the one hand, or an elitist scholars' program, on the other.

The four strains of purpose as stated may theoretically coexist; but in their present state, with partisan followers, they compete. An evaluation of their relative worth or potential power will not resolve the competition; but it may tell us what is at stake in our struggle for educational purpose.

What is the value of academic discipline as an overarching educational purpose? Not much, it can be guessed, if you're unemployed and seeking some way to maintain yourself and others, let alone advance. A liberal education makes no immediate sense in economic terms for the short run. It is difficult to justify in purely economic terms at all. Is there an economic benefit from the study of history or literature or language or natural science? No doubt, one can show examples of prosperous scientists who have made it financially because they began with a liberal education. Or there may be a reasonably wealthy and influential historian whose success, in part, can be attributed to training in the academic disciplines. Or a writer who would not have attained the renown he or she (say, John Updike or Flannery O'Conner) has enjoyed without a solid grounding in the academic discipline of a liberal education.

But financial reward is not overtly the purpose of academic discipline. On the face of it at least, one trains the mind to think, not to become a financial wizard or a corporate leader. It should be recognized, of course, that what in Green's terms is often regarded by the affluent as the "best" education they can buy at Andover or Exeter and at Harvard, Yale, or Princeton is actually aimed at academic discipline and not vocational competence. While it may seek the development of the individual, it does not do so in the manner of the child-centered advocates.

If the products of Andover and Harvard are any yardstick, education which espouses academic discipline as its purpose is eminently successful. All who are educated in that fashion do not become wealthy. But for most it is successful not because it has enabled them to gain economic status. For most of them had that before they were given access to academic discipline. Given a reasonable economic start, academic discipline teaches students how to reason about their world and their place in it, how to make choices, to define goals and attain them. The problem with it is not its value but its accessibility. Green identifies the problem in stark terms, as was noted earlier, when he states that the issue is "whether the education that the rich buy for their sons is, indeed, the operational standard to which everyone is entitled."

The practical question is not whether public schools can match what Andover and Exeter do or whether land grant institutions can provide what Harvard, Yale, and Princeton provide. In some measure they do. But can the clients afford the liberal education or will they desire it or value it or even understand its value? Can it be recognized that, in an era of fast changing occupations and growth in the number of persons who engage in significant career change during their lifetime, vocational training easily can become outdated and irrelevant? Or can the underclass afford to delay economic gratifications and prepare themselves for life choices which are beyond their ordinary experience? The basis for justifying the power of academic discipline as an educational purpose well might be found in its providing sufficient language skills and social understanding and scientific know-how for one to choose and fit oneself out for one or more careers, for new and untried life experiences. But is that a tenable individual goal, not to mention a believable educational purpose?

The prime competitor with academic discipline is vocationalism. In one form or another, whether that is put in terms of minimum competencies or useful skills or that awful linguistic corruption "knowledges" which has inspired the ire of the likes of Peter Goldstone,[13] the claim of vocational competence as the purpose of education asserts that education is or should be training for a job. As such, it entails development of specified skills which can be applied to discernible tasks. The criterion for evaluation is performance not meaning ("here's not to reason why, here's but to do or die . . . .").

At this juncture, it is pertinent to note that one side of the notion that education should promote social efficiency relates to vocationalism. Insofar as education is aimed at producing individuals who can fit into some

niche in the social and industrial fabric, it tends toward a purpose of vocational competence. To put that another way, education for social control reduces to vocationalism.

Not dissimilarly, the other side of the social efficiency movement in education (the development of those skills and values which are intended to develop socially responsible participants or citizens) has some relation to an emphasis on academic discipline. Even though Hutchins articulated a view of education distinctly different from and in tension with Dewey's, both intended education to develop individuals who could be thoughtful and relatively independent citizens (not merely to do or die, but to reason why). Admittedly the temper of Dewey's notion of thinking and his problem solving paradigm requires subject matter and instructional processes hardly compatible with Hutchins's conception of an adequate curriculum. Nevertheless, in time the Deweyan notion of experience as a basic factor in learning and Hutchins's hyperbolic dichotomy of experience and intellect ("we may wisely leave experience to life and set about our job of intellectual training") has seemed less important and less interesting to debate. Dewey, after all, did know philosophy and history and Hutchins, especially after he left the University of Chicago, was concerned with relating the trained intellect, if not intellectual training, to social purpose. While education for social responsibility may not reduce to education for academic discipline, the two in their less intensely polemical forms are not completely incompatible. If one construes academic discipline as an instrument for responsible citizenship, the tension between the two is diminished.

So, at bottom, the competing claims of academic discipline and vocationalism describe the center of debate over educational purpose. The competition is not a benign matter. One cannot simply assume that the public is free to choose which emphasis and purpose it wishes, for policy is constructed today primarily on the basis of these two competing claims.

Recommendations

One way to evaluate the two claims is on the grounds of social power. Toward what end or in what way are individuals empowered either by academic discipline or vocationalism? Such an evaluation is by no means complete. But it may more clearly show the utility of education according to each notion of purpose.

At the risk of oversimplification, but for the sake of clarity of focus, I suggest that education for academic discipline aims to teach one to think about doing and education for vocational competence aims to teach one to do.

Consider two simple cases in point. The statement on performance based education devised by The Center for Vocational Education at Ohio State University in 1975 provides a clear expression of the attitude and aims of vocationalism. It asserts: "Competencies to be demonstrated by the student are [to be] . . . stated so as to make possible assessment of a student's behavior in relation to specific competencies."[14] Accordingly, assessment of learning, referred to as "the student's competency," is based on "performance as a primary source of evidence."[15]

Along with many others, I have commented on various linguistic and logical and cognitive problems associated with such statements.[16] I will not get into that here. The tack I want to take has to do with potential power outcomes. That is, How is one empowered when education is aimed vocationally? On the face of it, if vocational claims result in success, the student can do something like drive a car, weld, type, or bake a cake. The behavioral outcomes need not be restricted to physical or mechanical actions. One may be trained to write, to observe, to cipher, or to program a computer. The emphasis in the educational training resides in a behavioral outcome or what Dewey referred to as a "doing." What is not deliberately included is reflection or

critical thinking about what is done or what is to be done. This is not to argue that no mental activity occurs when one bakes a cake or programs a computer. But the character of that activity is following directions. Richard Hofstadter describes a person so trained very well:

> he has acquired a stock of mental skills that are for sale . . . . at his job he is a hired mental technician who uses his mind for the pursuit of externally determined ends.[17]

It is possible, of course, for the cook to experiment and the programmer to innovate. But the emphasis in vocationally oriented education on a prescribed outcome hardly fosters it.

In contrast, education for academic discipline can stimulate increasingly independent thought. Although there is no guarantee that it will necessarily occur or that it will result in self-determined action, it provides the opportunity. One of the weaknesses, in my estimation, of the Great Books curriculum was not that it was traditional, but that it was narrowly focused on one tradition, one culture, and failed to analyze its own values critically. In this regard Dewey's theory of experience and his emphasis on problem-solving is salutary in that it can help one relate idea to life situation. In the process, one has the experience of determining something for oneself. Merely removing constraints, in Dewey's view, is insufficient. I think he was talking about empowering individuals. "The ideal aim of education," he said, "is the creation of power of self-control. But the mere removal of external control is no guarantee for the production of self-control."[18] He went on:

> it is easy . . . to escape one form of external control only to find oneself in another and more dangerous form of external control. Impulses and desires that are not ordered by intelligence are under the control of accidental circumstances. It may be a loss rather than a gain to escape from the control of another person only to find one's conduct dictated by immediate whim and caprice; that is, at the mercy of impulses into whose formation intelligent judgment has not entered. A person whose conduct is controlled in this way has at most only the illusion of freedom.[19]

Dewey's view of intelligence as a basic instrument for developing self-control is a helpful corrective to Hutchins's splitting of experience and intellect. Intellect is the means by which we cope with and order what we confront. I may love to read literature or history or experiment in science, or I may not. But beyond training me to know some thing, such studies assist me to understand my circumstances. Dewey's instrumentalism is not antithetical to liberal education. It shows how such studies help me not merely to think, but to think about some things, including myself and my circumstances. And that, I am saying, is the way to empowerment.

Consider a simple statement of the claim that academic discipline affords one such power. The commencement speaker at my daughter's college this past June focused on the power of language, which I would extend to cover reasoning ability--capability to frame perceptions and to make sense of what we confront in our experience. He put it this way:

> You will live a lot of your lives on a mundane, practical level . . . giving and taking directions, making and breaking plans. If your language is faulty then these transactions will be faulty. Each of you literally will be in danger of not knowing what the other is talking about. Reconsider for a minute: can you really get through the day? Can you really always get your meaning across?

> The cardinal virtues of language are clarity, simplicity, precision, vigor, and on good days, gracefulness. What you ask of yourselves in each of those categories will define the terms by which you think, by which you register on the world around you.[20]

That can empower any one of us--to understand ourself, our circumstances, our own goals, desires, and capabilities and to choose a place, to make sense of what we do. Is this to suggest a *push* for academic excellence? I think it is rather more than that. It is to suggest that grounding in language, in critical reasoning, and in understanding of one's social and cultural circumstances and historical location can empower us to make choices and have some significant role in determining our life purposes. But the problem continues to be whether such purposes are accessible to those without power. (I mean those without political and economic power and, as well, psychological power or what is called self-esteem.) Can what Green calls the "best principle," education which enables choice, become the operational principle for all education?

That requires broad support. For education geared toward academic discipline has no immediate economic payoff. It assumes *neotony*, time to mature and delayed gratification. Time is required for two values to be realized. The first value is the realization that simple survival need not be the prime purpose of education. The second value is of a different order. It is economic and political and social. It entails society's support of the best education, or at least what people choose for themselves and those whom they guard, to be accessible to all.

These two values, at least implicit in the foregoing, have not been sufficiently analyzed here. Maybe Green will look at such axiological matters or maybe I or someone else will. But someone should.

Summary

Let me recapitulate the argument. Butts provides a clear framework for analyzing educational purposes as they have evolved over time. But his four areas of purpose may be reduced to two: education for academic discipline and education for vocational competence. They describe the heart of the debate about purpose and they function as the principal competitors in educational policy as it relates to questions of purpose.

When each of the two is examined in terms of how it empowers individuals, vocationalism tends toward equipping learners to do something without necessarily analyzing or understanding its meaning or significance. Adademic discipline, on the other hand, is geared toward developing the critical tools necessary for original thought and independent judgment. However, academic discipline has no immediate or even necessary economic payoff. Thus, while it may better empower individuals for developing their own goals, for surmounting constraints, and participating in social decisions, not to mention social and economic advancement, it is neither a credible nor tenable goal for those who cannot afford it.

If what Green calls the "best" principle is to be broadly operational, support of academic discipline beyond anything we now experience is required. At present, however, vocationalism is the prevalent mood, perhaps most significantly in higher education. This could mean an increase in social participants who possess no clear educational basis for independent judgment.

NOTES

[1]R. Freeman Butts, "The Search for Purpose in American Education." *The College Board Review* no. 98 (Winter 1975-76).

[2]Thomas F. Green, "The Systemic Dynamics of Two Principles: 'Best' and 'Equal,'" *Philosophy of Education 1978* (Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting), Champaign, Illinois, 1978, pp. 133-150.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 149.

[4]*Ibid.*, see also T.F. Green, "Equal Education Opportunity: The Durable Injustice," *Philosophy of Education 1971.* (Proceedings of the Twenty-Seventh Annual Meeting), Edwardsville, Illinois, 1971, pp. 121-143.

[5]Quoted in R. Freeman Butts, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

[6]*Ibid.*

[7]Robert M. Hutchins, *The Higher Learning in America* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936), p. 70.

[8]Theodore H. White, *In Search of History* (New York: Warner Books, 1979), p. 51.

[9]*Ibid.* p. 44.

[10]Quoted in Lawrence A. Cremin. *The Transformation of the School* (New York: Alfred I. Knopf, 1961), pp. 240-241.

[11]*Ibid.*, pp. 243-245.

[12]Earl F. Cheit, *The Useful Arts and the Liberal Tradition* (New York: McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1975), pp. 135-137; quoted in R. Freeman Butts, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

[13]Peter Goldstone, "A Plea for Incompetence," *Philosophy of Education 1978.* (Proceedings of the Thirty-Fourth Annual Meeting), Champaign, Illinois, 1979, p. 44FF.

[14]Norton, Harrington, and Gill, *Performance-Based Teacher Education: The State of the Art* (Columbus, Ohio: Performance-Based Curricula Program, The Center for Vocational Education, Ohio State University, August, 1975), p. 23.

[15]*Ibid.*

[16]See David E. Engel, "CBTE: A Problem in Definition," *CBTE: Issues and Perspectives* (Pittsburgh, PA: School of Education, University of Pittsburgh, 1977), pp. 37-46.

[17]Richard Hofstadter, *Anti-Intellectualism in American Life* (New York: Alfred I. Knopf, 1963), p. 25.

[18]John Dewey, *Experience and Education* (New York: Collier Books, 1963), p. 64.

[19]*Ibid.*, p. 6465.

[20]Dick Cavett, "The English language--an invalid with no health insurance," *Vassar Quarterly* vol. LXXV, no. 4, (Summer 1979), p. 18.

DIFFERING CLAIMS OF EDUCATIONAL PURPOSE

John E. Carter
Indiana State University

Response to Engel

A precursory examination of American history from early colonial times to the present results in an extended list of claims about educational purposes. Some claims have focussed on the development of citizens; many claims have referred to intellectual growth; while other claims have specified a host of intents, namely, the 3 R's--vocational training, skill development, personality growth, and so on. What future direction we, as educators, take in the field of education must include a philosophical analysis of past and present expressions about the purpose of education. This is where David Engel's article, "Claims of Educational Purpose," begins. After drawing from historical literature, which identified four claims of educational purpose--those of academic discipline, social efficiency, individual development, and vocational competency--Engel describes how these four can be reduced to two: academic discipline and vocational competence. To clarify these two "overarching" claims of purpose, he questions how each can empower individuals to act. While educating individuals for either vocational training or academic discipline empowers them to act, the problem that concerns Engel is whether these goals are accessible to individuals who are without social or political power. Likewise, he asserts that empowerment takes time--time for members of society to realize that vocationalism need not be the prime purpose of education, and secondly, time for society to realize that the "best education," academic discipline, demands more economic, political, and social support than it is being given at present. Although there are benefits to be gained from both claims of purpose, vocationalism, he stated, has increasingly become the dominant mode in today's educational practice.

Before critically examining David Engel's paper, I want to express my feelings of appreciation for having been invited to respond to this year's Presidential Address. I find myself in agreement with much of his analysis, an analysis that draws the reader's attention to a crucial issue, and an analysis that aptly clarifies the problem. In following the expectations of what a response entails, I have purposely avoided those areas of his analysis which I find well-developed; and as a consequence, I have narrowed my critical comments to three areas of concern which need further refinement.

First, I discuss Engel's reliance on an earlier, historical analysis about the purpose of education written by Freeman Butts; second, I analyze the effectiveness with which Engel reduces the claims identified by Butts to two; and finally, I suggest three possibilities for further clarification in his analysis.

Much of Engel's argument hinges on how effectively or accurately Freeman Butts has identified the historical claims about educational purpose in America. A closer examination of Butts's article reveals that his descriptions of educational purposes are based largely on claims by academicians and important figures within the educational establishment. Bernard Bailyn, and later Lawrence Cremin, criticized educational historians such as Elwood Cubberly for employing poor historiographical skills. As late as 1976 in the *Harvard Educational Review*, Sol Cohen states that Cremin's criticism of Cubberly is misdirected and should be aimed at the "Teachers College Group" of educators which included Butts. Also, while we should question, with considerable justification, many of the revisionist historian findings in education, I feel the revisionists (along with historians such as Bailyn, Cremin, and Cohen) have awakened among educators a more rigorous study of the past. Is it possible to assume that had Butts primarily used references other than those of academia and of the professional educational establishment, a case might be

made for additional or different claims of purpose? What might parents, lawyers, theologians, printers, farmers, artists, laborers, and teachers claim the purpose of education to be? Are there alternative or additional claims that have been missed? Would not the claim for equality of educational opportunity be a possible fifth purpose? From the time of Jefferson through the compensatory programs of the 1960s, schools have been given the purpose of readjusting the social-economic order and creating a just and an equal America. At first glance, equality does appear to be related to the claims of social efficiency as defined by Engel. For example, when describing social efficiency as having "two prongs," Engel asks, "Should schools sort students into useful slots in the social/industrial machinery . . . or should schools develop socially competent citizens?" But a claim for equality goes beyond Engel's "two prongs" in the sense that schools often have been the means for developing a particular social order.

A sixth claim may be that of religious development. Had Butts directed his findings further into the colonial past instead of focusing on these four claims from post-Civil War data, he would have had to deal more directly with a claim of religious development. Apparently, in Butts's discussion, the term "education" is closely identified with the public school movement in America to the extent that religious education (which has been increasingly deemphasized in public schools) is absent from his discussion. Yet, the first two-hundred years of our history were dominated by claims to religious development, and indeed, the growth of parochial schools today demonstrates a revived interest. This is not to mention a continuous history of seminaries, denominational colleges, publication of religious tracts, Sunday schools, and Catholic day schools, television programming, etc. The claims of equality and religious development, which I suggest as examples of additional possible claims of purpose, do share elements with the original four claims, but also include new dimensions lacking in these additional claims.

After discussing Butts's identification of educational purposes, Engel proceeds to assess each claim and demonstrates that the original four claims could be reduced to two claims--that is, for Engel, the claims of individual development and social efficiency are subsumed under the claims of vocational competence and academic discipline. How successful is he in this endeavor? Let us look at how effectively he argues for the reduction of social efficiency to vocational competency first and then to academic discipline second. When speaking of social efficiency, he describes it as separable into two notions: first, that education is a means "for sorting students into slots and providing workers for the social/industrial machinery." He later continues, "In so far as education is aimed at producing individuals who can fit into some niche in the social and industrial fabric, it tends toward a purpose of vocational competence. To put it another way, education for social control reduces to vocationalism." Subsuming this first notion of social efficiency under the category of vocationalism presents no problem; however, when Engel seeks to describe the second notion of social efficiency as fitting under the rubric of an academic discipline, a question does arise. In speaking of this second notion he says, "The development of those skills and values which are intended to develop socially responsible participants or citizens has some relation to an emphasis on academic discipline," and later, he continues, "If one construes academic discipline as an instrument for responsible citizenship, the tension between the two is diminished." The bottom line for Engel is that academic discipline and vocationalism describe the center of debate over educational purpose. But how can this be, if he has not equated the notion of social efficiency with academic discipline, yet maintains that they are consistent? That is, the second notion of social efficiency (when referring to citizens' development) has not been reduced fully to academic discipline. My contention is that Engel here has not successfully reduced Butts's four claims to two.

Finally, Engel's argument can be strengthened by further clarification and development of a few key terms and statements: (1) Engel tells us that the claims of vocationalism and academic discipline are "competing." Since he does not explain how he arrives at this assertion, might we suppose that these two claims are not opposed at all but are, rather, complementary? For example, with changing demands placed on a worker for new knowledge by a rapidly evolving, complex society, a worker needs not only the education offered by vocational and professional schools, but also that offered by academic disciplines. (2) Similarly, the term "to empower" requires additional clarification. This term is central throughout Engel's analysis, and when recapitulating his argument he concludes with the statement, "the test of claims comes from their ability to empower individuals." However, the particular meaning of this term is only implied in the text, not emplicitly described. (3) When summarizing his argument concerning academic discipline, he states, "It is neither a credible nor tenable goal for those who cannot afford it." Shortly thereafter, he says, "At present . . . vocationalism is the prevelant mood, perhaps most significantly in higher education." Based on the discription in the text, I find little evidence that warrants either of these statements. Furthermore, with regard to the former statement, if we look at what academic discipline returns to society, it can, in fact, be deemed the cheapest form of education: Surely, it is cheaper to provide a student with a history text than with a typewriter.

David Engel presents a valuable analysis of educational purposes in which he assesses how they relate to the question of social power. However, as I have suggested here, he should extend the argument to include claims in addition to those identified by Freeman Butts. Engel expands our understanding with new insights when he attempts to reduce all claims of educational purpose to two--a task in which he is not wholly successful. And lastly, his argument would have been enhanced by an early clarification of key terms, and his final statements would have been strengthened by elaboration in his analysis.

PART II

PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE GENERAL SESSIONS

THE LOGIC AND MORALS OF LABELING

Burnham Terrell
University of Minnesota

My distinguished colleague, that remarkable polymath, Paul Meehl, Regents Professor of Psychology, Psychiatric Research, Philosophy, and Law at the University of Minnesota, and a practicing psychotherapist to boot, has published a collection of his articles pertaining to psychodiagnosis, under that title.[1] At the end of the volume he included a previously unpublished piece he called "Why I Do Not Attend Case Conferences." Plainly not just an *apologia* for the neglect of case conferences, but something of an intellectual catharsis as well, the body of it is a series of mordant comments on the canons and principles that in Meehl's experience have governed such conferences. One of them is: *Reward everything--gold and garbage alike.* Meehl's expansion of this theme begins:

> The tradition of extreme tenderness in psychiatry and psychology reflects our "therapeutic attitude" and contrasts with that of scholars in fields like philosophy or law, where a dumb argument is *called* a dumb argument, and he who makes a dumb argument can expect to be slapped down by his peers.[2]

Meehl is decrying the sort of thing that goes on in the "helping profession" of clinical psychology and psychiatric care, not in education. I suspect his remarks might well be extended to other "helping professions" as well, of which education is surely one. Strident polemic is not unknown in discussions of educational theory and practice, particularly at a distance. But when it comes down to the level of face to face discussion at a case conference, the contrast with the pugnacious confrontations of scholars in disciplines such as law and philosophy is likely to be large. A dumb argument is rarely *called* a dumb argument, and the promulgators of dumb arguments rarely get their comeuppances.

I happen to delight in the contentious dialectic of philosophy, in the exchange and critique of argument. I admit to having taken pleasure on occasion in calling a dumb argument a dumb argument. At one point in this presentation I shall be doing just that. However, I believe that philosophy can be a helping profession, too. I recall to you John Locke's modest ambition "to be employed as an under-laborer in clearing the ground a little" for those master-builders in the commonwealth of learning "whose mighty designs, in advancing the sciences, will leave lasting monuments to the admiration of posterity." To be sure, a large part of this modest under-laboring and ground-clearing turns out to consist in "removing some of the rubbish that lies in the way to knowledge" and "[breaking in] upon the sanctuary of vanity and ignorance."[3] I shall try to be even more modest than Locke, as I believe I have ample right to be. Instead of focussing my efforts on the rubbish, I would rather lay before you some of the problems with which educators are rightly concerned and to which philosophers might helpfully devote their own attention. I shall even attempt to put some of the rubbish in a favorable light as potential building material.

From among the many areas of educational theory and practice in which I suggest that philosophers could be helpful, I choose to discuss one that has received much attention in recent years--the area of special education, and especially special learning disabilities. I do so not only because of the recent proliferation of research and writing, of legislation and programming in the area. There are certain logical and epistemological aspects that lend it philosophical interest in its own right. Further, it is the area in which my wife is professionally active. I owe my interest in the problems of special education and much of my limited knowledge about them to her. A

secondary, but also important debt I should acknowledge to valuable discussions with my colleague in the Department of Psychoeducational Studies, Professor Maynard Reynolds, with whom I was briefly associated on a part-time basis in the Minnesota Institute for Research in Learning Disabilities.

The expression "special learning disabilities" is itself a label. There are alternatives to it, and there are a number of more determinate labels that fall under it.[4] I have chosen to use it because it is the label that figures in federal legislation.[5] The most important piece of federal legislation in this area has been the *Education for All Handicapped Children Act* of 1975 (P.L. 94-142). Included in it was the following specification:

> The term "children with specific learning disabilities means those children who have a disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or using language, spoken or written, which disorder may manifest itself in imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, write, spell, or do mathematical calculations. Such disorders include such conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury, minimal brain disfunction, dyslexia, and developmental aphasia. Such term does not include children who have learning problems which are primarily the result of visual, hearing, or motor handicaps, of mental retardation, of emotional disturbance, or environmental, cultural or economic disadvantage.[6]

Both the substance and the criteria of application of this definition have proved controversial.

The background to this and other pieces of legislation included much discussion and debate among interested professionals and administrators. The meaning attached to the term "children with specific learning disabilities" by P.L. 94-142 essentially reproduces a definition that had been proposed in 1968 by a National Advisory Committee on Handicapped Children chaired by Dr. Samuel Kirk of the University of Illinois at Champaign/Urbana.[7] Dr. Kirk had proposed the expression "specific learning disabilities" in 1962[8] to replace previous terminology that had been perceived as too closely tied to medical terminology, especially such expressions as minimal brain damage, minimal brain dysfunction, or minimal neurological dysfunction. One suspects that he must have perceived the language of P.L. 94-142 as reactionary. Where his committee had used the expression "*which have been referred to* as perceptual handicaps, brain injury," and so on,[9] the Congress put it that "such disorders *include* such conditions as perceptual handicaps, brain injury," and so on. Dr. Kirk's intention had been to move away from the "medical" labels with the concept of some sort of neurophysiological damage or dysfunction built into them and to steer understanding in the direction of more psychologically oriented conceptual bases.[10] Such subtleties were not reflected in the legislated definition.

As the decade proceeded, it became evident that Kirk's emphasis on psychological process was itself being challenged by another perspective, the sociological or "ecological" model. The rivalry between the psychological approach and the ecological perspective has considerably more significance for the issues concerning "labeling" than did the earlier rivalry between the medical and the psychological.

One recent influential exponent of the ecological model in the classification and interpretation of educational problems has been Dr. Nicholas Hobbs. Dr. Hobbs had been director of a government-sponsored project on a scale far greater than the committee chaired by Dr. Kirk, one known as the Project on the Classification of Exceptional Children. This involved the cooperative

effort of ten government agencies, with an Interagency Task Force, a National Advisory Council, and several hundred scholars.[11] The effort had been evoked by Elliott Richardson, then Secretary of HEW, who expressed his concern with *labeling*:

> The inappropriate labeling of children as *delinquent, retarded, hyperkinetic, mentally ill, emotionally disturbed,* and other classifications has serious consequences for the child. Although experts in the various disciplines concerned with exceptional children have undertaken useful studies on appropriate diagnostic procedures and practices, there is lacking sufficient dissemination of their findings to professionals and the public and nationwide standardization and enforcement of appropriate diagnostic procedures.[12]

It is clear that Secretary Richardson was not calling into question the use of classificatory labels per se, but their *mis*application. As he saw it, the purpose of the project was to tighten up the procedures and criteria used in determining their correct application.

The Classification Project's principal outcome was the publication, in 1975, of *The Futures of Children*,[13] of which Hobbs himself was the primary author, and two volumes of reports titled *Issues in the Classification of Children*,[14] edited by him. Hobbs and his collaborators revealed anxieties about the use of labels and classification that clearly went deeper than Richardson's concern about accuracy in their application. *The Journal of Learning Disabilities* published a special report on the project and its published results under the heading: "Labeling: It Hurts More Than It Helps."[15] The author, Sharland Trotter, perceives the volumes as an indictment of labeling itself and ascribes to Nicholas Hobbs the opinion that labels have become a national problem. He sums up the opinion of the authors of *The Futures of Children* in these terms: "Not surprisingly, the authors conclude that the negative consequences of labeling outweigh the intended benefits."[16] It is against the background of such radical doubts about classification and labels themselves that the so-called "ecological strategy" must be understood. It is intended to provide a new and morally unobjectionable direction free of the moral, and even logical vices of labeling.

There are at least three distinguishable movements in the revolt against category labels, diagnostic labels, deficiency or disability labels, stigmatizing labels, to cite just the main epithets that have been mustered in the rhetorical struggles. (Labels can be categorized and labeled, too, it turns out.) The least radical of them can be understood best as a continuation of the development I described above--the movement from the medical emphasis on organic dysfunction to Kirk's emphasis on psychological (especially perceptual) disorders as the explanation of difficulties in learning. Reference to brain injury or minimal brain dysfunction and to "disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes involved in understanding or in using spoken or written language" are equally concerned with explanation or diagnosis of the learning problem. Both locate the source of the child's learning problem in the child. This first strain in the ecological model maintains the essentially diagnostic perspective, but ascribes the child's problems to interaction with something in his/her surroundings, family, social, cultural, educational background and relationships.

Hobbs's own account of the ecological model does not fit the diagnostic interpretation I have just given. Here is a statement of his position and program published last year:

> An ecologically oriented system is a classification system that is based on the service needs of children and their immediate worlds. In thinking about classification, one must always ask what the purpose of it is. Traditional

> classification categories serve clinical purposes reasonably well but are very poor as a basis for a service delivery system. If we say we want a classification system for the purpose of improving the delivery of services, we come out with quite a different scheme.[17]

Classification is to be determined not by differential diagnosis but by delivery of different services.

Hobbs's interest in "an ecologically oriented classification system," one concerned with delivery of services, forces us to recognize that we are now confronted with two distinct orientations in the construction of classification systems. One orientation is diagnostic, the other programmatic. There is a third orientation. Perhaps because it is so fundamental and obvious, it receives less attention. More often than not, it is conflated with one of the other two in discussions of definition and classification and the interpretation of labels. I mean an orientation that concerns itself with the identification and classification of children's problems as they present themselves in the educational process. The logic of explanation requires something to be explained; no *explicans* without an *explicandum*. The logic of delivery of services requires something for which those services are intended to provide a remedy. It should be possible and useful to consider problems as they present themselves without tying them immediately to a diagnostic or a programmatic approach to classification. I shall call it a presentative approach.

There will be more than one way to classify presentatively. The definition stated in P.L. 94-142 and cited earlier combines reference to "disorder in one or more of the basic psychological processes" with reference to the *manifestations* of the disorder in "imperfect ability to listen, think, speak, read, etc." Presumably the "manifestations" are the problems that *present* themselves in school performance, while the disorder in a basic psychological process is the diagnostic component that defines the essence of the presented problem. Disability can be thought of as a manifestation of a more fundamental disorder. Yet "imperfect ability" can also be construed as having explanatory force of its own in relation to actual performance. Furthermore, it seems to identify the manifest problem as an imperfection in the child. Consequently, classification of problems by reference to *disability* in one sort of academic task as distinct from another has been attacked. Disability labels are alleged to be unsuitable for purely descriptive, i.e., presentative classification, which should be *behavioral*. They are also accused of emphasizing problems in the child, whereas emphasis should be placed on systemic problems within the whole educational ecology. As an alternative to thinking of the presentative orientation to classification in terms of the child's manifest problems in school tasks, it is probably better to think in terms of the problems the child's performance in school tasks present to school personnel so as to call for their identification, understanding, and/or treatment.

A still more radical ecological position than either the diagnostic or the programmatic versions of it I described above relates that approach to a presentative interpretation of classification and labels. The child, it is claimed, does not present problems to the school. It is the other way around: The school imposes the problems on the child. All of the problematic features of the child's performance are "schoologenic." This is *not* a *diagnostic* claim, as the ascription of responsibility for learning problems to bad teaching ("dyspedogogia") would be. It is a matter of logical analysis, although the distinction is rarely drawn.

An article by Leon Eisenberg in the current *Bulletin of the Orton Society*[18] illustrates both the issue and the dangers of confusing the diagnostic with its logical interpretation. Eisenberg's prudent use of quotation marks in the following passage as well as his ensuing discussion suggest that

he is at least alert to the confusion, but the dangers are obvious, especially to someone who is not distracted by the scare value of the quotes:

> reading disability is, in a sense, "schoologenic" that is, "caused" by schooling . . . . it "disappears" as a social characteristic of the individual when the school-leaving age is attained. The slow learner is "lost" in the general population because no official institution counts which adults can and cannot master academic tasks.[19]

On such an understanding, the child's performance does not as such constitute any problem and would not in its own right be labeled and classified in terms of some problem category. The problem does not become a problem except within a context that confers the status of problem on it. We may say that the problem is presented by the child, but only while he/she remains in a problem-determining context. Remove the child and the problem is no more. Not just no longer present, but gone, evaporated, nonexistent.

The disappearance of the problem may sound like the same thing as the resolution of it, but they are quite different. Remove a child from a famine region to one in which food is plentiful and you have solved the problem of starvation for that child. But what we are now considering has nothing to do with *meeting* a child's needs in a new context, rather with changing the scene to one in which the needs do not count as problems to be met.

The distinction between the solution and the suspension of a problem, because it is relatively gross and obvious, threatens to obscure a more subtle consideration that has deeper significance for the understanding of labels and classifications of learning problems. To illustrate it, I shall use a fable in which the educational ecosystem is radically different from our own. Suppose that, many years in the future, the energy crisis has assumed proportions hardly conceivable nowadays. There are no automobiles, no buses, no trains; horses are available only to a privileged few. Ordinary common people can get about only on their own two feet. Treadmills and contrivances using pedals are the only sources of mechanical energy. The school curriculum has responded to the demands of the time. Educators still speak of the three R's as the foundations of the basic curriculum. What they mean, however, is the three *runnings*, the jog, the lope, and the sprint. On being informed by historians of education that at one time the basic curriculum had consisted of three R's--but that they were reading, writing, and arithmetic--the most erudite educational theorists have indignantly rejected such a representation as self-contradictory. *Curriculum*, they say, *means running*. Look it up. Logic *requires* that the essential content of anything called a curriculum must be running, in its diverse forms.

Other theorists, more pragmatically inclined, pointed out that competence in running, together with the ancillary accomplishments acquired in the schools, was a necessary condition of success in life. Without it, the individual's vocational opportunities would be narrowly circumscribed to those within a short distance of his or her residence. Managerial responsibility for anything but the most elementary one-site operation would be out of the question. And so on.

As one would expect, not all schoolchildren progressed at the same pace in the curriculum. Of those children who fell behind, some suffered from a general asthenia that impeded their progress in just about all curricular activities. Others suffered from more specific handicaps. Some were taliped, some hypoglycemic; a few apparently had genetically related subluxations, and so on. All such conditions were diagnosable. Remedial measures were available in many cases. All such children were assigned to a special curriculum conducted by trained specialists in remedial running.

There were a significant and perplexing number of children, however, who did not maintain normal progress in running, yet who presented no easily identifiable physical disorder. They were more prone to stumble than pupils who were making normal progress. It was also noted that they frequently went through brief periods of swinging their arms counter to the normal coordination of arm and leg movement when running. A variety of neuropathological etiologies for the condition were proposed, but without success in validating them with any significant degree of independent evidence. The condition came to be known just as *dyscurria*, subject to somewhat ambiguous interpretation. Sometimes it was understood to mean nothing more than an unexplained retardation in learning to run. Others included in its interpretation the notion of an as yet unspecified diagnosis or etiology. Dyscurric children were those who exhibited a mild to severe retardation in learning to run because of some disorder in the physiological, neurological, or psychological processes involved in running, especially those that have to do with muscular coordination. The nature of the disorder was difficult to specify; it was too subtle or minimal to be unequivocally susceptible of discovery by ordinary techniques. About all the specification you could get would be that it was, well, *dyscurrogenic*.

I wish to pick out for special attention one particular set of research studies on dyscurric children, studies that revealed an interesting but not yet entirely understood correlation with other phenomena not so directly connected with school achievement. The metabolic constraints on the curriculum required that work in the schoolground be interrupted at least once each morning and afternoon. During these recess periods, the children were permitted to leave the schoolground to go into the reading room in the school building itself. The time was free for them to amuse themselves as they pleased. They had all learned to read, from their parents or older siblings or friends in the neighborhood, and most of them chose to read a book or a magazine. Sometimes several of them would organize a game of spelldown. There were scrabble games and crossword puzzle books available as well. Often these would be in use right up until a bell rang to indicate the time to return to the classes outside in the schoolground.

(In time, the interest taken in the recreational activities had an impact on the curriculum, over the protests of the logical purists. A passion for spelling competitions spread through society. Organized competition between professional teams provided lucrative employment for the most gifted spellers and entertainment for millions on Monday night television. There was a Superbee each year, matching the two top teams. In response, many insitutions of learning created departments of lexical education offering courses in beginning and advanced orthographics and were represented by their own teams. To be sure, such programs were required to be self-supporting.)

The studies in which I am interested were undertaken to compare performance in the basic curricular disciplines with performance in recreational activities, particularly reading. Dyscurric children, the research revealed, tend to be inferior readers!

Interestingly enough, such a discovery actually has been made by studies conducted in our own time. Our contemporaries, however, do not report their results in the same way. They report a significant correlation between specific reading retardation, or dyslexia, and clumsiness and poor coordination.[20] I extrapolate from poor coordination to inferior running ability in order to be able to report, using contemporary labels, that dyslexic children tend to be inferior runners.

One way of understanding the point of my fable is that a child's problems are logically schoologenic, as we have seen. I now suggest that such an interpretation is not quite right. It is true that problems are determined by interaction between the individual and the demands of the circumstances. Whether a problem exists and whether it is conceived as a learning problem are two

different questions, however. The sort of child I have described, slow to run and slow to read, has two real problems, whether in our own society or the society of my fable. Which problem will cause the child the greater misery, if either does, will be a matter of individual psychology, parental pressures, peer pressures, and no doubt many other changing and variable factors. However, the aims and content of the school's curriculum will determine which problem will be identified as an *educational* or *learning* problem, will be ministered to by educational specialists, and will be labeled and studied by theorists in special education. What is schoologenic is not so much the problem or problems presented by a child but educators' systematic practice (responding to the cultural imperatives of their society as reflected in the school's curriculum) of devising labels and classificatory schemes concerned with success and failure in mastering school tasks. We come closer to the truth of the matter if we use the quoting device to form expressions in the metalanguage rather than following Eisenberg in using scare quotes as cautionary devices. It is not that a learning *disability*, say dyslexia, is in a *peculiar* sense "schoologenic," "caused" by the school. The fact is that the *expressions* "learning disability" and "dyslexia" are (*literally*) schoologenic, products of the school and its curricular emphases.

The most radical exponents of a new educational strategy profess to cast aside classification, labels, categories altogether. Their objection is not to special features of certain kinds of labels--diagnostic labels, deficiency labels, for example--but to labels themselves and the categories they purport to represent. Their reasons do not lie in logical considerations about the dependence of a classification of learning problems on the school curriculum such as we have just been examining. They extend the implications of the ecological model in a different direction, with its roots in Hobbs's emphasis on the importance of delivery of services. Delivery of educational services, the argument runs, is a transaction, a practical transaction between unique individuals.[21] Classes, categories, and labels representing them have no place in such a transaction, since they are concerned with generalities, abstractions.

The slogan "Each child is a unique individual, and so should not be treated as a member of a class"[22] is a blunt and unadorned statement of the argument with which we are now concerned. Traces of the same sort of objection, more subtly expressed, are not unknown in the professional literature. I shall not cite any specific writers, since I submit that the argument--from the unique individuality of the student (and the teacher, for that matter) to the conclusion that classification and category labels must be renounced--is a *very dumb* argument. There, I have said it, but I prefer not to be about the business of slapping anyone down. How dumb an argument it is can be shown by a simple dialectical refutation. As any respectable ontologist knows, the category designated "unique individual" is an extremely abstract category. According to some, it is the most general class of all, the universal class that encompasses everything whatsoever. The renunciation of classes, category labels, then, requires the renunciation of the premise itself. The claim that each child is a unique individual is not permitted. For that matter, "child" itself is a category label. Furthermore, it seems to be a deficiency label that confers an inferior status on those to whom it applies.[23] Therefore the subject of the argument's premise is even more objectionable than its predicate.

Having *called* the argument a dumb argument and *proved* it to be a dumb argument, I now add that the proof is really a dumb rejoinder. It is nothing but typical logicians' flim-flam. We should be able to do better, to be more helpful, not just show off our dialectical muscle with a knockdown argument. We might point out first of all that while there is a logical distinction between individuals and classes, there is no enmity between them. It is the business of individuals to belong to classes and of classes to include individuals. They constitute a complementary pair, not a conflicting one. To be a unique individual is to be a member of a class, indeed to be a member of

many classes, at least one of which must be a unit class with just that unique individual as its unique member. Such talk might make the objector more comfortable about admitting a role for classification in the delivery of educational services, even conceived as a transaction between unique individuals. I think it would still miss the point.

The fallacy that underlies the entire discussion, I believe, is not really an error about individuals and classes, but a fallacy of accent. We read the conclusion as "The child, a unique individual, should not be treated as a member of a *class*." Read it differently: "The child, a unique individual, should not be treated as a member of *a* class." Neglecting the null class and unit classes (which rarely if ever insinuate themselves into discussions of education), classes are general, shared by a number of individuals. Each of the individuals is indeed unique, to be sure, but not considered just as a member of that one shared class. Furthermore, according to Aristotle,

> all substance appears to signify what is individual[24] [and] The most distinctive mark of substance appears to be that, while remaining numerically one and the same, it is capable of admitting contrary qualities . . . . The same individual person is at one time white, at another black, at one time warm, at another cold, at one time good, at another bad.[25]

It is the individual, remaining one and the same, who changes, first belonging to a class determined by one property as intension then to a class determined by a contrary property. To accommodate change in the unique individual--and change is surely what the delivery of educational services aims to accomplish--we are required to consider the individual as a member of not just one class, but as actually a member of one, potentially a member of another.

However logically proper it may be, the psychological impact of a category label may well threaten the treatment of the individual child as an *individual* member of a class. Most of the objections raised against labeling as such by the authors of the section on labeling from the perspective of the schools in V. II of *Issues in the Classification of Children*[26] can be understood in terms of the label's distorting effect on the logic of individuals and classes. They consider nine morally objectionable consequences of labeling.[27] Only six of them seem to arise from inherent features of the labeling process itself, more precisely, from purportedly natural psychological responses to a label. I shall restrict my attention to these six, consequently. The first of them is that a label generates a tendency to overgeneralize. Overgeneralizing can be understood as neglect of other intensions, or other class memberships, not signified by the label, that distinguish each of the individual children so labeled from each of the others. That is, do not treat each individual child in the class as belonging to just *that* class. Another negative result, the same authors cite, we might call logical inertia. Labels are alleged to be self-sustaining. The attachment of the label, with its fixed and constant intension, inhibits our perception of the individual as belonging first to one class, then another, while remaining one and the same. The meaning of the label becomes part of the unchanging individuality, a category mistake that stultifies the flexibility essential to delivery of educational services to effect change. With the logical inertia goes a consequent practical inertia, then. The other three negative consequences of labeling as such seem to me to have their roots in those I have mentioned so far, in overgeneralization and logical and practical inertia. The reification of the label's intention as part of the individual can generate a tendency to explain the problems presented by the child's performance in terms of a fixed nature in the child (by way of logical inertia and reification). This in turn encourages abandonment or displacement of responsibility. Finally, stereotyping is clearly a consequence of overgeneralization plus logical inertia.

There is no denying that such consequences can psychologically arise from the use of category labels. The practical conclusion to be drawn need not, however, be the abandonment of classification and labels--which would mean the abandonment of theoretical understanding, and hence of prognosis and prevention--areas which are as important as the delivery of services to children who present with learning problems. We need a better understanding of how words work and of how, on occasion, we permit our intelligence to be bewitched by our language. Perhaps if there were closer cooperation between philosophers of education and practical educators engaged in the delivery of educational services, if philosophers would make the effort to be helpful at the level of concrete educational problems, there could be an effective resistance to psychological consequences of the use of labels representing general theoretical or practical concepts and categories without sacrificing their advantages.

NOTES

[1]Paul E. Meehl, *Psychodiagnosis* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1973; Paperback edition in the Norton Library, New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 1977).

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 228 (Norton Library edition).

[3]John Locke, *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*, Epistle to the Reader vol. 1, p. 14 (A. Campbell Fraser edition, Oxford: The Claredon Press, 1894; reprinted, New York: Dover Publications, 1959).

[4]W.M. Cruickshank, "Some Issues Facing the Field of Learning Disability," *Journal of Learning Disabilities* vol. 5, no. 7 (Aug.-Sept. 1972). Cruickshank observes (p. 382) that "in the literature more than 40 English terms have been used which essentially all apply to the same child." See also W.J. Bush and K.W. Waugh, *Diagnosing Learning Disabilities* (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Co., 1975), chap. 1, for a particularly detailed account of diverse systems of classification into subcategories.

[5]B.R. Gearheart, *Learning Disabilities: Educational Strategies* (St. Louis, Missouri: C.V. Mosby Co., 1977), Appendix A, "The Role of the Federal Government in the Development of Learning Disability Programs," pp. 227-233.

[6]*Federal Register* (Dec. 29, 1977), p. 65083. (This is not the earliest, but it is the most useful citation, since it occurs in the context of the definitive regulations for implementation of P.L. 94-142 as promulgated by the U.S. Office of Education.)

[7]Special Education for Handicapped Children: First Annual Report of the National Advisory Committee on Handicapped Children (Washington, DC: Office of Education, Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, January 1968), p. 14.

[8]S.A. Kirk and B. Bateman, "Diagnosis and Remediation of Learning Disabilities," *Exceptional Children* vol. 29, no. 2 (October 1962). The effective impact of Kirk's proposal was generated by his presentation, during the year following, of "Behavioral diagnosis and remediation of learning disabilities," published in vol. 1 of *Proceedings of the Annual Meeting of the Conference on Exploration into the Problems of the Perceptually Handicapped Child*, (Chicago: Fund for the Perceptually Handicapped, 1963).

[9]Italics in this and the following quotation are my own.

[10]Gearheart, *Learning Disabilities: Educational Strategies*, p. 11.

[11]Nicholas Hobbs, *The Futures of Children* (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1975), Preface.

[12]*Ibid.*, quoted on p. ix.

[13]See n. 11. Hobbs's work is subtitled, "Report of the Project on the Classification of Children."

[14]Nicholas Hobbs, (gen. ed.), *Issues in the Classification of Children*, 2 vols. (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass Publishers, 1975).

[15]Sharland Trotter, "Labeling: It Hurts More Than It Helps," *Journal of Learning Disabilities* vol. 8, no. 3 (March 1975), (Reprinted from the *APA Monitor* vol. 6, no. 1), pp. 191-193.

[16]*Ibid.*, p. 191.

[17]"Classification Options" [A transcript of an interview with Dr. Hobbs], *Exceptional Children* vol. 44, no. 7 (April 1978), p. 495.

[18]Leon Eisenberg, "Reading Disorders: Strategies for Recognition and Management," *Bulletin of the Orton Society* vol. XXIX (1979), pp. 39-55.

[19]*Ibid.*, p. 39.

[20]M. Rutter and W. Yule, "The Concept of Specific Reading Retardation," *Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry* vol. 16, pp. 181-197. Cited in Richard L. Masland, "Subgroups in Dyslexia: Issues of Definition," *Bulletin of the Orton Society* vol. XXIX, pp. 23-30. Masland comments (p. 24), "the specific reading retardation was . . . more commonly associated with constructional difficulties and poor coordination."

[21]This argument is often reinforced by the notion that the relationship of teacher to pupil should be a loving or caring one, which unlike "mere liking" must be grounded in the unique individuality of each pupil.

[22]In "Why I Do Not Attend Case Conferences," Meehl considers the error of "Failing to understand probability logic as applied to the single case . . . the vulgar error [being] the cliché that 'we aren't dealing with groups, we are dealing with this individual case'" (p. 234). Meehl's cliché, expressing an all too familiar attitude toward probabilities, is near relative to the slogan I cite, but despite the greater importance and complexity of the application of probability logic to the single case, I have chosen to neglect such problems in favor of the more "philosophical" perplexities about ontology and *praxis*.

[23]Cf. Francis Schrag, "The Child in the Moral Order," *Philosophy* vol. 52, no. 200 (April 1977), pp. 167-177.

[24]Aristotle, *Categories*, 3b.

[25]*Ibid.*, 4a.

[26]Herbert Goldstein, Claudia Arkell, S.C. Ashcroft, Oliver L. Hurley, M. Stephen Lilly, "Schools," *Issues in the Classification of Children* vol. II, chap. 16, pp. 4-61.

[27]*Ibid.*, pp. 42-52. See also chap. 2 in *The Futures of Children*, "Social Functions of Categories and Labels."

ON THE LOGIC AND MORALS OF LABELING

Ira S. Steinberg
Oberlin College

Response to Terrell

To say that one should not label people, if this is to be taken literally, is to say something that is virtually unintelligible. I say 'virtually' to mark the distinction between classifying and labeling. So long as one operates nonverbally, one may classify without using labels. One must classify. One cannot recognize objects as objects, or people as people, or individuals as the individuals they are without classification. Logically, to distinguish one individual m from the rest of the set N is to classify N into two subsets. The criteria by which one distinguishes an individual from the rest of a group are criteria of classification. To describe an individual as an individual requires that those criteria have names, that characteristics have labels. Unless we are to turn ourselves into nonliterate mutes, we shall find it impossible to avoid labeling people if we are to think of them at all, individually or collectively. A policy which is unintelligible, a policy which cannot possibly be put into practice, is not a policy on which rational people might reasonably disagree. So much for the literal interpretation of the general injunction against labeling people.

The topic of discussion before us is the matter of labeling in Special Education.' If we want to do a better job of suiting our educational efforts to the particular learning characteristics of individuals, we had better be clear about just what particular learning characteristics there are. If we want to help students to overcome particular learning disabilities, we must determine just what learning disabilities there are. If we want to assist students to surmount particular environmental obstacles to learning, we had better find out what environmental obstacles there are to what sorts of learning. And, if we are to prescribe educational services appropriate to specific individual students, we had better be able to characterize students specifically in terms of learning characteristics, disabilities, environmental obstacles, or otherwise justify the application to them of the specific services proposed. In so doing, we label students in these respects.

That appears to be unavoidable. To identify someone as better able to benefit from special program X rather than the regular program is to label him as someone for whom the regular program is less appropriate than the special program. If the special program is for people who cannot perform up to the expectations of the regular program in some respects, then the label will be viewed, by some people, at least, as demeaning or derogatory. If the special program is for people for whom the regular program is too easy, or insufficiently challenging, then the label will be viewed by some people as indicating superiority which they take to be a bad thing in bringing up children in the schools of a democratic society.

It is logically inconsistent to advocate the educational treatment of students as individuals and the elimination of educational classification in schooling. It is unlikely in practice that the labeling of children for purposes of differential educational treatment can be entirely freed of controversy. Whether the controversy is legitimate or not depends on considerations other than classifying or labeling.

Some people construe educational difficulties as deficiencies in human worth, and some people construe educational superiority as a claim or pretension to social preference. The problem, then, is to devise a means whereby children may be classified in some ways relevant to the provision of appropriate educational services without labeling.

Here the philosopher may be of special assistance. I quote Dean George Berkeley. This is from the *Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge*. He said,

> Upon the whole, I am inclined to think that the far greater part, if not all, of those difficulties which have hitherto amused philosophers, and blocked up the way to knowledge, are entirely owing to ourselves. We have first raised a dust, and then complain we cannot see.

Given the philosopher's special talent for raising the dust, we should be able to devise a means for the educational classification of students that defies description even by those so classified or by their parents. Only then can the issue of labeling in education finally be laid to rest. Short of that, what is needed is not so much the special knowledge of the philosopher but a critical eye with regard to the development of educational diagnosis and treatment, a sense for the difference between substance and semblance in educational research, sensitivity to the social and political implications of school policy and practice, and luck.

SPECIAL EDUCATION: A DISCIPLINE IN NEED

Wietse de Hoop
Eastern Kentucky University

Response to Terrell

Professor Burnham Terrell's intriguing thoughts evoked in me feelings of delight and of frustration. To give the good news first: I was delighted that he confirmed a need which I have mentioned to my colleagues in special education in informal discussions and correspondence (i.e., the need for philosophical analysis of our discipline, its language, purpose, methods, and so on) as a necessary condition for an orderly development. This need was expressed in *Exceptional Children* by Dr. Leo Connor of Teachers College, Columbia University, in 1968 when he was President of the Council for Exceptional Children:

> Special Education seems to lack philosophers within its ranks. An analysis of its own being, a framework of its techniques, and a theory of its objectives might distinguish its place in the realm of knowledge and spur available energies into meaningful channels of study and action.

A 1971 article in *Exceptional Children* by Professor Calvin Nelson and Leo Schmidt of the California State College at Fullerton pleaded for the application of philosophical analysis to certain specific issues in special education. Their plea included the following statement:

> Unless we deal systematically with the basic epistemological problems which confront us as special educators, we must content ourselves with studies which will be at best tenuous, and at worst trivial.

Regretfully, these and other voices presently seem to have much in common with the well-known voice in the desert. In all fairness to special education, I might perhaps add that forces outside the discipline, including philosophy, did not exactly rush in to offer assistance. Professor Burnham Terrell's assistance in clearing up some of the "debris," as he modestly calls it, is therefore most welcome.

That was the good news. Now for the frustration part. There are two reasons for my frustration. The first one relates to this seemingly inherent problem of contemporary academia: lack of time. I would like to have several hours to react to the many excellent points that were made, but, alas, it cannot be. The second reason relates to the content of the presentation. Disagreement, it seems to me, tends to electrify dialectical exchange. However, I find little, if anything, to disagree with. In other words, from my perspective, he did not use any "dumb" arguments. The perceptive listener might conclude that the second reason for my frustration preempts the first one. If there is nothing to disagree with, why not just say "Amen" and sit down? There, however, you meet an entirely new problem, which I can sum up in a brief sentence: You just don't know me! Frustrations aside, let me address some of the specifics of the problem of labels and labeling in special education.

As Professor Burnham Terrell indicated, much of the substance in labeling originated in medicine. Even some of the categories of special education which preceded the concern of medicine, such as the deaf and blind, were redefined in medical terms. Following publication of the first edition of Alfred Binet's intelligence test in 1905, several labels of exceptionality were redefined or extended by the discipline of psychology.

The label "learning disability," for instance, is a direct descendant of Alfred Strauss's label "exogenous mental retardation." Strauss, a psychologist as well as neurologist and psychiatrist, simply used that label to indicate a configuration of *behaviors* which *resembled* the behaviors of persons medically labeled as brain damaged. Thus we began to create a category of people who, medically speaking, were not brain damaged, but whose behavioral constellation suggested that they *ought* to have brain damage.

The generation of investigators that followed Strauss gradually transformed the offspring sired by mental retardation and borne to term by cerebral palsy into the presently hot category: "learning disabled." These investigators were mostly psychologists, including Dr. Samuel Kirk and Dr. Nicholas Hobbs. The key issue here is to recognize that, regardless of the investigators' educational leanings, the individual child-with-problems remained the unit of investigation and concern. This is not to say that these scientists had no eye for the environmental aspects of the individual's problems. Nationally respected persons such as Cronbach and Sarason expressed the need for diagnosis and evaluation of the home environment as well as the child. From its inception the Re-Ed model created by Nicholas Hobbs included systematic influence on the family environment in educational treatment of emotionally disturbed children. However, the concerns still originated on the basis of the problems of the individual pupil.

In keeping with the tenor of the times, the position of these scientists acquired the label of "ecological approaches." Their thrust was, and is, to deal with the child having problems in a therapeutic fashion up to the point where the child can cope with the normal educational program. In order to reach that point, adjustments are requested of the "regular" school and its programs. The approach, then, is psychological in nature, and educational modifications are needed in order that the psychological assistance may bear fruit. I happen to believe that this approach is internally inconsistent.

Professor Burnham Terrell proposed that the ecological approach be extended to include what he calls a "presentative" approach. This approach, if I understand it correctly, assumes as the basis for educational decisions a logical analysis of the child's *performance* within the context of the school. This performance analysis will provide a prescription for educational management of the instructional problems posed by the presence of the child having the problem. The improvement over the present situation is apparent to anyone who is familiar with the *practice* of special education placement. Observation of the problem may be followed by a referral, which again is followed by a process variously labeled diagnosis, evaluation, or assessment. The process includes some substance and some paraphernalia. The paraphernalia deal mostly with such items as input from the teacher and may even include a report of the school social worker and the principal. The substance consists of the reports on a number of standardized and informal testing instruments. Notwithstanding good intentions, it is often a mumbo jumbo of poorly conceived operations and overlapping and inadequately modeled instrumentation, mostly in a code which is cryptic to the average teacher, which provides relatively little *instructionally* relevant information. What is needed is a presentative analysis of the present diagnostic process and a consequent reformulation of the process into an instructional context which could be interpreted by teachers in terms of the problem presented by a given pupil. It is quite true that a number of teachers do exactly what Professor Burnham Terrell suggests, but on an intuitive basis. However, systematizing and operationalizing the presentative approach would result in adding a number of tricks to the teacher's bag of skills. These skills might be specific to the techniques of teaching the child with a problem. Or they might pertain to the managerial aspects of locating individuals with needed skills and calibrating the instructional program according to the need. Dr. Evelyn Deno, one of Professor Burnham Terrell's colleagues at the University of Minnesota, developed a model for just these kinds of modifications. Clearly, the presentative model would necessitate a redefinition of the roles of teacher preparation and certification. The major impact, however, would be to make the labeling problem

an educational problem and therefore continue the shift in definition of the labels from medicine (via psychology) to education. If labeling is a "schoologenic" problem, it is only logical that solutions should also be schoologenic.

I am troubled, though, by one aspect mentioned by Dr. Leon Eisenberg in the quotation included in Professor Burnham Terrell's presentation. Let me repeat the specific statement: "The slow learner is 'lost' in the general population because no official institution counts which adults can and cannot master academic tasks." Here, I believe, lies the crux of the schoologenicity of the problem: the relevance of education as a preparation for adult life.

I wish to mention here the research done by Dr. Oliver Kolstoe of the University of Northern Colorado, published in 1961. Comparing socially successful adults who had pupils of special classes for educable mentally retarded with unsucessful ones, he found, and I quote:

> It is quite evident that above a 2.5 grade level in reading achievement, the actual achievement level does not appear critical. Furthermore, the presence of an ancillary handicap does not seem to be important if the other desirable characteristics are present.

The work of Kolstoe and many others suggests that the roots of the labeling problem go beyond the instructional mission of the school to the role of the school as a social institution. And, indeed, the extensive work of Dr. Jane Mercer of the University of California at Riverside demonstrated that the school is only one, albeit an important one, of a number of institutions which label school children. She included medical facilities, law enforcement, mental health facilities, religious organizations, and several others who participated on a regular basis in the labeling enterprise.

I would like to approach the labeling problem from a different perspective. Professor Burnham Terrell's delightful fable regarding an entirely different ecosystem provides a most appropriate starting point for this approach. Let us operationalize that system once again by specifying what that system would do to education. It would appear that at least eleven (11) operations might take place. First, the system would generate certain tools and commodities, treadmills and the like. Second, it would give rise to certain sociological institutions, such as education, partly in response to the demands emanating from the by then commonly used tools and such. Third, it would develop value systems, such as the three R's of running. These value systems would be used both as the basis and the rationale for the choice of appropriate curriculum content in education. Fourth, the ecosystem would proceed to develop taxonomies of appropriate curriculum content, such as the various classifications of running. Fifth, it would then equate success in life with success in the completion of the valued curriculum entities. Sixth, it would establish norms for that success, thereby implying that some running performances are better than some other running or nonrunning performances. By implication, again, these norms would enable the ecosystem to distinguish between "good" and "bad" performers, which would in time create a category of deviates. Seventh, the ecosystem would invent labels for those deviates, which would necessitate the development of diagnostic methods in order to apply the invented labels to individuals. This again would obviate item eight, the need to create one or more explanatory systems to account for the individuals labeled. Ninth, the ecosystem would then conclude that politically expedient items should be added to the curriculum in order to illustrate the concern of the "good" performers for their less fortunate brethren. Step ten is, I am sure, entirely predictable to all of us: The ecosystem would institute systematic research in order to explicate the hidden associations between its educational institutions and the existence of labeled groups of deviates. Item eleven may not be quite as obvious. The system would neglect to question the appropriateness of its own assumptions. At this point I would like to say goodbye to the by now developmentally advanced ecosystem of the three R's of running: the jog, the lope, and the sprint.

Let us now turn to our own system which presently, at least, might be more concerned with the I, the D, and the P, meaning the inflation, the oil, and the presidential hopefuls. The labeling process, it would seem, is rooted in society's assumptions underlying its institution of education. "Schoologenicity" of labeling problems would then be a conditioned response to the beliefs underlying these assumptions. The moral problems which are inherent in the labeling problem could be addressed in terms of the underlying assumptions. I would like to highlight a few of these. The choice is arbitrary, based primarily on the arguments which I have encountered most often in my contacts with all kinds of educators. The first one was already mentioned earlier: It is assumed that the content of the curriculum offers adequate preparation for adult survival in our society. If the labeled are to be an integral part of the school system, as the courts and the law say they will, the curriculum needs to be revised relative to the preparation for adult status in our society.

The second assumption concerns the present organization of the school plant and of the instructional management. Thorough revision of both these aspects of education will be necessary if the handicapped label is going to disappear. A great deal of flexibility will be needed in the process of making these revisions.

The third assumption is that placement of pupils on the basis of chronological age represents the best means of grouping pupils in terms of developmental levels or readiness levels. Developmental studies of the labeled tell us differently.

Assumption four concerns the widespread conviction among educators that "opportunity for all," this hallowed slogan of our institution of education, means equal time and equal money for all. And the last one I wish to mention is the assumption that our present system of teacher preparation, regular as well as special, provides sufficient preparation for the various labor divisions within the public school. If this were so, the labeling problem would long since have been a general educational concern, rather than one of specific disciplines.

Labels can appear and disappear almost instantly. In 1973 the American Association on Mental Deficiency decided to change the definition of mental retardation by accepting a norm of two standard deviations below the mean of a standardized individual intelligence test as the upper limit, rather than one standard deviation. This decision reduced the incidence from sixteen percent to three percent of the test population. When the first draft of the proposed regulations for Public Law 94-142 came out, it was proposed by federal decree that the number of learning disabled pupils be restricted to two percent of the school population. If the definition should be changed by omitting the restrictions on social and economic conditions, the incidence of mental retardation might again be reduced. Such a change would not be at all unusual, as may be gleaned from the amendments to the Vocational Education Act, where the labels include the "handicapped" and "disadvantaged."

There are, as I see it, two alternatives. We can continue to label as is done presently, leave our present school system intact, and create a different, separate school system for those labeled. This is the alternative pursued in some European countries. The other alternative is the one presently pursued in this country: Integrate those labeled into the existing public school system. If that is to be done properly, it will necessitate a redefinition of our entire practice of schooling.

PART III

PAPERS DELIVERED AT THE CONCURRENT SESSIONS

FORMS OF EXTRINSIC VALUE:
A REPORT OF WORK IN PROGRESS

Philip G. Smith
Indiana University

Introduction

Over the years, one of the problems connected with valuational decisions in education has been that philosophers have operated with too small a catalogue of forms or types of value. For example, in justifiying curriculum decisions (Should we have push-pin or poetry?) the typical analysis and discussion have proceeded in terms of an intrinsic-instrumental dichotomy: Does push-pin or poetry have the greater intrinsic value? For what ends will one or the other be the better means? And which is the more appropriate question in an educational context?

On other occasions I have attempted to set forth a more adequate conception of the forms or structures of valuing,[1] so I shall not repeat all of that on this occasion. I'll try to reduce much of it to a few rather sketchy paragraphs in order to get on with "a progress report" on the problem that now interests me--i.e., Are there additional forms of extrinsic value and additional evaluational structures not accounted for by my theory as so far developed?

The Present Theory

Following Dewey's lead that value is basically a verb rather than a noun, I have mapped the logical structure of some of the ways or forms that the valuing activity takes. Retaining the basic distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic values, I have said that to value intrinsically is to value something for its own sake, in its own terms, and without regard for its actual or potential relations (including comparison) to anything else. To value extrinsically is to value something *because of* its actual or potential relations to other valued things. While such valuing does not literally create value, it does result in valuation claims. When I prize, cherish, or care for something, I claim (and believe) that *it* has value. When I value it just for its own sake, I claim that it has intrinsic value; when I value something because of its relations to other values, I claim that it has extrinsic value. Such valuational claims cry out for evaluation--i.e., for an assessment of value that will support or refute the claim and thus warrant the use of *evaluational terms* such as valuable (disvaluable), good (bad), right (wrong).

Under this conception I have identified three basically different forms of extrinsic value. They are: exemplified value,[2] instrumental value, and contributory value. Since these are contingent relationships, a claim that something has one or more of these forms of extrinsic value can, in principle, be supported or refuted by observation and empirical inquiry. Consequently, these three forms of extrinsic valuing provide the structures for evaluation in education or elsewhere. But to speak of evaluating intrinsic value (or to use evaluational terms in relation to intrinsic value) is a category mistake. For "to evaluate" means to *assess* merit, worth, or value, while a claim that something has intrinsic value is a claim based upon the object as a unique particular. As such, it is incomparable, incommensurable, and invaluable--its value is beyond assessment. For example, if in a moral context I value someone as a distinct individual person, then all comparisons or assessments are odious. In another context, of course--say, when interviewing a job applicant--an evaluation of the person's skills or other merits becomes relevant.

Now there are two kinds of more or less critical activities that can be engaged in while valuing intrinsically, and they are sometimes confused with evaluation. The first is phenomenological description or analysis. One may certainly examine a valued object without changing focus to extrinsic relations. One may describe the object, and its internal structure and form, noting what features make it attractive, interesting, and why it is that it arouses

prizing or cherishing. This may be done for one's own elucidation or to help someone else join in in an appreciation of the object. This kind of activity is, no doubt, of critical importance in developing what Harry Broudy has called "enlightened cherishing," yet it is not *evaluation*; it does not result in an assessment of the intrinsic value of the object.

A second kind of critical activity in relation to valuing (either intrinsically or extrinsically) is introspection; it may result in a carefully considered preference rating. But this is clearly not an assessment of the value *of the object*. It is a comparison of one's reaction to the object with one's reaction to other valued objects. To call a preference rating an evaluation is such a clear case of confusion that one might suppose it would seldom happen among educated or enlightened persons. Yet it is very common in higher education. The results of a survey of students' perceptions, preferences, and feelings of satisfaction (or dissatisfaction) in reaction to an instructor's performance is routinely called "student evaluation of teaching."

Now, of course, there is a true form of evaluation that is appropriate *in relation to* one's intrinsic valuing. One may assess the value of having or engaging in such a valuing experience. What is the contributory value of the experience to the realization of one's conception of the good life? What is its instrumental value in relation to certain goals? These are important questions, but again, they are clearly not directed toward an assessment of the *intrinsic* value of an object.

Subcategories and Species of Extrinsic Values

Now, since extrinsic value is concerned with the actual or potential contingent relationships that may exist among or between valued objects, it seems that, in principle, there may be as many different forms of extrinsic value as there are different forms of relation. For example, the three forms of extrinsic value that I have studied--i.e., exemplified value, instrumental value, and contributory value--are, rather obviously, merely names for three categories or groups of relationship. In other words, there are several species within each genus. A major subdivision of exemplified value is customarily made in terms of exemplified goodness in contrast to exemplified rightness. Or, in the context of evaluation, this is the difference between an evaluation according to standards, or according to rules. But since there are, from a structural standpoint, many different kinds of standards and more than one kind of rule, further distinctions and species identification might prove useful in evaluations and perhaps even in our understanding of the problem of relating "right" and "good."

Certainly there are many forms of instrumental value other than a direct cause-effect relation. This is why teaching may be viewed as an instrumental activity without assuming that teaching is typically a direct cause of learning. Actually, since instrumental value is the name, in a valuational context, for utility or usefulness, it seems likely that a catalogue of types of instrumental value could be quite extensive. In education, for example, a wide variety of actions as well as physical objects and materials are valued as instruments for the guiding and facilitating of learning. And, of course, there are also conceptual instruments, such as objectives or "ends in view," and some interesting psychological categories, such as motivating, reinforcing, inhibiting, and asking probing questions. Perhaps a major subcategory of instrumental value should be called "heuristics," and even a provisional catalogue of types might contribute to a more imaginative design for our present rather dismal studies of so-called teaching effectiveness.

In considering contributory value, C.I. Lewis has differentiated two types,[3] the contribution of an earlier experience to a later one--and this, of course, is extremely important in relation to the problem of sequencing of instructional materials and procedures--and the contribution of part to whole in a more organic form of relationship. Or as Lewis speaks of it, "in the manner of ingredients in a temporal *Gestalt*."[4] He points out that

"working and achieving, for example, is a different total experience than achieving without working, and it is not a foregone conclusion that the effortless attainment of desire will be on the whole more satisfying."[5] There may, of course, be other forms of contributory value, but as yet I've made no progress at all on this possibility. For awhile I thought that what Dewey called "consummatory value" might be another distinct type. But now I don't believe that it is.

Are There Additional Major Categories?

Now the question arises, Are there categories of extrinsic value in addition to the three major types, exemplified, instrumental, and contributory? The answer is, I think, "Yes." One category I have uncovered might be called "symbolic value." There is a wide range of things that we prize and hold dear, not primarily for their own sake but because they stand for or symbolize important values. Such things include simple mementos that we keep around for years and, of course, religious and patriotic symbols that we protect and care for. An important subcategory of symbolic value appears to be ceremonial values. I believe there are some interesting questions about the proper and improper use of ceremony in education and about the deliberate and incidental fostering of symbolic valuing. And this is true whether we are thinking of "education" as the development of individual intellect, character, and personality, or thinking of "education" as the socio-political institution that we support for the purpose of enculturation, credentialing, and many other purposes with rather tenuous (or at least unclear) relationships to education in the first sense.

Phil Phenix once said, somewhere, that our society is becoming "ceremonially impoverished." In a sense this is probably true, and it may be one more result of the general iconoclastic erosion of respect and confidence that is evident in our society at the present time. On the other hand, a current fad in education is so-called "multicultural education" which involves a neutral and uncritical acceptance of such a wide range of cultural values (and the objects and behaviors that symbolize them) that what may be happening is a kind of symbol inflation--and hence, a devaluation of symbolic values--resulting in "ceremonial trivialization."

In any event, the question arises as to how symbolic value may be evaluated. Since this form of valuing is clearly extrinsic--that is, the object is valued *because of* its relationship to other values--I had expected that here would be another distinct evaluational structure. But to my surprise I can't find any satisfactory meaning for the expression "an assessment of symbolic value." In this respect, symbolic value seems to be more like intrinsic value than like exemplified, instrumental, or contributory values.

Now, of course, this doesn't mean that an object of symbolic value cannot be evaluated *at all*, (and the same is true of objects of intrinsic value). But it does seem that in order to evaluate, one must shift the mode to one or more of the three forms of extrinsic value that we have identified as evaluational structures. For example, if we could create a set of quality standards either for symbols in general or for various kinds of symbols, then any given instance of an object thought to have symbolic value could be assessed (evaluated) to determine whether it's a good one of its kind. We could examine it to see to what extent it exemplifies or embodies the standards. And we could, of course, assess the instrumental value of the symbol in relation to some valued end such as social cohesion, obedience, the development of moral sensitivity or a sense of duty, or the like. Finally, we might assess its contributory value in relation to a life style or some other valued whole. But none of these would be a direct assessment of its symbolic value.

Now why is it that the relation of symbol to what is symbolized does not seem to be an appropriate structure for evaluation? The relation is contingent in the sense that there is surely no a priori or logical necessity that a shell found on the beach should become a valued memento of a wonderful vacation or

that a flag of stars and stripes should become a symbol of the U.S.A.! Perhaps we have here another example of the blend of analytic and synthetic that we find in dictionary definitions: on the one hand they are reports of how words are used and, hence, empirical claims; on the other hand the content of the report is a relation of meanings and, hence, analytic. One may explicate the meaning of a word, but it doesn't seem to make much sense to speak of evaluating it.

So it seems that the symbolizing relation is arbitrary (in the nonpejorative sense) and the symbolic value of some objects is private or esoteric, while the symbolic value of other objects is a matter of social-cultural convention. In either case, while the symbolic value accrues *because of* the object's relation to some other value, that relationship, once established, is analytic and, hence, the value it bestows on an object follows logically from this relationship and therefore is not a proper item for evaluation. And this is not because the object is invaluable but because a logical relationship defies the old dictum that whatever exists must exist in some amount. If each of three conclusions follows logically from its premises, it really doesn't make sense to ask which is the most logical.

So it seems that while I have found an additional distinctive category or genus of extrinsic values, I have not found a new evaluative structure. And that is what I really have been looking for.

NOTES

[1]Philip G. Smith, "Knowledge and Values," *Educational Theory*, vol. 26, no. 1, Winter 1976, pp. 29-39.

------, "Structure of Evaluations in Education" A.E.R.A. San Francisco, 1976 (available through ERIC).

------, "Valuing and Value Education," *Proceedings*, 28th Annual meeting, Southwestern Philosophy of Education Society, (University of Oklahoma, Normon, 1978) pp. 215-221.

------, "Evaluation and Practical Deliberations in Education, *Educational Theory*, vol. 28, no. 4, 1978, pp. 279-285.

[2]To refer to exemplified value as "inherent value," as is frequently done, is a linguistic mistake--or at least an infelicitous manner of speaking--for "inherent" is too easily confused with "intrinsic" and this tends to promote equivocation or even a breakdown of the basic intrinsic-extrinsic distinction.

[3]C.I. Lewis, *An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation* (LaSalle, IL: Open Court, 1946) chapter V.

[4]*Ibid.*, p. 487.

[5]*Ibid.*

INTRINSIC AND SYMBOLIC VALUE

Jerome Popp
Southern Illinois University

Response to Smith

In the spirit of Smith's progress report, I want to probe several areas of value theory which are related to Phil's theory and yet are not widely discussed in philosophy of education. The questions I want to raise have concerned me for some time; moreover, I have not found the philosophical literature outside of philosophy of education very helpful in answering them. Phil's work on values gives both an importance to these questions as well as a framework in which I can try to express them.

Intrinsic Values

In talk about values, one regularly encounters two distinctions. The intrinsic-extrinsic distinction is familiar and runs through both philosophy and psychology (for example, intrinsic versus extrinsic reinforcement). This distinction makes a good deal more sense when it is used in tandem with the valuing-evaluating distinction, as Phil uses it. In other words, when these two distinctions are logically multiplied, four categories are generated:

	Intrinsic	Extrinsic
Valuing	A	B
Evaluating	C	D

Phil, I think, will not be likely to draw this diagram for, on his view, category C is empty. More strongly, it is a "category mistake" to speak of intrinsic evaluation. Phenomenological descriptions and preference ratings are not evaluations.

The gambit would be to show that intrinsic evaluation is possible by doing it, i.e., by demonstrating such a method. R.S. Peters tries this gambit by appeal to his transcendental logic. Note that in intrinsic evaluation, one has to show or determine the worth of something, the evaluandum,[1] by methods which do not invoke other values. That is, the premises, assumptions, or evaluans may not contain value claims. Peters seems to think that justifications or justifying activities are somehow depreciated if viewed solely in extrinsic terms. He claims that justification, in effect, is self-justifying, for one cannot question its value without accepting its value. This fact, says Peters, reveals its intrinsic value.[2] Whether or not this is a valid example, I shall leave to the discussion.

I want to examine category A more directly. Phil says, "When I value [something] just for its own sake, I claim that it has intrinsic value; when I value something because of its relations to other values, I claim that it has extrinsic value." The word "because" indicates that a relationship exists between the thing valued and some other noncontested valuings. So it seems that to value extrinsically is to know of or be aware of the value one has for things related. But what of the category A valuings? Is it the case that to value something in and of itself allows those cases where one values something without having considered why it is valued? The above "because" renders extrinsic valuing the product of a certain kind of affective-cognitive state. What I want to know is the nature of the alternative affective-cognitive state involved in intrinsic valuing.

If a person is in a primitive or unreflective state of valuing, then one cannot distinguish between intrinsic and extrinsic valuing. He or she just values something. To get to the "because," one must reflect or analyze. This reflection is not evaluation, though it may well lead to evaluating. Some why-questions may not produce evaluational inquiry. Counseling is a ready example. But what is it to have analyzed nonevaluatively and to value something in and of itself? Does this mean that it could not be successfully analyzed, as may be the case with posthypnotic suggestion or enculturation? In other words, does category A exist through deference to the nonreflective state of some persons, or does it constitute an affective-cognitive state on a par with the "because" of extrinsic valuing? Is it rational to value intrinsically as a result of a competent analysis of this valuing? Or is intrinsically as a result of a competent analysis of this valuing? Or is intrinsic valuing actual or potential fanaticism? We seem to have two options open to us: intrinsic valuing is of a lower affective-cognitive nature than extrinsic valuing, or they are both on the same affective-cognitive level. The former actually negates the distinction. The latter possibility raises further questions.

If there is a valuing which is parallel to extrinsic valuing but not extrinsic valuing, then what are the candidates (for category A)? Enter the hedonists. The hedonic tone is claimed to be valued, and yet not valued for any "becauses." The hedonic tone, subsequent to seriously asking why-questions, is valued "in and of itself." Note that this claim is not an evaluative one. It is, thus, drawn from psychological hedonism rather than philosophical hedonism.

Perhaps in the discussion this may be discussed and clarified. But if we hold that the hedonist conception of intrinsic valuing has substance, its consequences for educational theory must be considered.

Symbolic Value

Smith's method seems to be to examine the possible relationships which can exist in category B (i.e., how something may be related valuationally to something else) and then to look for an evaluational structure for each of the distinct types of relationships found. He finds a type of symbolic valuing but is unable to isolate a distinct structure. What is different here from his previous work is his concern for a specific thing valued (what I am calling the evaluandum). I wonder why symbols are singled out from all of the things people value. Why not emotions or human relationships? Put differently, Smith seems now to have become concerned with specific objects of value whereas before he was only concerned with general forms of value. I see no difficulty for his theory or problem for value theorists in the fact that symbols are open to the three types of evaluation Smith has already identified and do not possess their own evaluational structure.

The concept of symbol and its relationship to value theory is a very important consideration and one I hope that the majority of philosophers of education will not continue to ignore. I think that it is an embarrassment to philosophy of education that, with only a few exceptions, we have given over, as it were, the "affective domain" to educational psychology and, what is worse, to the plethora of hack "humanists" who seek to "humanize education." It is precisely on this point of symbolic value where I see a clear entry for philosphers into the "affective domain."

My former colleague F.T. Villemain has begun an investigation of the nature of the aesthetic in order to better identify what he calls "qualitative intelligence." This inquiry has led him to separate two kinds of symbols. Thus, he writes,

> By qualities is meant . . . a type of representation that stands for the relationships and things related that yield the distinctive character of the representation.

> These qualitative symbols constitute the subject matter of the aesthetic. They differ from a second type of symbol, those of discursive knowledge . . . by virtue of the fact that the latter are not used to represent the relations and things related that yield the distinctiveness, the quality of the symbol itself.[3]

All symbols represent, but aesthetic or qualitative symbols present that which they represent. This seems to be some of what is involved in sea shells' symbolic value.

I bring this theory up because I want to claim that any theory of symbolic value must provide us with an account of the nature of aesthetic symbols. Moreover, I think that Smith is right in pursuing the nature of as well as the structure for symbolic valuing and evaluation. A sound theory of symbolic value would help us not only to make some sense out of the phenomenon of multicultural education but also to begin to realize Dewey's conception of the aesthetic as the "incomparable organ of instruction."

NOTES

[1]I use the terms "evaluandum" and "evaluans" in value theory because they nicely parallel "explanandum" and "explanans" of the explanation literature.

[2]"The Justification of Education" in R.S. Peters (ed.) *Philosophy of Education* (1973).

[3]F.T. Villemain, "Methodological Inquiry into Aesthetic Subject Matter," *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society* (1961) p. 164.

THE EDUCATION OF THE WHOLE PERSON

William E. Andersen
University of Sydney, Australia

Wholes, Persons, and Education

Among those who pride themselves upon their clarity and specificity, talk of "wholes" often seems mysterious, even obscurantist, and the position is scarcely improved by the holist's recital of the brief credo "the whole is more than the sum of its parts." The question arises: What is the nature of the "more," and how can ordinary, as distinct from, say, poetic people or mystics, discern it?

Move the discussion so that it applies to *persons*, however, and we are less skeptical. For we all know some individuals who seem to be lacking something, which, had it been present, would have facilitated what we can only call "whole functioning." Not only do we have this knowledge, but it worries us, and there are times when we suspect that a different education might have supplied what was lacking. Thus, X functions superbly in exams, but shrinks from ordinary, nonintellectual social contacts; Y has a magnificent physique, but "cannot put two words together"; or Z, though knowing what others mean when they describe certain actions as "wrong," is in the position where such knowledge has no "bite" on his own behavior, where there seems to be no bridge from ethical knowledge to ethical deeds.

(a) Persons as Wholes

Even the above examples of social or intellectual or moral crippling, however, bring us immediately to one of the important issues facing those who discuss the whole functioning of persons: Is personal wholeness best viewed as the *subtraction* of some significant area of functioning, so that the whole would be restored by its reintroduction? In answer, it must be immediately obvious that if X overcomes his nonsocial tendencies, this may be expected to broaden the base for his academic functioning, to deepen his conception of himself and much else; the effect on the person is by no means restricted to the remedying of an observed deficiency. And so, manifestly, for Y and Z. In dealing with persons, then, "subtraction" and "addition" would seem to indicate a grossly inadequate approach. Can we discover a better one?

The alternative available is to give a straightforward, rather than a mysterious interpretation of the adage "the whole is more than the sum of its parts," at any rate where persons are concerned. We commence this with the general claim that a person is caught up, or implicated in many relations with elements of the universe, whether these be external or within himself.

Where such elements are internal, *the whole, the "personality"[2] is that complex comprising the parts in their relation to each other.* The "more," then, is the system or pattern within which both the elements and their interrelations function or figure. Strictly, the whole is *different from*, as distinct from *more than* the sum of its parts, in that it displays their interconnection rather than only their summation.

Where the elements to which he is related are *external* to the person, he as a whole, will typically function as a part of one or more wider systems.[3] On this basis it might well be pointed out that it would therefore be appropriate to locate whole-functioning only in the wider system and not in the person. However, one has only to entertain the claim (made on the basis of plausible criteria) that the person should, for his own development, participate actively in at least systems A, B, and C, to conclude that not to do so would mean not only weakening A, B, and C to some degree (say, the community

or the physical environment), but also depriving himself of something valuable that otherwise he would have experienced. In general terms the person will thus suffer a restriction of his "agency," which is equivalent to being "less than whole-functioning" in the light of the norms involved.[4] In these circumstances, *the whole, the "agent,"*[5] *is that complex comprising the roles*[6] *he has assumed* (while participating in external systems) *in their relation to each other, as they make demands on his resources.*

In addition to the cases where the elements in question are clearly internal or external, there exists a special case where the relations in which the person is implicated are, in a sense, both external and internal to himself. This is so where the relation concerned is best termed a "relationship," and is typically entered into with one other person.[7] It is external, because the other person is "out there"; it is internal, however, because the relationship is a shared experience, common, and therefore internal to both partners. In these circumstances the *whole*, the *"self,"*[8] *is a complex comprising*:

(i) *A's significant attributes*, demonstrated by him, and reflected back descriptively to him by B,[9] in the course of the relationship;

and

(ii) *B's significant expectations of A*, accepted by A as normative during the relationship;

in their relation to each other, as they modify his current self-image, and make demands on his resources.

We have now depicted the person as at least *three* wholes. Is this an embarrassment? By no means. *The* whole is often *architecturally* conceived, requiring that at one time all elements dovetail within one pattern. By contrast we resort to a whole *orchestrally* conceived which (a) is capable of an almost endless variety of internal relationships, as determined by the musical score; (b) is still a whole when some members are silent; and (c) can function within wider wholes such as ballet or opera.[10]

(b) Perceiving Persons as Wholes

For either the empirical investigation, or the theoretical conceptualization of persons, some epistemological stance is presupposed. Thus the one who is considering personality may be an external observer or theorist, and for purposes of this discussion we shall call his stance "objective." Hence the possibility of an objective account of personality.[11] Or the one thus viewing personality may be the person himself; and we shall call this a "subjective" stance, and his account subjective also. Or the one contemplating personality might be someone sharing a personal relationship with the person in question, and we shall call this an "intersubjective" stance and account.[12]

In parallel, there exist the possibilities of objective, subjective, and intersubjective standpoints in giving an account of agency--the person as involved in active participation in the external world. It must be admitted, however, that the intersubjective would tend to collapse, in this case, into the subjective; except perhaps for the advantage of B in yielding perspective to the way roles call upon A's personal resources, either knitting or scattering them.

In the case of "self," however, the parallel is incomplete. The case where A views himself as a whole *in an unmediated way* has already been covered in this classification by a subjective approach to personality. Hence, there seems little point in speaking of a subjective approach to "self," when grasp of the latter has been defined as an intersubjective achievement. This intersubjective stance, of course, yields a view of the whole, mediated by relation-

ship with another. Finally it appears difficult to imagine some external observation of a person's grasp of his own attributes and ideals, as this has been gained in a relationship. However, because theoreticians have discussed such reverberative processes, it must be allowed to remain as a possibility.[13]

(c) Education and Persons as Wholes

Before examining some theories in which persons are featured as wholes, there are several further issues which will assist first in mounting a critique and then in constructing a position.

First, it should now be made explicit, arising from our discussion of persons as wholes, that instead of a model in which "wholeness" is achieved by the addition of parts or influences or by the prevention of subtraction, we need one in which significant factors interpenetrate and thus severally permeate or transform the whole.

Secondly, when looking at any model of the person as a whole, there would need to be a reasonable *positive* elaboration given, since, as we have seen, there is a richness and complexity apparent in human experience and behavior which must be accounted for. Any model must do reasonable justice to these within its own discriminations.

Finally, since our discussion of the whole person is being undertaken with a view to usefulness in education, any model, in addition to being sufficiently elaborated, should be constructed in such a way that its connections with *educational* processes either are demonstrated or could be implied. Should its focus or implications lie elsewhere, it would scarcely qualify.

Some Models of the Whole Person

There follow a brief display and discussion of some influential models of the whole person. While examples do not seem to be available for all eight of the possible epistemological stances discerned in (b) above, it is possible to illustrate approaches at least to each of "personality," "agency," and "self" by reference to one or more models.[14]

(a) Some Models of Personality

In considering the internal relations of the person, conceptualized *from without*, one could scarcely omit reference to the work of Freud, particularly in his characterization of personality as superego, ego, and id, the ego being belabored from "above" and "below," while struggling to control the direction of the psyche. Mindful of the three normative principles laid down in (c), there is no doubt, of course, that Freud's model was dynamic, allowing for constant interpenetration among the psychic structures he posited. There is a good reason to doubt, however, that he contributed any elaborated *positive* formulation of wholeness. One could recall his ideal of "the genital man"[15] or his adage "where id was, there shall ego be," indicating the desirability, in the long run, of human rationality; but these would provide but sketchy hints for the educational theorist.[16] Freud's insights, encompassing though they were from some angles, concerned the psyche of individual patients in isolation from their wider social involvement,[17] who were viewed also predominantly from the perspective of their sexual development, yielding a view of personality dominated by its relation to *one* of its constituent elements.

Kurt Lewin is to be considered now because of his expressed commitment to the notion of holism in personality. For him personality comprised "regions" representing dispositions having their own reservoir of drive or tension, some being more centered or fundamental, while others were more peripheral and easily changed. The "boundaries" between regions, however, could easily become "barriers," blocking both the normal interpenetration of regions and the interfacilitation of speed and direction in the whole. In spite of assembling a promising set of constructs and also, applying a topological mathematics to

personality study, Lewin postulated no *general* features of personhood, so that what constituted regions would vary with the particular person and problem encountered. His genuis lay in visualizing the progressive differentiation of personality and the dynamic of internal relationships. His elaboration was rich in form but lacking in content. As an educational model, therefore, it would be difficult to visualize as a goal.

We turn next to the internal relations of the person's experience, conceptualized *from within*, under the categories "cognitive," "affective," and "conative."[18] Such an approach merits discussion in that this "trinity" has proved resilient in the face of much critical work in philosophical psychology and also because it permeates, in fact, an extraordinary amount of our current evaluations of educational procedures and outcomes. The form of many of these evaluations is that some educational program *lacks* either cognitive, or affective, or conative impact on those exposed to it. However, one of our self-imposed requirements is to eschew such negative approaches and to fashion positive formulations. Thus predominantly cognitive activities would need to be so devised that affective elements and relevant planning or action would be integral to them. Similarly, predominantly affective activities probably already have a "cognitive core" built into them, for, except in extreme psychopathology, it is experientially impossible *just* to feel; we normally feel *about* something, of which we have some minimal cognitive grasp.[19] And again it does not seem initially difficult for affective experiences to issue into some kind of expressive, and hence conative activity. Finally activities which are "actions," and not merely ritualistic "performance" or conditioned "behavior," already presuppose some knowledge of the situation and its point, as well as some underlying affect--a point driven home strongly by W.H. Kilpatrick, in 1919, when he launched the "project" or "activity" programs. Thus, by turning the members of our "trinity" in upon each other, it would seem that relatively more effort and imagination is needed if we are to provide for the whole personality, in transforming work that is predominantly cognitive, than in the other cases.[20] The procedure, however, would seem to have yielded, in outline, a curriculum approach richer than one which requires, loosely, that some of each modality figure somewhere in the mix which is the educational cake.

(b) Models of Human Agency

Agency refers to the whole person as he engages in his relations with the other significant external entities in his radius of life, rather than avoiding, neglecting, or being prevented from such engagement. A whole literature has grown out of this understanding of personal wholeness, centering around the notion of "depersonalization," "dehumanization," or "alienation." Strictly speaking it explores what happens to the person when one or another kind of relation is either severed or attenuated[21] (the subtraction model once again) and educational responsibility enters this picture when educational agencies or bureaucracies build such severance or attenuation into their institutions and programs.

We shall examine in detail but one view of agency: the Marxist view, and this largely because of its lively contribution to theory of education on the contemporary scene. In line with the kinds of views already mentioned, Marxism objects to the severance of the worker from the product of his work that occurs in industrial capitalism, and also the worker's isolation from normal human relations with his fellow workers, because of bourgeois individualism--the term for these separations being "alienation." Positively there must be an appropriate incorporation of the individual within the socialist mode of production, an appropriate relating of him with fellow workers within socialist relations of production, and a willing embrace, on his part, of the Marxist world-view. Basically, this task will be accomplished only by a transformation of society as a whole--at which time both "the ensemble of social relations,"[22] which is desirable, and the appropriate educational arrangements will follow and dovetail. But ahead of that time educational strategies will emphasize participation in collectivities and immersion in Marxist thought. Thus Anton Makarenko, the paragon of Soviet educators, said:

> The man in whom the collective perspective prevails over the personal is already the soviet type of man.[23]

As with Lewin in the sphere of relations internal to personality, so with Marx in the sphere of social relations; there is an expressed commitment to holism. However, since the human essence is the ensemble of social relations (see footnote 22) what seems to remain as the role of the whole person is to express this solidarity faithfully. The deficiency in this is that, contrary to most other sociological and anthropological views of agency, the Marxist view might betray a grave neglect of what Makarenko called the "personal" perspective (arising from the subjective elements or modalities of personality) and also of interpersonal factors. Within a theory devoted to the macroscopic forces operating in humanity, there may also be room for an adequate theory of the microcosm, the person. It would seem that contemporary Marxists must frame such if they are to avoid the possible alienation between collective man on the one hand, and a proper development of self and personality, on the other.

(c) A Model of the Self

In the theorizing of Carl Rogers, we have a view of the "fully functioning person"[24] in which the good life consists in being "inwardly free to move in any direction."[25] Such freedom includes openness to one's experience, trustfulness of one's organism,[26] the formulation of one's own canons of evaluation, and willingness to see oneself in the process of change. All experiences should be accepted into one consistent, integrated system. It will be granted that Rogers has here elaborated a positive model of a person, but it is denied that we could fashion from its attributes any principles *of educational procedure* which were not still heavily therapeutic. The ideal person, who understands his own behavior from what we have called an intersubjective standpoint,[27] has here been described positively, but the procedures used to bring about his emergence are seen only in problem-removing terms.[28] There are no positive "building" strategies apart from these.[29]

Rogers's doctrine manifestly stands at the opposite pole from that of Marxism, in that for him "every individual exists in a continually changing world of experience *of which he is the center*,"[30] and the "the best vantage point for understanding behavior is from the internal frame of reference of the individual himself."[31] To claim, however, that the individual is central, even in a world of *experience* (that is, that *his* consistency or integration has absolute priority) is to ignore the possible impact upon him of his agency in external systems. His very experience of others may induce him, not to jettison or sacrifice his perspectives, but to centre them elsewhere, say, in a community perspective, allowing, for the moment, some degree of chaos in self-understanding. And this is said, in balance with the corresponding point aimed at Marxism, that effective participation and agency within external systems require adequate subjective resources, including personal self-awareness, to draw upon.

(d) The Hebrew View

The last model to be dealt with emerges from the Hebrew perspective on persons, as discerned in the Old and New Testaments. For the Old Testament the world-view consists of a series of interlocking systems: the universe, with the Creator central, but in mutual relationship with his creatures, both human beings and "nature"; the nation, tribe, clan, and "house"[32] as solidary groupings, each with a corporate distinctiveness in which its members share; and finally the system or whole which is the person, functioning actively within the other systems mentioned.

The person is *nefesh*: a needy human being, firmly rooted in the created order, whose nature is to act with respect to God and other humans and to be acted upon by them. The person is also *basar*: a flesh-being who, as such, affirms his commonness and also his psychic unity with others--a being geared

for personal fellowship and communication with his fellows. He is *leb*, functioning thoughtfully or feelingly or purposefully. (Note some correspondence here with the traditional "trinity" of experiential modalities.) Further, as *leb*, the central focus of his being is turned in a certain direction, i.e., with a specifiable orientation. And he is *ruach*: a wind-being or breath-being, subject to being moved (particularly towards God), a total being sensitive to the promptings of his Creator and geared to interrelate with all the elements of God's creation.

What of this admittedly unsystematic approach? It is not an account of *parts*; so much has become utterly plain to scholars in the last half-century.[33] It appears to say: the person is a whole of this kind; again a whole of that kind; and yet of a further kind; look once, now look again! The result? Although there is much resilience in the Hebrew use of these terms, it seems clear that the concepts[34] are used *relative to particular contexts of personal involvement*, and hence in step with our "orchestral" view.

The tendency is taken even further by Paul, the early Christian missionary and writer of New Testament letters. Writing strongly in the tradition of Hebrew anthropology, Paul freely appropriated Greek words for his own purposes. His use of *nous* and *kardia* is particularly instructive. *Nous* is both a thinking and morally responsible person who determines, in the light of God's messages to him, how he will act in the world. *Kardia* is used almost synonymously, except that affective factors figure somewhat more explicitly.[35] In improvising this model, Paul has put together a picture of a person who selects, from those available, the facets needed to respond to the situation or challenge at hand. Paul then has fused these facets together under appropriate terms. Thus *nous-kardia* is basically intersubjective, reflecting the relationship between God and the inmost "self" of the believer; it indicates clearly the involvement of knowing, feeling, and acting, though emphasizing the cognitive; and it issues in moral agency.

Our brief survey of "the Hebrew view" has, I think, thrown up several features of importance for this stage of the discussion. First, it acknowledges generously a many-faceted view of human personhood, inclusive, at least, of the three "wholes" and of the basic epistemological emphases derived earlier.[36] But, as a further major contribution, it emphasizes the relevance for the shaping of a view of the whole person, not only of the broad situation confronting the person but of the life-view within which both person and situation assume significance.

Educating the Whole Person

Little has been said to this point about the nature of education; nor even now can we attempt an extended account. In any case the analytic version offered by R.S. Peters during the 60s and 70s is well-known among philosophers of education, so much so that many criticisms of it have been made in recent years.[37] One of these seems particularly pertinent to our theme.

John Kleinig, in the course of his recent critique of analytic philosophy of education, points out that if we wish to become clear about what education is, this will not merely be a matter of "seeing how we talk about it."

> We need also to ask *why* we talk about education in the way we do, to uncover its historical roots, so that we may then critically examine the foundations of our present ways of seeing it. In particular we need to ask ourselves what vision of life we wish to promote, and to examine whether what passes for education contributes in any way to its realization.[38]

As a partial response, we have already agreed that ways exist of visualizing the person when functioning *vis a vis* the elements constituting reality as we know it and that the enterprise of education needs to have in mind the

whole person in providing for his development.[39] But in the course of arguing thus, we would emphasize what I take Kleinig to be suggesting in his second sentence: that an educational theorist needs to make explicit the life-view that he has in mind, and also to seek to discover the life-view of the person(s) being educated,[40] since it is only in the light of what exists and what is important that a person's commitment, and what this brings of action and experience, can be either understood or encouraged.

We conclude concretely, now, by suggesting linkages of a normative kind between the perspectives presented above on whole persons and some educational procedures relevant to them.

(i) The whole person is someone who possesses now, but is in process of revising and extending a vision of life, or system of reality, value, and potentiality, in the light of which he finds himself committed, consciously or unconsciously, to a distinctive set of goals and way of doing things.

Hence, seeing that each educator and school will convey some world-view, efforts should be made to make such views explicit and also to acquaint students with world-views significant within the culture, bearing in mind their level of development.

(ii) As situations arise which prompt commitment, they are likely to involve external physical or social factors. The one concerned will function as a whole person insofar as he discerns and relates to these rather than ignoring them or refusing to engage them.[41]

Hence, the importance of encouraging discussion of social, ecological, national, or international issues and encouraging students to recognize channels for action or for expressing their comments.

(iii) As situations arise which cause one to question perception of oneself, one's beliefs and values, they will require either the changing or the preservation of personal attitudes. The one concerned will function as a whole person insofar as he discerns and deals with such attitudes rather than avoiding them.

Hence, the educational appropriateness of giving students the opportunity to hear the beliefs and attitudes of others, and the exercise of speaking or writing on topics, in a nonthreatening atmosphere, which would bring their own under review.

(iv) When a person's experience is chiefly either of a cognitive, affective, or conative kind, he will tend to experience wholeness, as the dominant modality is infused with the others, and where, in addition, bodily factors are duly catered for.

Hence, the relevance for the educator of Paulo Freire's notion of "praxis" as both active reflection and reflective action; of Wordsworth's notion of reflective affect ("emotion recollected in tranquility") and St. Paul's admonition to be "speaking the truth in love."[42]

(v) The whole person will relate to external factors bearing in mind the influence of subjective factors upon them and vice versa.

Hence, the educator will help the person to match his gifts and sense of security against the challenge of social participation and to see the ways in which his personal adjustment could be affected by assuming new social roles.

(vi) A person will be functioning as a whole insofar as he develops the ability to form personal relationships[43] with some others interacting

with him and as he experiences that sense of solidarity derived from joint activity in groups.

Hence, the educator will seek to weave personal relationships into the structure of the institution, i.e., to create a "community," as well as encouraging such spontaneous relationships as appear.

(vii) Where the person is active in the above ways, he will enhance his whole-functioning by "feeding back" his experiences into the continuous re-vision of his life-view.

Hence, the helpfulness of small group discussions where issues are discussed at a fairly personal level and members bring up matters which are important for them.

We have now traced some of the more regular and predictable expressions of wholeness brought to attention by a systematic analysis. The last of our models reminds us, however, that as new challenges or new angles on old challenges appear, there are likely to be new facets of wholeness available to meet them.

NOTES

[1]I use the masculine pronoun rather than saying "his or her" throughout; this is a purely linguistic device to avoid awkwardness; no chauvinist discrimination is intended!

[2]The term "personality" is appropriated here, because in psychological studies of personality, the procedure is normally to approach some account of structure and function in terms of internal elements such as traits, sentiments, attitudes, schemata, motives, drives, states, and so on.

[3]This is a brief statement made to avoid excessive complication. It is, of course, possible, within sociopsychological theory, for an *element* of a personality to form part of an external system, e.g., where my attitude on a certain matter interacts with the attitudes of others in a meeting to produce a "group atmosphere." Similarly the person may participate actively within merely one segment of an external system; and so on.

[4]There is equally the possibility of *over*-participation in, e.g., social systems, leading to break-down, which again would be "less than whole functioning." Hence the stress on the need for norms or criteria which give some indication of optimal participation. The main point is, of course, the relevance of participation to the person-as-a-whole, and not merely to the external system-as-a-whole.

[5]"Agency" is taken to refer to the human ability to make practical moves within one's situation which are intentional, rather than accidental or involuntary. It is, of course, the *amplitude* of one's agency that is particularly in view in the argument, presupposing norms of obligation and relevant beliefs about the situation and our ability to modify it.

[6]"Roles" refer to the behaviors or action expected of the person on account of his participation in a social system.

[7]Briefly, "personal relationships" are those links between persons within which there is mutual reciprocation of interest in and concern for the other. There is, then, no *logical* limit to the number of persons who are thus in mutual interaction. However, it is easier, for purposes of exposition, to speak of two only.

[8]The term "self" is appropriate here, because, within a personal relationship, via the other partner, one is able both to "see" and evaluate *oneself*. It is this reflexive function, vis-a-vis the person under consideration, that seems to make the term appropriate. Our use does not necessarily correspond theoretically, however, to any of the numerous "self theories" in existence.

[9]Or by B, C, and D in successive relationships.

[10]The implication to be drawn from (a) is that our threefold delineation of person as personality, agency, and self is not intended as an exhaustive listing. The demands of the person or the external situation or both could well call for and "carve out" other facets of whole-functioning. The body, for example, is manifestly a whole, in that its parts are internal to the person, and its wholeness consists in the many neurophysiological and other systems which are so exquisitely interrelated. The three made explicit are chosen because of their significance in past and present discussion.

The observation made in (b) needs further comment. Obviously if some instruments *never* made their expected contribution, or made it in bizzare spots, then the orchestra would indeed be "deharmonized!" The position is, however, that the drummer who "rolls" only twice during the performance, affirms his membership by silently, but actively counting the bars between entrances.

Observation (c) allows, of course, for what we have called "agency." Change the orchestra to a jazz band in New Orleans during mardi gras, and the extended image may even invade the streets!

[11]This sense of "objective" does not suggest any truth-status. An "objective" account of personality could be given, say, by the use of personality tests and the ensuing theoretical manipulation of results.

[12]This possibility has been called into question by Bernard Mayo, *The Logic of Personality*, (London: Jonathan Cape, 1952). His view is that it is only when both parties behave *unreflectively* towards each other, that they share a personal relationship. I would argue, to the contrary, that a deep and continuous relationship may be such that one friend temporarily objectifies the other so that he may counsel him more effectively; and further that what has once become clear by reflective means, shortly becomes the background to further unreflective or spontaneous responses.

[13]For example Sears, R.R., "A theoretical framework for personality and social behavior," *American Psychologist*, Vol. 6, No. 9, September 1951, pp. 476-482.

[14]The selection is by no means complete, and, therefore, no doubt, subject to a variety of biases.

[15]That is, the person well-adjusted in human, but basically in sexual relationships.

[16]Psychoanalytic insights were taken up by Ben Morris, in his educational theorizing, as, for example, in "Guidance as a Concept in Educational Philosophy: United Kingdom," in *The Year of Book Education, 1955*, eds. R.K. Hall and J.A. Lauwerys (London: Evans Brothers, 1955); and by A.S. Neill in his educational practice, but did not prove generally persuasive within educational thought.

[17]This sociological isolation was corrected considerably by the later neo-Freudians.

[18]These categories have frequently been reified in philosophical discourse through the ages into "reason" or "mind," "emotion" or "feelings," and "will" or "action." There is no great harm in this tencency, provided that we remind ourselves, as Kleinig remarks, that "they are but abstractions from a single centre of consciousness, each of which (in the experience of persons) presupposes the other." (From "Topics in the Philosophy of Education. 3.Education," unpublished paper, Sydney, Australia, 1978, pp. 3-12.)

[19]If A.N. Whitehead is correct in his aesthetic theorizing, a clearer grasp of the meaning of parts, within any part-whole context, will "contribute to the massive feeling of the whole, and the whole contributes to the intensity of feeling of the parts," (*Adventures of Ideas*, Cambridge University Press, 1942, p. 324), and further more a contemplation of any enduring thing "concentrates upon itself the wealth of emotion derived from its many occasions," (*A of I*, pp. 361-2).

[20]This is, of course, the area in which much trenchant criticism is offered.

It is here, also, that R.S. Peters's brief reference to the "whole person" may be understood in the light of the position just developed. In the course of outlining his revised, sophisticated notion of the educated person, he remarked:

> The saying that 'education is of the whole man' is a conceptual truth in that being educated is incompatible with being narrowly specialized. ("Education and the Educated Man," *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain*, Jan., 1970, p. 6.)

Now the immediate context shows that the breadth that Peters saw as necessary for being called "educated" is a cognitive breadth, which--along with cognitive depth, interest in a pursuit for its intrinsic satisfaction, and a sensitive grasp of standards built into such pursuit--together constitute *a principle of cognitive transformation*. Hence, Peters expounded an important entry on our agenda of wholeness, and it is also clear from other references that he concurs with the necessity for overall personal development.

What he has done, however, is to identify "education" solely with the *cognitive* transformation occurring within such total development. This might be defensible on purely conceptual grounds, whereby one says that educators, as such, will contribute to the cognitive development of the whole person, leaving other kinds of transformation to other people and other agencies. The fact of the matter is, however, that living beings are developing, in their multifaceted ways, whenever and wherever they are caught up in new relations with aspects of themselves and the world. Hence, Peters's view needs only to become institutionalized, with schools and other centers adopting a cognitive "dividion of labour" approach (as, indeed, it widely has been, both before and since his utterances), and the development of whole persons already has been abandoned.

The alternative surely is to visualize both educational and other "helping agencies" as concerned with all facets of human transformation, but within this to capitalize on the contributions situations and circumstances under their control can make.

[21]See my paper "Depersonalization and Education," *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia*, June, 1972.

[22]Marx, in *Manuscripts* (D. Struik, ed., N.Y.: International Publishers, 1964) and elsewhere, criticizes the distinction and, hence, would wish to abolish the tension between "society" and "individual," seeing the individual as the expression of social life. Thus, "the human essence is no abstraction inherent in each single individual. In its reality it is the ensemble of the social relations," *Theses on Feuerbach, VI.*

[23]Anton Makarenko, *Perspectives*, 1936 (trans. A.R. Crane, Armidale, Aust. 1964).

[24]In Carl R. Rogers, *On Becoming a Person* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1961), chapter 9: "A Therapist's View of the Good Life: The Fully Functioning Person," pp. 183-196.

[25]Rogers, *On Becoming a Person*, p. 187.

[26]"Organism" is used to include everything that may be experienced, whether consciously perceived or not. It is thus wider than "personality" or "self" because of the inclusion of somatic experience.

[27]Though, in Rogers' scheme, he is in a therapeutic relationship with someone who acts not in a normal spontaneous interpersonal way, but as an *alter ego*, or reflector of his own attitudes.

[28]The "freedom" referred to is a liberation from (i) defensive strategies which shield the self or self-concept from the reality of one's own impluses or feelings; (ii) the threat occasioned when there are discrepancies between the way we perceive social reality and the way we perceive our capacities for dealing with it; (iii) the distortion brought about when we have, as part of the self-structure, values which are not truly our own, but taken over from others; and (iv) the disturbing effects of experiences which have been denied symbolization because they are inconsistent with the self-structure.

[29]Rogers might, at this point, object to this analysis, in that he has written explicitly upon the application of his client-centered principles to education, emerging with the following analysis:

> *If* the individual or group is faced by a problem;
> *If* a catalyst-leader provides a permissive atmosphere;
> *If* responsibility is genuinely placed with the individual or group;
> *If* there is basic respect for the capacity of the individual or group;
> *Then* responsible and adequate analysis of the problem is made;
> responsible self-direction occurs;
> the creativity, productivity, quality of product exhibited are superior to results of other comparable methods; individual and group morale and confidence develop.

(From *Client-Centered Therapy*, pp. 63-4.) While this passage is taken from chapter 2: "The attitude and orientation of the counselor," the author states in chapter 9, given over to "Student-centered teaching," that the point of view developed in the earlier chapter "seems to hold for teaching *just as much as it does for counseling*." p. 393. (Italics are mine.)

Surely these may be regarded as positive building strategies, the client-centered therapist may say? Briefly, in reply, either Rogers's basic approaches to teaching have *the same* procedural basis as his approaches to therapy or they are based on *additional*, even if analogous procedures. If the latter is the case, then no independent evidence has been advanced for it; if the former (and the whole exposition supports this as so), then what present the appearance of being positive educational procedures are merely extrapolations, into the classroom, of therapeutic techniques, indeed of group therapy, in which case our criticism holds.

[30]Carl R. Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1957), pp. 483, Italics are mine.

[31]Rogers, *Client-Centered Therapy*, p. 494.

[32]Or extended family.

[33]See the definitive work of Johannes Pedersen, *Israel--Its Life and Culture* (London: Oxford University Press, 1926); of A.R. Johnson, *The Vitality of the Individual in the Thought of Ancient Israel* (Cardiff: University of Wales Press, 1964); of C.A. Van Peurson, *Body, Soul, Spirit* (London, O.U.P., 1966); of H.W. Wolff, *Anthropology of the Old Testament* (London: S.C.M. Press, 1974).

[34]Possibly apart from *nefesh* which is the most general of the terms.

[35]See Herman Ridderbos, *Paul - An Outline of His Theology*, trans. J.R. de Witt, (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Eerdmans, 1975) pp. 118-20. Note, in particular, the author's claim that "the personal pronoun could stand in all these expressions" (p. 120), i.e., that "he" (the person) could be justifiably substituted for, say, *kardia*, indicating a whole-person reference.

[36]As George David has aptly remarked: "The Hebrew approach to knowledge emphasizes the relational [what we have called the 'intersubjective'] dimensions of truth without ignoring the objective and subjective dimensions." (*The Eclipse and Rediscovery of Person*, Bombay: TRACI Publications, 1976, pp. 65-6. The interpolation is mine).

[37]See R.S. Peters, *Education as Initiation* (London: Evans Bros., 1964); *Ethics and Education* (London: Allen & Unwin, 1966); "Education and the Educated Man," *Proceedings of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain*, January, 1970.

[38]See footnote 18, p. 3.12.

[39]See, in particular, our own argument with Peters's cognitive transformation model in footnote 20 above.

[40]There arises the complication, of course, that the vision of life that "we" wish to promote may well differ from that forming within our pupil or student. This, however, while undoubtedly raising ethical questions, is not an insuperable difficulty and was, indeed, tackled most sensitively by Martin Buber in *Between Man and Man* (London: Fontana, 1947).

[41]The requirement is not, of course, to engage *all* the relevant external factors actually operating, for to be "a whole person" is not equivalent to being a universal genius and polymath but rather to engage those, out of the total number, which are discerned, held to be significant, and within his powers in the light of his current perspectives.

[42]*Letter to the Ephesians* 4:15.

[43]This requires "outgoingness" to another as an individual human being (as well as receptiveness to another's outgoingness) and the expression (and reception) of some degree of affect, shown in interest and concern.

ON "THE EDUCATION OF THE WHOLE PERSON"

Karen Hanson
Indiana University

Response to Andersen

The figure through which Professor Andersen presents his holistic conception of the person--the metaphor of the orchestra--is appealing and initially plausible. It suggests the need for balance in the whole and the promise of a dynamic harmony. Andersen's attraction to this picture of the person is grounded, he says, on three features of the illustration: an orchestra "can function within wider wholes such as ballet and opera," "is still a whole when some members are silent," and "is capable of . . . [a] variety of internal relationships, as determined by the musical score."

We may have no difficulty tracing parallels appropriate to the first and second features. As an orchestra can function within a wider whole, a person can function as a unit of a larger organization--as, e.g., a member of a club, a worker on a production line, an employee in a corporation. And just as not every instrument of the orchestra need be sounded through every moment of a performance, not all features of an individual are expressed at each moment of his or her life, not all abilities exercised in each action or in all circumstances. A woman playing tennis, e.g., is not drawing on her knowledge of astronomy or testing her knack for solving differential equations, and when she is solving differential equations, she need not be using her capacity for sympahty and fellow-feeling.

But if these parallels are easily seen, the point of Andersen's third observation is not so readily discerned. The force of an allusion to a "variety of internal relationships" would depend on some solid sense of the elements in these relationships, some specification of what is variously arranged and rearranged. The basic musical inventory is stocked with sounds, and an orchestra can indeed produce endless combinations of these sounds; but if one fails, as I think Andersen does, to distinguish any comparably basic elements of persons, then the point of the musical analogy is here dulled. The illustration does not, in this region, shed any real light.

Andersen might dispute the charge that he does not indicate the elements of the person which can subsist in these varied "internal relationships." He does, after all, sketch what he calls a "three-fold delineation" of the person, and he mentions, in connection with each of his three conceptions, particular parts of the human being or the human environment. But it seems to me that he never does in fact clearly specify these parts or elements and that his conceptions of the "wholes" of "personality," "agent," and "self" suffer accordingly and do not, finally, cohere.

Let us inspect, first, his remarks on "personality." Andersen says that "a person is caught up . . . in many relations with elements of the universe, whether these be external or internal . . . . Where such elements are internal, the whole, the 'personality' is that complex comprising the parts in their relation to each other." *What* parts? one presses to know. In a footnote Andersen presents a list--"[c]redos, sentiments, attitudes, schemata, motives, drives, states, and so on--which is meant to suggest the "internal elements" to which his definition refers. But I find myself confounded by the motley character of this list: Andersen says "and so on," but What would count as a correct continuation? There are relevant theoretical puzzles about each entry on the list. For example: In what sense is a "state" an "element" of the person? How is it a *part* in this whole? It might be better understood as a *condition of* the whole. And in what sense is a state an "internal" object? To assert that a "state" is an "internal object" is to make a philosophically peculiar claim, and this claim wants attention and needs some justification. "Motives" also appears on the list. The idea

that a motive is an internal object is less peculiar, more common; but it is a common idea which, I think, deserves scrutiny nonetheless. For even if one is tempted to think of motives as internal objects, one must grant that motives cannot be identified or individuated without reference to particular or characteristic actions; and Andersen wants to label actions "external."

It is only by doing so that he can distinguish his second whole, the "agent." This is a "complex comprising [assumed] roles." These roles are described as "behaviours or action . . . in a social system" and they are said to be "elements . . . external to the person." But the assumption of certain roles typically involves, requires, the assumption of certain attitudes--(think, e.g., of the role of a foreman or supervisor)--and attitudes were earlier labeled "internal elements." Some roles are in fact more readily defined in terms of personal traits or attitudes or sentiments--all "internal elements," according to Andersen--than in terms of specific sets of "external" actions. (Think, e.g., of "the maternal role.") The distinctions Andersen needs to sustain his theoretical framework are not immediately given, and, as he does not produce them, his framework collapses for want of any solid foundation.

Andersen himself avowedly relies on a conflation of "external" and "internal" elements in his characterization of his third whole, but his notion of "the self" is no clearer than his concepts of "personality" or "agent." It is not merely that, in the absence of some antecedent delineation of the internal and the external, we do not know what is suggested by their combination--though this is a problem. An additional problem can be located in the claim that what is definitive of this whole is that it involves a relationship with one or more other persons. Don't many features of "personality" depend upon, have existence in, logically require, relationships with others? (Think of friendliness or courtesy.) Aren't roles usually played out in interactions with others and aren't the requirements of a role often both shaped by and productive of the "significant (normative) expectations" of others? (Think of the role of an umpire. He or she is expected to call "Out!" if the catcher is touching the plate, ball in glove, before the runner reaches home.) Again, it seems to me that Andersen has not secured the underpinnings for the superstructure he wants to build.

And if it is thought that what should follow are minor repairs--hammering out these definitions in order to produce more intelligible conceptions of, and more perspicuous distinctions between, these three "wholes"--let me stake out a larger worry about the direction of this enterprise. I do not doubt that we could agree upon clear and distinct notions of "personality," "agent," and "self," and I recognize the clarification of these notions as a philosophical task. I acknowledge, too, that any number of philosophical, and practical, undertakings might depend upon this prior task of definition. But I think Andersen misconceives his own project if he takes it to be thus suspended from such definitions or analyses. Part of his motivation for the claim that the person is a whole composed of these other wholes of personality, agent, and self seems to be his feeling that we want what he calls a "positive elaboration" of the person. He feels we must say what a person is, say fully and completely, through "positive formulations," if we are to know how to develop, how to educate, persons. But his allegiance to the idea of a positive account seems to me to be, in this sphere, misguided.

To explain why, let me revert once more to the metaphor of the orchestra. The sounds produced by the performing orchestra are, or should be, as Andersen notes, a function of the musical score. The score is prescriptive. Do we really think there is a comparable, a full and complete, prescriptive account of the person? Do we think we can, in educating the person, work from some analogous "positive formulation"? This would involve the production of individual instances ("whole persons") which satisfy the specifications of

the "score," the "positive account." Is this--after all, when its outlines are clearly seen--an appealing picture? (One might now want to counter what might sometimes be a useful educational slogan--"We must educate the whole person"--with another, a different, slogan--"We must educate the individual.")

But if that is not enough to make us relinquish the musical metaphor and the idea of the "positive account" of the person which it might be helping to convey, we might recognize another problem. There are, we must note, any number of genuinely different, but equally serviceable scores: working only with one song, we could find indefinitely many good arrangements. And there are, of course, indefinitely many good sonatas, indefinitely many good concerti, indefinitely many good symphonies. There is no antecendently fixed "positive account" of a musical work. There may be what might be called "rules of composition" and compositional forms, but the artist does not, in composing, mechanically apply these rules or seek simply to realize these forms. And the highest art may sometimes consist in breaking such rules or transcending the standing forms. Thus, there can be no really useful antecedent judgments about, or useful antecedent statements of what counts as a good composition. It is only by facing the work itself, attending to some actual composition, that we can make judgments about the music. And if we find fault, if we point to defects or shortcomings, we do not imply that there is some perfect or ideal type which this piece has failed to instantiate. Our criticisms cannot be cast in these terms, for there is no such ideal type.

Similarly, our feeling that there is "something missing" from this particular person, or our judgment that that individual's psyche is not as well-integrated as it might be, need not stem from or be grounded upon any general, positive account of the person. Although Andersen wants to reject what he calls the "addition and subtraction approach" to persons, the language he himself uses to introduce the topic of "personal wholeness" in fact serves to acknowledge my point. He speaks of "individuals who seem to be lacking something," of "observed deficienc[ies]," and he gives more or less specific examples: X lacks social interests or skills; Y has an inadequate command of the language; and Z seems amoral. We are struck by these deficiencies; and we mark them in each case not by measuring some gap between this individual and the positive standard: there *is* no one positive standard to be laid alongside X, Y, Z, no one positive standard from which they variously depart, X in the social, Y in the intellectual, and Z in the moral dimension.

It is because there is no one positive standard that Andersen founders whenever he broaches the topic of norms. He says, e.g., in his discussion of agency, that there are norms which define "whole-functioning" in "external systems," criteria which indicate "optimal participation." But he never further characterizes "optimal participation"; he never says what these norms are; his standard of participation really amounts to the recommendation that the person should participate neither too little nor too much. None of us can take much guidance from that.

I think there are comparable problems with the educational recommendations Andersen claims to derive from his discussion. Some of his remarks seem to me empty, devoid of the educational implications he claims for them. (Cf., e.g., iv:

> When a person's experience is chiefly either of a cognitive, affective, or conative kind, he will tend to experience wholeness as the dominant modality is infused with the others, and where, in addition, bodily factors are duly cared for. *Hence*, the relevance for the educator of Paulo Freire's notion of "praxis" as both active reflection and reflective action; of Wordsworth's notion of reflective affect ("emotion recollected in tranquility") and St. Paul's admonition to be "speaking the truth in love."

What is presented here is not an educational procedure, but vague redundancy.) Where there are specific recommendations, they do not in fact follow from or depend upon Andersen's theoretical structure. (Cf., e.g., vii:

> Where the person is active in the above ways, he will enhance his whole-functioning where he "feeds back" his experiences into the continuous revision of his life-view. *Hence*, the helpfulness of small group discussions where issues are discussed at a fairly personal level and members bring up matters which are important for them.

Small group discussions may or may not be most conducive to self-awareness and the critical examination of one's attitudes. This seems an empirical issue.) And, again, form often masquerades as content, and there is, underneath, merely the reiteration of the goal of harmony and balance. (Cf., e.g., v:

> The whole person will relate to external factors bearing in mind the influence of subjective factors upon them; and vice versa. *Hence*, the educator will help the person to match his gifts and sense of security against the challenge of, say, social participation; and to see the ways in which his personal adjustment could be affected by, say, assuming new social roles.

The educator will help *match* gifts to challenge, asking neither too little nor too much.)

It is, I think, not surprising that Andersen cannot be more specific in his recommendations; because, to reopen the contest of slogans, the educator encounters not just "whole persons" but individuals. Each has his or her own distinctive endowment, and the difficulties connected with the development of each individual's gifts, and the obstacles and limitations which must be faced or overcome, may be endlessly variable. We are approaching our task from the wrong direction if we begin with a "positive account" or model of the person and hope to deduce from it specific recommendations for specific persons. Problems of underdeveloped abilities and problems of personal integration are always just that--problems; and it is in the context of such problems--individual or social--(as we notice that X shrinks from social contacts or Y "can't put two words together" or a whole population is physically unfit) that the appeal to some goal of "wholeness" gains its specific sense.

My suggestion--that the power of the slogan "We must educate whole persons" must be directed by some sense of a problem, a failure, or a breakdown--should not be understood as an endorsement of some non-holistic view of persons. Indeed, it seems to me that, ironically, Andersen does not have enough confidence in the utter simplicity, the plainness, of the truth that persons are wholes. What are sometimes regarded as parts of the person--for example, the critical faculty, cognitive ability, artistic talent, and so on--are clearly always *abstractions* from a whole. The usefulness of these particular notions may vary, but there must always be some more or less specific point in making the abstraction. No science teacher would, without some very special reason, speak of the "thirty cognitive faculties waiting in the classroom"; no music teacher instructs disembodied voices. Of course, then, we must educate the whole person--because persons are wholes.

ACADEMIC EVALUATION AND THE CURRENT CRISIS OF GRADE INFLATION AND COMPETENCY TESTING

Bernard A. Gendreau
Xavier University

It is common knowledge that there is a growing concern in primary and secondary education as well as in colleges and universities with the academic evaluation of students. Grade inflation and lack of competency suggest a need to promote objective and effective accountability in the use of our grading systems and of our testing methods. There seems to be a need to have the pattern fit the cloth and a desire to take drastic measures to meet head-on what seems to be a crisis in education brought about by the misleading grade point average the student is given and the inadequate performance in the use of learning possessed by the student.

The grades given seem to be too high to fit the learning experience offered by the teaching process and the competency seems too low to fit the expectation of society with its needs in the work force and its standards for graduate and professional schooling. The solution seems to be to lower grades so that the student's grade point average will represent his actual achievement in the context of the teaching offered and to use competency testing to promote the minimum and specific learning expected from society for further success and functioning in schooling and in work.

One could question whether this approach leads to a more appropriate academic evaluation of the student who with lower grades and more efficiency in performance could have been judged on a basis which leaves out important factors in the objectives proposed in the philosophy of education of the school the student has contracted with for appropriate education and instruction. While recognizing the value of tightening the reins in assessing students' achievement by being stricter in distributing grades and by being more accountable in judging evidence of the performance ability for the students' own future success and the society's own future welfare, one could indulge oneself in wondering whether the gains justify the possible losses in the academic experience. Instead of changing the present pattern of evaluation, one could consider refashioning the cloth being measured so that the product would justify what present methods of grading and testing stand for and hope to achieve in the academic evaluation process.

Competition for employment and entrance to higher educational institutions often requires the student to have a higher grade point average than would seem needed to function adequately in the work or school task. Getting the foot in the door is of the essence quite often. Fairness requires that in our effort at being more honest in our academic evaluation we do not unduly impede the student's use of his education to assure his future success. Yet justice requires that as long as grades given to express evaluation about student achievement tend to be used to serve the public more than to promote learning, both objectivity and accountability should be enhanced. Since our present educational approach leads to an evaluation situation in which grades given the student in fulfilling the objectives set forth take priority over the teaching and learning process, it would seem that the best way to restore the balance would be to make the grades fit the performance achieved through the present teaching and studying effectiveness in the classroom context. And yet could it be that in restoring the balance the higher grades should be kept, especially since there is little that can be done about the present pattern and since the student needs high grades for entry and perhaps survival in our economic and academic world?

In the efficiency of performance the student is to be provided with the tools and instruments to assure success in the performance of skills and in the furthering of learning if he is to find acceptance in society and in the

academic world. In restoring the balance in giving public recognition to a student for his academic efforts, accountability for efficiency in performance by the student as a result of his learning experience should be established. To assure proficiency for future success in performance in our economic and academic worlds, would the best way be to make the performance testing fit the expectation of society for the performance of adequate and specific competency in tasks to be assigned or presently projected for the student in the future? Could it be that a broader base as called for by the philosophy of education advocated should be kept, especially since the student's academic achievement in performing tasks that establish his success in partaking in the objectives proposed in the teaching and contracted for is broader than the normal expectations projected in the competency testing?

Lowering the grade point average will not add to the student's betterment on the academic level and could deprive him of what he has a right to in the use of the opportunities for the future the schooling should offer. Limiting the academic instructional evaluation of the student by grading in competency testing will not do justice to the overall academic success the student has achieved and could lead to a de-emphasis of educational opportunities which would be meaningful to the student's overall education.

The reform in grading and testing when making the evaluation of the student's total lived academic experience might consist in changing the base for our academic evaluation by making the learning situation bring results that fit the higher grades needed by the student for future success as a skilled and learned individual and by making the testing fit the total performance actually achieved by the student for the future in total living as an educated person. The student's lot would be bettered for now and for the future as the evaluation serves to promote learning and to serve the public. Many noninstructional factors help assure success and efficiency in the economic and academic world. These factors are part and parcel of the whole educational enterprise. While these factors do not appear in the standard grades and are not measured in competency testing, still the grade and the testing should not bring about an evaluation which keeps the student from using these to his advantage. If success and performance depended solely on academic competency and testable results, the present method of grading and testing would seem more acceptable even if less than adequately appropriate. The range of the objectives of education is wider than this, so that in judging the total performance, one would be justified and required to take more into account. This would justify a higher differential in the grades given and in the judgment on the competency expected. This would also prevent burdening the student with the full responsibility for grading and testing reform intended to make up for whatever shortcoming and irresponsibility teachers might have been guilty of.

Would the various and sometimes antagonistic philosophies of education at work in our educational enterprise not have an opportunity here to assure that, from various philosophical perspectives, justice would be done to the student? This broader scope for evaluation would remain within the academic perspective. We could consider the evaluation process within the field of philosophy to see if one could cope with the crisis of grade inflation and competency testing by making the teaching and the measuring such that the student would acquire more in his learning experience so that higher grades could remain available and imposition of competency testing would not be needed.

The evaluation of the student in a class of philosophy will be determined by activities on the part of the student indicating that he has fulfilled the objectives of the course in terms of what the student is to be and to do as a result of taking the course. The objectives of a course in philosophy depend on the commitment of the academic institution, the philosophy department, and the faculty member. The objective could be personal achievement ( ) and/or discipline performance ( ). [Parentheses for inclusion of grade.] In

measuring what the student does at the end of the course the evaluator could emphasize information (facts and figures; thinkers and ideas) ( ), formation (do philosophy in dealing with reality rationally) ( ), and/or critical sense (test out and verify rational evidence) ( ). The student's way of being and way of doing at the end of the course involves the functioning of the impact from the lived experience with the intellectual master ( ) and/or of the data of the content and methodology of the discipline ( ). The student has achieved self-appropriation and liberation in dealing with philosophical issues ( ) and/or operates with competency and proficiency to function in society ( ). Evaluation could stress the degree of success in performing activities on a philosophical level for the student's self-promotion as a learner ( ) and/or as learned ( ) and/or for the certification of the student for society as a citizen ( ) and as a worker ( ). The objectives will vary depending on where, when, and with whom the student makes a contract leading to evaluation for education ( ) and instruction ( ) received. The operations used to serve as a base for evaluation such as tests ( ), assignments ( ), diaries ( ), library research work ( ), class presentations ( ), and group discussions ( ) are used as different measures of the level achieved in reaching course objectives.

The worth sought in the evaluation of the student through measurements expressed in their results in grades could be on the four basic levels found in any academic evaluation either exclusively, eclectically, or integrally: The first two levels are concerned with the student as he finds himself in the process of learning ( ) or will find himself working and participating in society ( ); the last two levels are concerned with the discipline as it affects the performance of the student as a person ( ) and as learned in the field of discipline or art ( ).

1. The grade helps promote the student in the process of learning within the course or the whole curriculum as a learner ( ). In this liberal arts approach nondiscipline aspects are also used to evaluate: effort, extra work, motivation, attendance in class, class participation, work habits, length of assignments, consistency in reports done ( ), and the student's progress in developing the art of doing philosophy and in acquiring an attitude of sensitivity to the type of evidence proper to philosophy ( ).

2. The grade helps certify the student for acceptability in society as a citizen and as a worker ( ) and/or as a graduate student or a professional school student ( ). In this performance context--with regard to content, methodology, and prerequisites--GRE tests in philosophy and/or competency or proficiency tests are useful ( ). Here there is the role of competition with other institutions and with the consumerism aspect for graduate schools and job opportunity. The community of scholars in the field of studies and society at large project the norms of success in satisfying performance expectations.

3. The grade helps confirm the student's sense of ability to face up to life problems in the world ( ). The lived experience with an intellectual master in a philosophy course has enriched the student who can identify his own philosophical perspective within the pluralistic context available for triadic opportunity in philosophizing in history [as if he were a philosophizing Christian] ( ) and help him achieve self-appropriation for thought and action ( ).

4. The grade helps confirm that the student has been well-instructed in the discipline and that he can operate effectively in doing philosophy or in sharing the experience of philosophy ( ). Being presented with any philosophical issue, the student is able to 1. state the question clearly ( ), 2. develop the problematic adequately ( ), 3. identify and explain the alternative options

available ( ), 4. formulate a solution as an option within pluralism ( ), 5. elaborate appropriate proof and argument for a solution ( ), and 6. analyze results with critical judgment in light of personal principles and ideals as well as of the intellectual master's approach and exigencies of philosophical discipline ( ).

Different disciplines working within different philosophies of education could set up this kind of broader base for grading to maintain the present level of grades and yet have fair grades at the same time.

SORTING, REWARDING, AND CERTIFYING: THREE FACETS OF EVALUATION

Sam R. Snyder
University of Toledo

Response to Gendreau

Professor Gendreau has shed a great deal of light on a complicated and puzzling educational problem: that of academic evaluation. I am not in disagreement with Professor Gendreau's conclusions, or with his proposal. However, I would like to attempt further clarification of some of the different, but related functions of grading.

One of the ways that academic evaluations, i.e., grades, have been used is as a sorting mechanism. As access to formal education was increasingly democratized in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, to go to school became the right of virtually all white children. To remain in school, however, was a privilege to be earned. A child entered the first grade, and at the end of that year he or she took an examination. If the child passed, he or she was promoted to the next grade; if not, the child repeated the grade.

In a school structure characterized by a fixed curriculum and annual examinations, school enrollment resembled a pyramid with a very broad base and a very narrow apex. In Toledo, for example, in 1908 about eight percent of the children who completed elementary school (through the eighth grade) entered high school. Of those who entered high school, approximately eight percent graduated. The message was clear: Those who can, do; those who cannot, get out.

A second way in which grades function is as a rewarding mechnaism. Grades provide a system of positive reinforcement for appropriate behavior and function as a feedback mechanism to modify responses in the learner. This is the area in which competency-based instruction and testing make their contribution to grade inflation.

If a skill, procedure, bit of information, or attitude can be learned, it can be taught. It must first be analyzed into its component parts, or subskills, which then must be translated into behavioral terms. The behaviors are identified as specific objectives to be attained, and one of the criteria is that the objectives must be capable of being attained by the audience to whom they are addressed. If success is not achieved on the first attempt, then successive attempts are made until the objective is obtained. Therefore, anyone who has the tenacity to work through the procedures until the objectives are reached will receive an "A."

The third function that grades serve is that of certification. Through testing one can be certified as belonging to a group that is entitled to goods and services which are denied to others in our society. At the elementary and secondary school levels, much of teachers' autonomy in grading has been eroded by I.Q. tests and standardized achievement tests. At the collegiate level the question of grading may become "purely academic" as the model of the university as a community of scholars is gradually replaced by a corporate model of heirarchical organization.

Grade inflation at the collegiate level is at least in part a product of the transformation of collegiate education from academic elitism to an extension of common schooling. Traditionally, evaluation at the collegiate level has been "norm-referenced," and the norms have been set by the great scholars

of the past. The goal of academic excellence pursued by a leisured class is at crucial points inconsistent with the goal of creating producers (and, increasingly, consumers) in a postindustrial, technological, consumer-oriented society.

Mass education, including collegiate education, as a product must be capable of being packaged, advertised, and sold in competition with other consumer goods. The test of academic excellence becomes increasingly irrelevant as the test of marketability becomes, if not the sole criterion, the most important one.

There is still, fortunately, a large degree of diversity among the collegiate institutions in this country. I applaud Professor Gendreau's attempt to develop criteria for his students in the institution with which he is affiliated. I hope and urge that he will encourage his academic colleagues to do the same, each unto his or her own likes. It is through such concerted action that vigorous and rigorous academic standards are honored and promulgated.

The distinction between a community and a committee seems to elude the bureaucratic mind. A community acts in concert in matters of shared interest and shared concern. That common interest and concern nurture and sustain each individual participant. A committee, on the other hand, responds to a directive. The common interests of the committee focus upon the task at hand, and when the task is completed, a report is made and the reason for the committee's existence is ended. The work of the committee strengthens the organization at the expense of the individuals who particpate in it.

The problems of grade inflation, academic standards, and professional autonomy will come closer to being resolved when committees of scholars are replaced by communities of scholars responsible to themselves, their students, and their scholarship. Whether such a venerable institution could survive in the economic marketplace is another question.

AND SOME ARE MORE EQUAL THAN OTHERS: THE EXEMPTION OF REVENUE PRODUCING SPORTS FROM TITLE IX

Eleanor K. Roemer
Bowling Green State University

Title IX of the Educational Amendments (1972) states that "no person shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any educational program or activity receiving federal financial assistance." In general this law bars sex discrimination in any academic program, extracurricular activity, research endeavor, occupational training, or other educational program (preschool to postgraduate) operated by an organization or agency which receives or benefits from federal aid. However, the law also establishes exemptions--namely for educational institutions controlled by religious organizations whenever compliance with Title IX would be contrary to their religious beliefs and for those schools whose primary purpose is training for the U.S. military services or for the merchant marine. In addition, membership policies of the Girl and Boy Scouts, the YMCA and YWCA, Campfire Girls and other single sex youth service organizations (the members of which are chiefly under age 19) as well as university based social fraternities and sororities are also exempt.[1]

A new exemption has been proposed by a lobby of approximately 300 universities and colleges spearheaded by Bud Davis, President of the University of New Mexico. This group, organized at the NCAA conference in January, 1979, proposes that revenue producing sports should be excluded from Title IX considerations.[2]

At issue is the section of Title IX which states that no person may be subjected to discrimination based on sex in any scholastic, intercollegiate, club or intramural athletic program offered by a recipient of federal education aid. While the intent of this section of the law is the promotion of equal athletic opportunity for men and women, these regulations do not equate equal opportunity in athletics with dollar for dollar expenditures, nor do they require the duplication of men's programs for women. Offering exactly the same sports for women as for men, in exactly the same fashion, is not mandated. Instead, the specifications of a standard for equal athletic opportunity would be determined on the basis of the interests and abilities of members of both sexes in that school situation. Such a context-specific formula for equal athletic opportunity would involve taking into account the interests and abilities of members of both sexes in that school in terms of selection of sports, talent awards, maintenance and development of facilities, level of competition, provision of travel and per diem allowances, assignment and compensation of coaches, and publicity given to sports. While equal-per-capita spending is not required by Title IX, expenditure levels cannot be entirely ignored when establishing standards to accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both sexes equally in terms of the selection of sports and levels of competition.

The proposal by some groups, such as NCAA and the de Hart Coalition, to remove these sports from Title IX consideration follows from the argument that if an equal spending formula is applied, the level of competition for revenue producing sports, such as football and basketball, would decrease. This decrease would contribute to a reduction of interest in these sports, which would cause a decline in the earnings which not only help to promote these particular sports but also support the rest of the athletic programs for women as well as men. Thus, including revenue producing sports in Title IX policy interpretations would result in the destruction not only of revenue producing sports, such as football and basketball, but also other sports as well.

The argument opposing such an exemption--made by Project on Equal Educational Rights (PEER), the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW), and the American Council on Education--is that the removal of these sports would be unfair and blatantly discriminatory. These organizations maintain that women are currently prohibited by law, regulation, and tradition from receiving either an equitable or adequate share of athletic resources and opportunities.

In this paper I propose to examine critically the justification of the two opposing positions regarding exemption of revenue producing sports. The position for exemption is supported by the argument that using Title IX's standard of equal athletic opportunity would lead to the destruction of intercollegiate sports. The justification of this position rests on the argument that favoring a particular group is justified when the group has been traditionally favored and when the general good is at stake. The pursuit of equal sport opportunities, it is claimed, would deny persons involved in these sports the continued opportunity to participate at the expected level and further would counteract the general good, which in this case would be defined as *more* athletic opportunities for all.

The position against exemption is supported by the argument that removal of revenue producing sports from Title IX application would perpetuate discrimination on the basis of sex and would prevent women from receiving an equitable or adequate share of athletic resources and opportunities. Further, once sports which are revenue producing are exempted, the entire equal opportunity concept would begin to erode. This position appeals to the value of equal opportunity as the dominant standard in arranging participation in intercollegiate athletic programs.

Since investigating the justification of educational policy decisions which affect women and men, boys and girls, is an important philosophical task,[3] the critical examination of these two positions has current importance and relevance. The House Education and Labor Committee and the Senate Labor and Public Welfare Committee of the U.S. Congress are considering substantive legislation to amend Title IX to exempt revenue producing sports. Such legislative action follows former Department of Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary Califano's announcement in late 1978 that the guidelines regarding athletics would be subject to review.[4]

The Exemption Argument

Let us begin with the argument which attempts to justify excluding revenue producing sports from Title IX application. I shall refer to this as the Exemption Argument, and it is stated as follows:

1. The application of Title IX's standard[5] of equal athletic opportunity for male and female athletics would result in the destruction of sports.

2. The destruction of sports would lessen the general good,[6] defined as athletic programs and sports and the beneficial results which participating in, as well as following them brings.

3. It is morally justifiable to show preference to one group whenever the general good is at stake.

Therefore,

4. It is morally justifiable to exempt revenue producing sports from the application of Title IX.

Premise 1, namely that strict application of Title IX would lead to the destruction of sports, is a prediciton about what would happen if the standard of equal athletic opportunity for male and female athletes were applied.

There are two ways in which this prediction can be supported and these two sub-arguments, the first (named the "competition argument") and the second (called the "erosion argument") will now be reviewed.

Sub-argument #1 - the competition argument

a. The application of Title IX's equal athletic opportunity standard would cause a decline in the level of competition.

b. This decline would translate into a reduction of interest in spectator sports and thus a drop in revenue which helps pay not only for football and basketball but also for the rest of the college's athletic program.

Sub-argument #2 - the erosion argument

a. The application of Title IX's equal athletic opportunity standard would erode, change, the way in which sports have been played in America.

b. This erosion would translate into a decline in opportunity for character building and disciplined education for males in terms of their traditional sex roles.

Let us consider each way of justifying the exemption argument.

The Competition Sub-Argument The competition argument rests on the claim that the implementation of the Title IX guidelines in order to promote equal athletic opportunity for both sexes would produce a counter effect--i.e., a reduction of the total number of athletic opportunities. Thus everyone would be worse off.

The presidents of many universities and representatives of men's athletic programs contend that meeting the requirements would cost too much and, in some cases, would force them to take money from the budgets for men's programs. NCAA estimates that compliance with Title IX would cost its members 60 million.[7] To Walker Byers, former executive director of NCAA, for example, the regulations are ominous and forecast the possible doom of intercollegiate sports. Other sports directors express fear that application of the equal athletic opportunity standard in Title IX will force them to spend more money on women's sports and so starve the already hard pressed men's programs.[8] But if the Title IX standard of equal athletic opportunity were applied, would the level of competition at even the "big time" schools decline? And would this decline translate into a reduction in spectator sports and a drop in earnings which help pay not only for the football team but also for the rest of the college's athletic program?

It is the case that 10 percent of the college athletic departments in the U.S. are able to finance athletic programs with income from revenue producing sports.[9] At Ohio State University, for example, money making sports under the current setup pay for all the others. All other intercollegiate athletic programs, including these for women, are financed by men's football and basketball. The annual profit from the $6 million + budget is invested in facilities used equally by men and women.[10] Again, at Pennsylvania State University only football and basketball pay for themselves; everything else rides on monies generated from those sports.[11]

Thus the argument runs that to apply Title IX to revenue producing sports would be killing the goose that laid the golden egg. "It's like having a factory where you have seven production lines, six of which you carry because they are good for society and one of which makes money. If you cut back on that you cut back on the ability to put out the other six lines.[12]

There is some possibility that athletic programs at institutions of higher education, such as Pennsylvania State, would have to be scaled down if the Title IX guidelines were applied. But would this necessarily result in less competition and less interest on the part of the fans, and ultimately in the destruction of revenue producing sports? First, the standard of equal athletic opportunity does not require equal-per-capita expenditures if the institution can demonstrate that differences are based on nondiscriminatory factors such as the cost of a particular sport or the scope of competition which is national rather than regional. Second, competition is a relative thing; it always takes place in a context of others who would face the same "handicap." Even if the program were scaled down slightly it is not clear that this would result in diminished interest on the part of the fans or even on the part of the participants. The odds of winning or losing would stay the same because all programs would be affected by the same scaling down, if this were to occur. What would remain, regardless, is the chance to win and lose.

For 90 percent of the intercollegiate athletic programs, revenue producing sports do not support themselves, much less the other athletic programs at educational institutions. An analysis from the NCAA organization reveals that four out of evey five football programs lose money. Of 475 NCAA Institutions with varsity football programs in 1977, only 92 or 19 percent achieved revenue from football at least equal to the team's operating expenses. Most (81 percent) didn't even break even. Therefore, far from making enough money to be self-supporting, football programs often sap funds from other programs.[13]

Let us now evaluate the argument for exemption based on the "competition" sub-argument: This "competition" sub-argument involves the claim that the application of the equal athletic opportunity standard would cause a decline in the level of competition which would translate into a reduction of interest in spectator sports and thus a drop in revenue which helps pay for football, basketball, and the rest of the college's athletic programs.

Even if it were morally justifiable to provide special privileges to one group so as to protect the state of intercollegiate sports overall, exempting intercollegiate sports at 90 percent of the institutions of higher education would not promote funds for all sports. The sub-argument fails because the first premise is not true 90 percent of the time.

The question to consider now is: At those schools where some some men's sports do promote funds for all sport programs, should revenue producing sports be exempted? Would the application of the equal athletic opportunity standard destroy revenue producing sports at those institutions? Here the established link between having less money for recruitment, for scholarships, for coaching and supplies, etc. and a lowered level of competition is crucial. As we pointed out earlier, such deprivation at one institution in the midst of others who were not so affected would be serious. But if all institutions were affected in a similar fashion, would not the level of competition be protected? Also, it is not clear that a great deal of scaling down would have to occur with the application of Title IX if the level of competition at the national rather than the regional level were the issue.

It could be pointed out that no athletic program can exist without funding, and one could argue here that the generation of money for intercollegiate sports must necessarily be the overriding factor. Most interference with the raising of that money should be prevented, it could be argued. In school financing cases a similar argument has been made that the effect of wide disparities in money spent between school districts is the result of the method of raising funds. The necessity of the latter (raising money) entails the former (spending money).[14] However, it has not been shown that revenue producing sports are the only way of generating funds for athletic programs.

Those schools where revenue producing sports do not generate enough to pay for themselves, much less the whole sports program, have found other ways of generating funds. They still have football and basketball teams.

The Erosion Sub-Argument The "erosion argument" is the second way in which the claim that application of the equal athletic opportunity standard to intercollegiate athletics would result in the destruction of sports can be supported. The claim here is that the way in which sports have been played in America would erode if intercollegiate athletics are not exempted from Title IX application. This erosion would translate into a decline of interest in manliness, discipline, and character building related to the American way of life. This challenge to the quality of America's way of life and traditional sex roles would lead to societal unrest as well as individual unhappiness. Perpetuating the traditional sex roles and promoting their virtues should take precedence over equality of the sexes in educational programming.

American sports have been defined traditionally as a male activity following the example of ancient Greece where women were not even allowed as spectators on the playing fields at the Olympic Games.[15] The benefits of athletics were believed to lie chiefly in the development of virtues appropriate to the male. Historically, most colleges and universities in America have emphasized intercollegiate sports for *men*. Thus the application of the equal athletic opportunity standard for sport programs challenges age-old stereotypes of masculinity, as well as femininity, and causes some to fear for destruction of the American way of life, along with sports.

Consider the following statements which reflect this concern. A state judge in a decision regarding women's participating in Little League declared: "athletic opportunities build character in our boys. We do not need that kind of character in our girls, the women of tomorrow."[16] Furman Bishop, sports editor of the *Atlanta Journal*, asks: "Do we want a race of Amazons or broads that chew tobacco? What do you want for your darling daughter--a boudoir or a locker room full of cussing and bruises?"[17] William Furlong, *Washington Post* sports writer, referred to women athletes as "grotesqueries" in a scathing attack on women's invasion of the male territory of sports.[18] In Waco, Texas the deeply held tradition that values athletic competition, football in particular, not only as a builder of men but as a course of civic pride and boosterism, is reflected in a comment by school board member and psychologist Clifford Knapke: "Competitive sports for girls in Waco is not part of our culture."[19]

Many women have been told, as was Nancy Lieberman (the star of the Old Dominion Women's basketball team and Wade Trophy winner as player of the 1979 year), "Ball playing is for boys. You are going to grow up and you are going to get married; there's no place for you to play ball when you grow up."[20]

Suppose that providing more equitable athletic opportunities for men and women would destroy sports as they have been defined? The philosophical question on which to focus here is Why should we worry about destroying sports as they have traditionally been defined?

The belief in two such mutually exclusive spheres, based on sex, provides explanation and justification for our social structure and can be used to justify social policies regarding the distribution of benefits and burdens, including sports opportunities. One can argue that such opportunities should only be provided for males: (1) because they are the only sex to be physiologically and psychologically capable of taking advantage of such opportunities; (2) because sports activities are appropriate for male socialization and not for the female; and (3) because males need such opportunities to become productive members of our society but, conversely, for females such opportunities are not only unnecessary but dysfunctional.

We do treat women and men differently in our society and there are historically understandable reasons for this based on biological and physical differences in the child bearing function of the female and the greater physical strength of the male. Men, in general, are physically taller, stronger, and heavier than women. Women are shorter, lighter, and they are built differently with wider hips, smaller lung capacities, and different amounts of muscle tissue. But does it follow that because these differences exist we should not provide equal athletic opportunities for both sexes? In terms of being able to take advantage of athletic opportunities, other factors not unique to either sex can compensate for the lack of speed and strength, such as mind-body coordination, mental determination, sensory perception, courage, intelligence, willingness to practice, and experience. A large oxygen consumption is not necessary for golf, but concentration and coordination are. That we, in the past, justified differences in the provisions of athletic opportunities on the basis of sex does not support the claim that we should continue similarly.

Steve Goldberg in his book, *The Inevitability of Patriarchy*, argues that males are physiologically and psychologically more aggressive and dominant; this explains why males have filled the most sought after positions and enjoyed privileges associated with those positions in society. Goldberg argues that this pattern will continue to be the case. Thus he concludes that raising girls to strive for these positions which they have little chance to attain, would result in failure and unhappiness for adult females and the general unhappiness of society at large.[21]

Given this anthropological argument (that considerations of sex are relevant in assigning roles, benefits, and burdens, and that hormonal and genetic differences are linked to male dominance), it is often said that women should be socialized to accept male domination and not challenge men for either their position or the privileges which accompany their position--such as athletic opportunities--for their own sake and the collective good.

Assuming for the sake of the argument that the anthropological claims are correct, would the conclusion follow that patriarchy is inevitable and that men and women should be socialized differently in order to prepare them for mutually exclusive roles? Consider the following analogy developed by Jane English: It is accepted that height is determined by genes and hormones and that the tall dominate the short. A small percentage of exceptions would not be considered relevant in forming the following conclusion: We should condition short children to accept the dominance of the tall and not to strive for positions of power and leadership. Jane English states: "If this conclusion does not follow from the assumptions about height then the conclusion about socialization does not follow from the analogous assumptions about sex."[22]

The erosion sub-argument, the present focus of analysis, has further support in the claim that the basic unit of society is the family with the woman functioning according to her nature as wife and mother and the man according to his nature as provider and protector. Sports opportunities, like other educational opportunities, should promote and protect the traditional family and the American way of life.[23] However, in response, one could say that the family may be the basic unit necessary for the preservation of society and still deny that the family is defined in terms of strict sex roles of caring for the individuals within that family. Further, playing team sports may actually encourage the development of more common interests which can be beneficial in terms of physical and mental health of the individuals within that family. Playing team sports could facilitate learning how to work and interact with other people.

Suppose it were the case that giving women equal athletic opportunities would lessen the athletic opportunities to which men are entitled. First it is not clear that men's participation in sports would lessen if women had comparable opportunities to participate. If it were the case, the question

should be raised: Should we promote the kind of society where half of the population must defer to the other half so that the benefits bestowed on the latter would continue? Would this be just or fair? Would it even be more useful or promote general happiness?

The Retention Argument

Now let us turn to the other side--that there should be no exemptions of revenue producing sports from the application of Title IX's equal athletic opportunity. The argument for retaining revenue producing sports can be stated as follows:

1. Exemption of revenue producing sports from Title IX application would perpetuate discrimination on the basis of sex.

2. Perpetuating discrimination on the basis of sex is morally unjustifiable unless elimination of such discrimination would result in greater harm or injustice.

3. The possible destruction of "big time" sports does not qualify as an overriding harm or injustice.

Therefore,

4. It is morally unjustifiable to exempt revenue producing sports from the application of Title IX's equal athletic opportunity standard.

The first premise of the retention argument--that exemption of revenue producing sports from Title IX application would perpetuate discrimination on the basis of sex--can be supported in two ways. First, there is the *prima facie* claim that there are great differences between allocations for men's and women's intercollegiate athletic programs. These differences represent discrimination based on sex. I will call this the "*prima facie* argument." Second, discrimination in athletics is part of discrimination against women in general, and this claim and its support I will call the "pervasive inequality argument." In this part of the paper there will be a discussion of each of these arguments.

The Prima Facie Argument The "*prima facie* argument" rests on the claim that there are great differences between men's and women's athletic programs and that such differences are not based on relevant criteria. The difference can be illustrated by comparing the nation's average expenditures for athletic programs for men and women: $141,000 for women compared to $717,000 for men.[24] Some of the difference can be explained by recognizing that women constitute only 30% of the intercollegiate athletic population. But one must also pay attention to the fact that this group of persons which comprises 30% of the intercollegiate population receives only 21% of the scholarship budget, 14% of the operating budget, and 19% of the salaries budget.[25] Women's programs are unequal to men's programs in terms of organizational influence and authority, access to facilities and equipment, as well as financial assistance and opportunities for recreation and competitive programs. This is the case despite a growing interest in women in sports and despite an undergraduate population of women which is almost equal to that of men.[26]

Further, one could also argue that this latter fact provides the base figure against which the assessment of current intercollegiate athletic participation rates, program offerings, and resource allocations should be evaluated. In a nondiscriminatory environment it would be reasonable to assume that participation rates in collegiate athletic programs should ultimately reflect the proportion of females and males in the undergraduate student body.

The argument has also been made by the counsel for the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women (AIAW)[27] that the current status and development of intercollegiate athletics for women are substantially

understated in the policy presented by HEW last December, 1979 because there is no reference to the state of currently developing national competitive programs for women. Since the draft policies emphasize the distinction between local/regional, national competitive scope, the resulting implication is that regional national competition for women is underdeveloped and unavailable. Actually, however, AIAW currently offers 18 national championships in 13 different sports for female intercollegiate athletes. Also AIAW's nine regional organizations offer regional tournaments in 11 sports. Counsel for AIAW concludes that national and regional intercollegiate sports for female athletes are constrained by a lack of finances and for personnel reasons "rather than by inclination or availability of competition."[28]

Not recognizing these realities contributes to the belief that many intercollegiate athletic programs require a greater share of available resources than women's programs. Again the counsel argues:

> insofar as the policies permit the justi cation of future disparity in the allocation of resources based upon heretofore extant, competition patterns, the policies, in effect, sanction the perpetuation of discrimination against women's athletic programs, based solely upon the fact of past discrimination."[29]

The value judgment here is that an institution should effectively accommodate the interests and abilities of its students, both male and female. An institution would be presumed in compliance with this standard if it could show that its present athletic program reflected the same participation on the basis of sex as is reflected by its present overall, full-time undergraduate student enrollment or that it has offered opportunity to women which would reflect such percentages but insufficient interest existed to justify establishing additional athletic opportunities for women. Practice or tradition may have contributed to the current discrepancy between athletic opportunities for males and females, but to view these practices or traditions as being required by the nature of certain sports is to perpetuate past and present inequalities in the future.

The *prima facie* argument emphasizes the claim that at the current time women are prohibited by law, regulation, and tradition from receiving either an equitable or adequate share of athletic resources and opportunities. The application of Title IX to all intercollegiate athletic programs (including revenue producing sports) offers the possibility of lessening such discriminatory differences in treatment.[30]

The Pervasive Inequality Argument Sex discrimination in educational programs and activities functions not only to deny equality of opportunity, but also to affect individuals' ability to participate fully in other societal institutions and benefits. The claim here is that there is a relationship between direct effects of sexual discrimination in education and a larger pattern of societal sex stereotyping.

Those who argue for exemption as we noted in the earlier parts of this paper do not deny there are differences in athletic opportunities for men and women. The crucial debate focuses on the justifiability of such differences. The groups arguing for exemption of revenue producing sports find such differences in treatment appropriate and characteristic of a way of life which should be maintained. From this viewpoint "big time" sports are an important element in protecting the function of traditional sex roles and in preparing men for their adult roles in life, so it is entirely appropriate that men should play the athletic games and women should support them from the sidelines.[31]

On the other side, those who argue for retention are those who desire greater social equality of the sexes, and equality of athletic opportunities are perceived as part of a major social movement of our time--expansion of social roles for women. The claim here is that the imbalance in accommodation between men's and women's sports programs not only harms women and prevents the development of their athletic potential and lifelong recreational habits, but also serves as well to confine women to preselected roles which narrow their options and reduce their freedom, overall.

Those espousing the "pervasive argument" are not claiming there are no sexual differences but rather that these differences are usually not relevant to decisions regarding allocation of athletic opportunities on an unequal basis. The argument for putting an end to disproportionate treatment of the sexes rests on a denial that biological differences between the sexes justify differences in rights, duties, and opportunities. Both sexes should be treated equally, unless there is a difference between them which is relevant to the social good or to the opportunity being offered. Men may be heavier and taller in general, but such a general difference (according to the advocates of the retention position) does not justify inequality of athletic opportunity. Women, as well as men, benefit from the opportunity to develop tneir physical potential, to enjoy team and individual sports, to acquire discipline and character.

Further, differences between the sexes do not matter as they have in times when families needed many children and when muscle power was the prime source of energy. In a developed technological society like ours, those characteristics do not justify the extent of the differences in treatment which still prevail. Sex differences from the retentionist's perspective rarely matter to one's educability, job performance, recreational needs, and to most roles within the family. To continue to prepare young men and women for the roles of a past era is unjustifiable, and our educational programs should be encouraged to eliminate sex discrimination, not perpetuate it.

As the American Council on Education proposed, athletic programs at American colleges and universities should be part of the total educational program. Such programs should provide for as wide student participation as possible, enhancing development through competition, whether at the club, recreational, or intercollegiate level. Universities should foster and work toward equality of opportunity for men and women in sports activities. "Clearly, this responsibility includes providing factual evidence of equality between men's and women's sports."[32]

The ideal legislator, uninfluenced by the need to please voters, can pose the following questions and answers: Is it morally justifiable to exempt revenue producing sports from the Title IX standard of equal athletic opportunity? There are no absolute criteria to which one might appeal to answer this question. In our culture equality is an important ideal, but as wise persons have noted, the nature of equality and the question of whether it is a good thing turn out to be difficult problems. Is it morally justifiable to exempt revenue producing sports from the Title IX standard of equal athletic opportunity? Should some be more equal than others? Only when there is a greater harm or injustice which would result is such a position justifiable. Is the possible destruction of revenue producing sports, as they have traditionally been defined in 20th century America, the *greater harm*?

NOTES

[1]Public Law 92-318, 92nd Congress, S. 659 (June 23, 1972), Sec. 901.

[2]Phyllis West, "Massive Lobbying Campaign Seeks to Get Title IX," *National NOW Times* (June 1979), p. 1.

[3]Hugo Bedau, *Justice and Equality*, Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1971, p. 2.

Norman E. Bowie and Robert L. Simon, *The Individual and the Political Order: An Introduction to Social and Political Philosophy* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1979), p. 4.

[4]Joseph Califano, "Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics," HEW *News* (Dec. 6, 1978). ERIC document ED 164 470. Also see Federal Register (December 11, 1978).

[5]The standard of equal athletic opportunity for males and females refers to the one stated in the HEW announcement last December (1978). Expenditures on men's and women's athletic programs should be proportionate to the number of men and women participating in athletics. This proportionate standard applies to athletic scholarships, recruitment, and other readily measurable financial budgets (such as equipment and supplies, travel and publicity) and also for those benefits and services that are not so readily measurable (such as the opportunity to compete and practice, the opportunity to receive coaching and academic facilities). This standard of comparable accommodation of both sexes' interests and abilities must be met unless institutions can demonstrate that differences in expenditures are based on non-discriminatory factors such as the cost of a particular sport and the scope of competition which is national, rather than regional.

[6]The concept of the general good is a complex topic appropriate for lengthy philosophical discussion. Here, however, athletic opportunities are claimed to be part of whatever standard of a good quality of life one would hold, for either sex or for both sexes. One can imagine a world where any extra movement lessens the survival chances of the individual or the collectivity, but that is not our world.

[7]*The Chronicle of Higher Education* (April 23, 1979), p. 19.

[8]U.S. Congress. Senate. Senator Clark speaking for Women's Rights. Including "No Sporting Chance," written by Bart Barnes and Nancy Scammell. 93rd Congress 2nd Session (May 20, 1974), *Congressional Record* 120:16399.

[9]Phyllis West, p. 13. "Of 475 NCAA institutions with varsity football programs in 1977, only 92 or 19%, achieved revenue from football at least equal to the team's operating expenses. 81% didn't even break even."

[10]Barnes & Scammell, *Congressional Record* 120:16400.

[11]*Ibid.*

[12]*Ibid.*

[13]Phyllis West, p. 13.

[14]This was one of the state's arguments in Serrano v. Priest, Supreme Court of California, 1971. 5 Cal. 3d584. Cal. Rptr. 601,487 P.2d 1241.

[15]Except for the priestess.

[16]Barnes & Scammell, *Congressional Record* 120:16399. The decision has been reversed by a federal court.

[17]*Ibid.*, 16400.

[18]*Ibid.*, 16400.

[19]Women's Equity Action League, Texas Division, Survey of Sex Discrimination in the Waco Independent School District, Houston, TX, 1973.

[20]Larry Tabal, "Women's Sports on the Rise," *National NOW Times* (June 1972), p. 12.

[21]Steven Goldberg, "The Inevitability of Patriarchy," adapted from *The Inevitability of Patriarchy*, by Jane English, ed., *Sex Equality* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), pp. 196-204.

[22]Jane English, ed., *Sex Equality* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1977), p. 196.

[23]Phyllis Schlafly, "Child's Declaration of Rights," in Eagle Forum Declaration of Principles in Observance of the International Year of the Child, Jan. 1979, reprinted in *National NOW Times* (June 1979), p. 9.

[24]AIAW (Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women) Competitive Division Structure Implementary Survey. The national average expenditures in 1973 were $26,000 for women's athletics and $586,000 for men's. Comparing the increase in money in men's athletics in 1973 and 1978, one might conclude that men's athletics have not been affected by the development of women's athletics. Fall 1978, p. 11. (1201 16th Street, N.W., Washington, DC 20036).

[25]*Ibid.*

[26]*Ibid.* See also Joseph Califano, "Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics," and "Racial, Ethnic and Sex Enrollment Patterns," Office of Civil Rights, U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1978, at 221.

[27]Margot Polivy, "Comments of the Association for Intercollegiate Athletics for Women on Proposed Policy Interpretation on Title IX and Intercollegiate Athletics" (February 12, 1979), available from Renouf, McKenna and Polivy, 1532 16th St., NW, Washington, DC, 20036.

[28]*Ibid.*, p. 7.

[29]*Ibid.*

[30]The ironic result of the exemption proposal from this perspective is that if revenue producing sports were exempted, the concomitant adjustment imposed on women's programs would mean that women's programs would then be considered to exceed on a per-capita basis the monies allocated to the remaining men's sports! Women's programs would have even less money for scholarships, supplies, facility development, etc.!

[31]Some might even say that "you have come a long way since the Olympic Games in Greece, Baby."

[32]American Council on Education, "Responsibilities in the Conduct of Collegiate Athletic Programs," as reported in *The Chronicle of Higher Education* (October 9, 1979), p. 3.

IS THERE A GOOD ARGUMENT FOR EXEMPTING REVENUE-PRODUCING SPORTS FROM TITLE IX?

Keith L. Raitz
University of Louisville

Response to Roemer

One who favors the exemption of revenue-producing sports from the purview of Title IX is interested, quite understandably, in discovering the strongest argument in support of his position. So is his opponent or his critic interested in establishing the strongest argument in favor of such an exemption. The opponent or critic, however, is after the best argument in order to attack it and, he hopes, to destroy it; for, if the strongest case can be destroyed, the others might go down with it. Strategically, therefore, it seems advisable, especially in a brief response such as this, to seek the most compelling argument available to those who favor exemption of revenue-producing sports from Title IX and to test the strength of that argument.

What is the best argument? Is it "the competition sub-argument" that Roemer explicates? According to this argument, the application of Title IX to revenue-producing sports would sap money from the budgets of football and basketball programs, which would lead to a decline in the level of competition for these "big-time" intercollegiate sports, which would cause a reduction in spectator interest in these sports, which would result in severe losses of revenue produced by these sports, which would--finally--have the net effect of making less money available to the rest of the colleges' athletic programs. This argument must surely fall of its own weight, for it represents a species of begging the question: i.e., the competition sub-argument is an attempt to support a dubious contention (viz., that Title IX would mean the demise of big-time intercollegiate sports) by marching out a whole host of equally dubious assertions. Besides, as Roemer points out, there is the fact--which is not at all dubious--that only ten percent of college athletic departments in the United States are able to finance their college athletic programs with income from revenue-producing sports; so the competition sub-argument is not even relevant in ninety percent of the instances, as Eleanor also points out. There is no need to go on. The competition sub-argument is untenable.

What about "the erosion sub-argument," then? How persuasive is the argument that revenue-producing sports should be exempt from Title IX because their inclusion under the law will lead to "a decline of interest in manliness, discipline, and character building related to the American way of life"? As Roemer reports the argument further,

> This challenge to the quality of America's way of life and traditional sex roles would lead to societal unrest as well as individual unhappiness. Perpetuating the traditional sex roles and promoting their virtues should take precedence over equality of the sexes in educational programming.

Am I wrong, or do I detect a certain relish in Roemer's tone as she tears into these truths of yesteryear? Perhaps "gusto" is a better word than mere "relish." In discussing the erosion sub-argument, Roemer argues generally that psychological, cultural, and biological facts in themselves provide no basis for value judgments and moral pronouncements regarding the place of women and girls in our society. She might have pointed out also that value judgments and moral beliefs themselves play a very important part in determing what will be accepted as "the facts" about females in any given time or place. For example, here are some "facts" about girls, circa 1930:

> External stimuli such as cheering audiences, bands, lights, etc., cause a great response in girls and are apt to upset the endocrine balance. Under emotional stress a girl may easily overdo. There is wide-spread agreement that girls should not be exposed to extremes of fatigue or strain either emotional or physical . . . . In addition, custom and good taste should always influence in questions of public display, costumes, publicity.[1]

> Girls are not suited for the same athletic programs as boys. The biological difference between them can not be ignored unless we are willing to sacrifice our school girls on the alter [sic] of an Olympic spectacle. Under prolonged and intense physical strain, a girl goes to pieces nervously. She is "through" mentally before she is completely depleted physically . . . . The fact that a girl's nervous resistence [sic] can not hold out under intensive physical strain is nature's warning. A little more strain and she will be in danger both physically and nervously.[2]

The interplay of facts and values illustrated above gives good reason to doubt both the values and the "facts" upon which those values are presumably based. Again, there is no need to go further in assessing the erosion sub-argument. Both the moral values of the argument and the so-called facts upon which they depend are too questionable to lend any support to the conclusion regarding the exemption of revenue-producing sports from Title IX.

So the sub-arguments that Roemer explicates in the first part of her paper appear to be quite weak. If one had to choose the best argument in behalf of exemption, perhaps it could be found within the first sub-argument that Roemer examines. I refer to the competition sub-argument as it applies to the ten percent of colleges where football and/or basketball produces sufficient revenue to fund the entire athletic program--the Ohio States, Penn States, and Notre Dames. In such cases, Roemer says, "the established link between having less money for recruitment, for scholarship, for coaching and supplies, etc., and a lowered level of competition is crucial." She goes on to argue that if application of Title IX results in equal deprivation for all of these football and basketball programs then the level of competition and, presumably, the level of fans' interest will be maintained. Furthermore, Roemer points out that there are means other than big-time sports to generate funds for athletic programs, as is shown by the fact that football and basketball programs still exist at schools where these sports do not generate enough money to pay even for themselves.

Now, in my view, it is unfortunate that Roemer deals so fleetingly with the argument in behalf of the income-producing athletic programs and their proposed exemption from Title IX. Here, I believe, is the strongest argument that can be presented. And her claims that funding cuts will not lessen levels of competition or spectator interest at the bit-time colleges appear to be unsubstantiated empirical claims. One could point to funding cuts in high school football that seem to have resulted in lowered levels of competition and interest. And perhaps additional evidence could be brought forward. But suffice it to say here that opponents of exemption (i.e., people like Roemer) are under the same obligation as advocates of exemption to substantiate claims regarding the effects of lowered funding upon the athletic programs in question.

Roemer also points out in her argument that there are ways other than the promotion of revenue-producing sports to pay for athletic programs. As she says, colleges where football and basketball programs do not pay for themselves--much less pay for the whole sports program--still have football and basketball teams. In such cases, however, it will usually be found that the expense of big-time sports is claimed to be justified because such sports

are important to students, alumni, governors, and legislators, i.e., to influential people who help pay the bills for the entire institution, not merely the athletic programs. But cases such as these are not germane to the arguments that Roemer is examining, for the general good that is sought via governors and legislators is different from the general good sought by increasing opportunities in athletic programs for everyone.

In closing I want to add that, in my view, *all* arguments in behalf of Title IX exemption fail if they incorporate a premise that defines the general good as "athletic programs and sports and the beneficial results which participating in, as well as following, brings." To circumscribe the notion of the general good in such a manner (as many exemption advocates do, incidentally) is to overvalue sports and, concomitantly, to undervalue equal opportunity for women (as many exemption advocates also do, incidently). If the general good is interpreted more broadly, as it is by those who oppose exempting revenue-producing sports from Title IX, then there is *no* good argument for removing such sports from the reach of the law.

NOTES

[1]President of the American Physical Education Association, 1933. Quoted in "Title IX: Myth and Fact," *The Scholastic Coach*, January, 1978, p. 101.

[2]Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Women's Division of the National Amateur Athletic Federation, 1932. Quoted in "Title IX: Myth and Fact," p. 101.

LOGIC IN CHILDREN'S LITERATURE

Bonnie Hume
Eastern Kentucky University

The subject of logic in the elementary and middle schools is receiving considerable attention today. Programs have been designed that take as long as a year to complete. In some cases students have been given crash courses in hopes that they will become disciplined enough that they will continue to apply the basic principles of good reasoning. There have been attempts to incorporate concepts of logic in the curriculum. The latter approach is the main concern of this paper.

The Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, in keeping with the findings of Piaget, recommends that the study of logic as a discipline begin no earlier than the fifth grade. But from my own observations of children, I am inclined to believe that children are far more logical and appreciative of rules of logic than they have been credited as being in most research following the work of Piaget. In most cases the topics of investigation and the research settings have been designed by adults, and the conditions, if not stifling, at least do not encourage curiosity, imagination, and ingenuity.

Piaget found that at around the age of seven the child is capable of a logic based on the classification, relation, and numbering of objects. Even preschoolers may be observed sorting objects without the verbal promptings of adults. They may be seen grouping things according to color, size, or shape. They group stuffed animals, toys on wheels, construction blocks, and dolls. The child of two to four years of age is perfectly capable of telling anyone that all of these may be called toys, and that they can be sorted and named. Observing the child in his natural surroundings, as Piaget often did, seems to be a far more accurate way to get at how the small child thinks than experimentation in a controlled one-on-one situation where the child manipulates geometric designs or colored wooden beads, for instance. If the child weren't so polite and respectful of adults, he might very well respond with "That's a dumb question" if asked, "Do you have more toys on wheels or toys?" But researchers persist in frustrating children with questions such as "Are there more red beads or more wooden beads?" when they are shown several red beads and two yellow beads all of which are wooden. Yet children can pick violets, dandelions, and daisies and make bouquets without a doubt that they are all flowers. They can identify furry, four-legged creatures even though they may all be called "doggie."

This paper is an attempt to present the rudiments of formal logic in a manner that might be comprehended by preschoolers and early elementary school children. It has some suggestions as to how the teacher might teach a few basic logical principles through children's literature and by capitalizing on children's conversation whenever possible.

An excellent way to get young children to begin thinking logically is to present them with contradictory bits of information or contrasting descriptions of an individual's personality and background. Children's books have the potential of raising real logical questions in the child's mind when used by teachers with imagination and understanding of some very elementary concepts of logic. After examining several selections in the children's section of a library, I chose two that seemed sufficient to illustrate how conflicts can be created in children's minds and how the concepts of contradiction and implication may be introduced to young children. The books were *Wise Dog* by Josephine Wright and *The Dog Who Insisted He Wasn't* by Marilyn Singer. The first book is about a dog who, through his cunning

and good judgment, was able to receive all sorts of favors from his less intelligent friends. Konrad, on the other hand, who is the main character in *The Dog Who Insisted He Wasn't*, found himself in a variety of unpleasant situations because he thought he was a person.

The following exercise is designed for the teacher rather than the child. The child would no doubt become bored with the list of relationships in question, but the teacher needs to be alert to the type of reasoning that might be elicited from children on appropriate occasions such as (1) when they are discussing personal experiences, (2) when they are engrossed in the plot of a story, or (3) when they are confronted with conflicting bits of information. Without being concerned with rules, the reader is invited to complete the following exercise. Answer as TRUE, FALSE, or UNKNOWN:

If it is true that ALL dogs are wise, then

1. SOME dogs are wise is _____
2. NO dogs are wise is _____
3. SOME dogs are NOT wise is _____

If it is true that NO dogs are wise, then

4. SOME dogs are wise is _____
5. SOME dogs are NOT wise is _____
6. ALL dogs are wise is _____

If it is true that SOME dogs are wise, then

7. SOME dogs are NOT wise is _____
8. NO dogs are wise is _____
9. ALL dogs are wise is _____

If it is true that SOME dogs are NOT wise, then

10. SOME dogs are wise is _____
11. NO dogs are wise is _____
12. ALL dogs are wise is _____

Answers

1. T	4. F	7. U	10. U
2. F	5. T	8. F	11. U
3. F	6. F	9. U	12. F

As anyone with the scantest acquaintance with logic can recognize, the above exercise is based on the so-called square of opposition which illustrates the relationship between logical sentences. A logical sentence is much more simple than most of our sentences in everyday usage. It begins with a *quantifying word* such as "all," "no," or "some." It has a *subject term* and a *verb* which, when properly stated, is usually the present tense of the verb form "to be." The purpose of the clean, clear-cut logical sentence is to help us keep in mind that the subject belongs to a well-defined class of things or, in the jargon of mathematics, that the subject is a subset of a set of things. The class or set of things with which the subject

is identified is referred to as a *predicate*. When we say "All dogs are wise," we are not to think of wise as a mere characteristic of the subject, but that the dog belongs to a class of wise creatures. If we say "No dogs are wise," then we are saying that dogs are excluded from that set of creatures deemed wise.

There are, as we have seen, four forms of sentences in traditional logic. These are identified by the letters A, E, I, and O. The relationships among these sentences can be illustrated very simply by the square of opposition shown below.



The square of opposition tells us the following. If A is true, I is true by implication; E and O are false because they are contrary and contradictory, respectively. If E is true, O is true by implication; A and I are false because they are contrary and contradictory, respectively. If I is true, we know only that E is false. If O is true, we know only that A is false. Now let us look at the denial of the sentence forms. If A is false, we know only that O has to be true. If E is false, we know only that I has to be true. If I is false, we know only that O is true. If O is false we know only that I is true.

It would be most naive to suppose that elementary school children are apt to become enthused about the square of opposition. But the principles can be introduced in a manner which children can grasp through literature and their own experiences. After reading and allowing children to discuss freely the short books *Wise Dog* and *The Dog Who Insisted He Wasn't*, a teacher might ask the following types of questions.

1. What does it mean to be wise?
2. What were some of the things Konrad did that may not be wise?
3. Was Wise Dog really wise according to some of our definitions of "wise"? What were some of the things he did?
4. Are ALL wise creatures dogs?

5. Are ALL dogs wise?

6. Are NO dogs wise?

7. Are SOME dogs wise?

8. Are SOME dogs NOT wise?

9. Children might be encouraged to discuss some wise things their pets have done.

In response to these questions, the importance of agreement on definitions such as "wise" should be stressed. If it is suggested that a wise person or dog knows who he is, then, by definition, we may eliminate Konrad from the class of wise creatures. It should be easy for children to understand that a class such as "wise creatures" can include members other than dogs, provided the children offer or are offered acceptable examples of other creatures. If children agree that Konrad was not wise, they are able to contradict the notion that all dogs are wise. If they agree that Wise Dog's behavior was in conformity with their definition of "wise," then they can contradict the notion that no dogs are wise. They may even go beyond the books and refer to dogs or other pets for cases to affirm or deny the statements about dogs.

One of the most important lessons to emerge from teaching logic to young children is the development of caution in using universal statements. For example, much ethnic and racial prejudice may be averted as a result of brief attention to logic. One teacher who participated in a program of instruction in logic for elementary school children relates an experience in which a student told her "All Puerto Ricans are nasty." Then the student suddenly recalled his lesson and said, "Most Puerto Ricans are nasty," which may be translated into "Some Puerto Ricans are nasty." "Some" may be as few as one person.

Children's books already in existence may also be a means of introducing important logical concepts. Books may be used to introduce the syllogism to the young child in a way that is palatable. Prerequisite to good reasoning is the ability to observe and recall similarities and differences, to place items in order, and to name and classify objects.

The book *One Was Johnny: A Counting Book* by Maurice Sendak, 1962, is an excellent tool for illustrating the above. The book is in poetry form and is about a little boy who lives by himself. He is reading a book when all of a sudden creatures begin entering his room one at a time. The opening lines are:

> One was Johnny who lived by himself
> Two was a rat who jumped on the shelf

The lines three through ten mention a cat, a dog, a turtle, a monkey, a blackbird, a tiger, a robber, and finally, a puzzle. "What should Johnny do?"

Johnny stands on a chair and says,

> I'll start to count backwards
> and when I am through--
> if this house isn't empty
> I'll eat all of you!!!

And the order of the animals is reversed as they leave the room one by one.

Questions pertaining to the story were used with twenty kindergarten children at the Model Laboratory School at Eastern Kentucky University and twenty kindergarten children at the Telford Community Center in Richmond, Kentucky, to determine whether there would be a difference in the responses

of children from different socioeconomic backgrounds. The first question on the list to be asked was "Which of the things Johnny counted was invisible?" But several children in both classes asked, "Where's the puzzle?" when the line "Ten was a puzzle" was read. Perhaps this immediate response was because they had been shown pictures as the story was read. But when allowed to reflect on their own question, they showed remarkable maturity in their ability to identify problems. At first they answered "his turtle," "his rat," "all the stuff in his room," and finally "how to get them out of his room."

The following questions were designed to check the children's abilities to observe, recall, and notice similarities and differences, to order items, name and classify objects, and reason about these things.

1. Which of the things counted in Johnny's room was invisible? Why?
2. Which of the things in the room have two legs?
3. Which of the things with two legs are the most alike? Why?
4. Could a little boy be a robber?
5. How is a bird different from a turtle?
6. How is a monkey like a person?
7. How is a monkey different from a person?
8. Which things in the room have four legs?
9. Which animal in Johnny's room would you like for a pet?
10. Which animal would be a bad choice for a pet?
11. Who left the room first?
12. Who left the room last?
13. Who was in the room the longest time (other than Johnny)?

The children in both groups easily recalled and named the two-legged and four-legged animals. Asked which things with two legs are the most alike, most of the children said Johnny and the robber because they are people. Similarities and differences were noted with excellent recall by both groups. To the question "How is a monkey different from a person?" hands and fingernails were mentioned. One little girl said "They are different back here" as she patted her bottom, and then said, "The monkey's got a tail." To the surprise of their teachers, the children defined "robber" as "someone who steals money, bikes, or anything." Teachers had expected that children would associate "robber" with major crime like bank robbery, but by granting that anyone who steals is a robber, they conceded that a little boy could be called a robber. They also discussed the possibility of just pretending to be a robber.

The children in both kindergarten classes responded that it was the robber who left the room first. To the question "Who left the room last?" they recalled that the cat was carrying the rat, so they left together. To the question "Who was in the room the longest time?" their response was the rat. They seemed to have no difficulty recalling that the rat entered first and left last with the cat. The children exhibited the ability to reverse the order of objects which is usually a difficult task for that age child. When the order of the animals was reversed some of the children voluntarily called the names of some of the animals in proper sequence before the teacher read the lines or showed the pictures.

The question "Which animal would you like for a pet?" sounds at first like a values question, but it can easily be turned into a logic question when the needs of a pet and the responsibilities of ownership are considered. The tiger may look adorable, but when the size of the animal, space he would need (a jungle-like setting), cost of feeding, possible danger, and destructiveness are taken into account, the choice could no doubt be shown to be illogical in most cases. In this study the children at both schools called the tiger a lion.

To check observation and recall, the teacher might see how many children can remember that the monkey took a banana in answer to the question of what was missing in the last picture. Since children, at the level in which this book is often used, are unable to read and write but love to draw, they could be asked to draw a picture of the missing object if they think they know what it is, and then they might compare their pictures. A question of equal interest and a lot more mystery is that of an object that appears when Johnny chases the creatures from the room. ("Four was the dog who slid home on a sled.") The dog is pictured on a sled in Johnny's room.

This paper will be concluded with some discussion of the syllogism and illustrations of how the basic elements of the syllogism might be introduced to young children using the characters from the book *One Was Johnny*. The syllogism consists of two statements or premises and a conclusion. The statements are usually in the A, E, I, or O form as shown in the square of opposition. A syllogism is concerned with three things: the subject, the predicate, and the middle term. The subject, predicate, and middle terms are mentioned twice each in a good argument. The conclusion is a statement about the subject (S) and the predicate (P) stated in one of the four ways below.

All S is P
No S is P
Some S is P
Some S is not P

The middle term (M)--that is, the quality or characteristic that the subject and predicate have in common--does not appear in the conclusion of a good argument.

It is highly unlikely that many children will be able to reach valid conclusions to all the arguments given below. Those conclusions which are observable and related to their own experiences will be accepted more readily. On the other hand, a valid conclusion is often rejected if it is in conflict with basic beliefs. But this is also true of many adults. For example, the conclusion of the following argument was rejected by several students in my critical thinking class at the end of the term, even when they were allowed to check it against the 24 valid argument forms.

All absolutistic creeds are undemocratic.	All M are P
Religion is an absolutistic creed.	All S is M
Therefore, religion is undemocratic.	All S is P

Logic, doesn't seem quite so rigid when we begin by saying, "What if I told you that _____?" and then ask for agreement or disagreement regarding the conclusion. Children will no doubt give teachers some argument concerning the truth of the premises, so the teacher may have to say "Let's just 'play like' they're true and see what might happen." The following arguments were constructed with the characters in *One Was Johnny*.

What if I told you that--
"All robbers are people who wear blue caps, and
all monkeys are people who wear blue caps."
Does that mean that *all monkeys are robbers*?

By the rules of grown-up logic, the fallacy in this argument goes by the name of the "undistributed middle term," because neither premise tells us anything about all people who wear blue caps.

What if I told you that--
"All robbers are people who wear blue caps, and
all robbers are people who like bananas."
Does that mean that *all people who like bananas wear blue caps*?

This fallacy is referred to as "illicit process," because a term is distributed in the conclusion which was not distributed in the premises, i.e., the conclusion refers to a whole class while the premise refers only to part of a class.

What if I told you that--
"All dogs are animals, and
all cats are animals."
Does that mean that *all cats are dogs*?

In this case our argument form is the same as that of the first argument, but children will have less difficulty, because their experience can tell them that this conclusion is silly. This argument, by the way, illustrates how the validity of an argument may be tested by analogy or substitution of terms. If we have true premises and a false conclusion, we have a bad argument. A subject for future study is the determination of the age level at which children understand that "animals" in the last argument corresponds with "people who wear blue caps" in the first argument. The concepts of correspondence and analogy are no doubt difficult ones for most preschoolers to grasp. But it would do no harm to suggest to the child that if the cat-dog argument is bad, then the monkey-robber argument must also be bad.

What if I told you that--
"All cats like rats, and
all tigers are cats."
Does that mean that *all tigers like rats*?

In this case we have a valid conclusion. Its truth may be questioned, but if we accept the premises we must also accept the conclusion, unless, of course, we want to get into the business of the "four-term fallacy." This fallacy may be detected when there is a shift in the meaning of words. Does "cat" mean the same in the first premise as it does in the second? This question seems appropriate for children even though it is a tricky problem in logic.

What if I told you that--
"The cat is bigger than the rat, and
the tiger is bigger than the cat."
Who is the biggest--the rat, the cat, or the tiger?

By sight or familiarity with the objects, children should be able to reach the correct conclusion without having to reason. The next example is more difficult because the objects are nearer the same size.

What if I told you that--
"The blackbird is bigger than the turtle, and
the turtle is bigger than the rat."

Who is the biggest--the rat, the turtle, or the blackbird?
Experience is not as helpful in answer to this question. Reasoning is required to reach a conclusion regarding the three objects. We can assume that the child's previous experience of these objects is limited enough that it is of little help. Some kindergarten and nursery school teachers I have had in workshops are confident that many of their children would actually claim that the rat in the picture was the biggest because of the extra long tail. If one finds this consistently to be the case, then Piaget's findings on the child's concept of conservation are supported anew. To begin understanding the logi-

cal relationship between the size of objects, children could be asked to draw a circle to represent the space needed for the turtle (our middle term). Then they could be asked, "If the blackbird is bigger than the turtle, will his circle be larger or smaller?" After that question is answered and a larger circle is drawn, the child will be asked, "If the turtle is bigger than the rat, will the rat's circle be larger or smaller?" The teacher may have to suggest that the rat's tail might be folded up so that he could fit in the circle. With the circles in a row the child then can determine by sight which object must be the biggest.

The conclusion that the blackbird is also bigger than the rat becomes obvious. Through this process the attention moves from experience to reason and back to experience when the child examines the circles and reflects on how he arrived at his conclusion.

The temporal ordering of events can be approached in the same manner as the above. Faces of clocks might be used with such questions as "If the blackbird was in the room five minutes before the tiger came in and the tiger was in the room five minutes before the robber came in, who was in the room the longest time?" The teacher could get the children started thinking by supposing that the tiger-time was ten minutes or two shaded areas on a clock face. The blackbird's clock would show three shaded areas and the robber's clock would show only one shaded area (assuming the robber got to stay that long in Johnny's room before he was chased out). By looking at the three clocks, children can easily determine which time period was the longest. It is the responsibility of the teacher to sense when a problem has no appeal for the child. The problems of space and time are very abstract, and problems such as the ones just discussed should only be used if there is interest.

Puzzles and problems should be kept in relation to the child's own experience, which of course includes his reading and being read to. There is hardly a question but that reading can be made a lot more interesting for child and teacher alike if frequent breaks are taken to discuss book characters and events and to reason in a formal manner about them.

At this point, in anticipation of the question "Why logic at such an early age?" I answer "Why not? so long as the teacher is alert to signs of frustration, anxiety, or boredom." If no more than the word "logic" is recalled from the lessons in kindergarten or the primary grades, children might be on the road to better reasoning.

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Further information is available through the Institute for the Advancement of Philosophy for Children, Montclair State College, Upper Montclair, New Jersey.

SYMBOLIC LOGIC IN EDUCATION

Tomis Kapitan
Indiana State University

Abstract

Advances within the field of logic over the past century have both generated and been made possible by increasingly sophisticated formal techniques that have come to be classified under the heading of "symbolic logic." In the past two or three decades these new modes of expression have dominated the logic curriculum in American universities, and even introductory courses in logic have acquired an unprecedented aura of precision and rigor. Recently, however, a movement has arisen calling for a broader, more informal approach to beginning logic with the aim of cultivating a wider array of reasoning skills. Philosophy departments, faced with declining enrollments, have responded to this call by replacing their standard offerings with more general courses bearing such titles as "Critical Thinking," "Practical Reasoning," "Informal Logic," and so forth. To some extent, the backers of this reform movement have disparaged the use of formalism at the introductory level. I argue, to the contrary, that because the utilization of formal techniques is not only compatible with a broader approach to logic but actually enriches this study, and since such techniques are becoming more and more important in developments outside the sphere of logico-mathematical inquiry, symbolic logic should remain a permanent feature in beginning logic courses.

> . . . if we could find characters or signs appropriate for expressing all our thoughts as definitely and as exactly as arithmetic expresses numbers or geometric analysis expresses lines, we could in all subjects *insofar as they are amenable to reasoning* accomplish what is done in Arithmetic and Geometry.
>
> -Leibniz (1677)

Introductory Logic

There can be little doubt that some of the most significant achievements of 20th century philosophy have occurred in the area of logic. While other branches of philosophical inquiry have rarely matched the speculative ambition and innovation of earlier epochs, logic has forged ahead at a pace unknown since Aristotle. Integral to this development has been the invention of new symbolisms which have furthered the construction and investigation of formal systems embodying precise rules of formation and inference. Thus has arisen what is commonly referred to as "symbolic logic." The entry or, as some would have it, the "intrusion," of this new child of the scientific revolution into philosophical and scientific circles has had many repercussions, some highly theoretical, some downright practical. For one thing, symbolic logic has worked its way into every branch of philosophy so that it has become impossible to understand much of the work of recent decades without a mastery of the formal machinery. For another, logicians, anxious to display the newly found precision of their science, have introduced symbolic techniques into introductory logic courses causing many students to register surprise at finding themselves in another mathematics class when the university catalogue had led them to believe that they had enrolled in a humanities course.

Unfortunately, the employment of symbolic logic at the introductory level has met with limited success. The complaints and shortcomings are various. Too often students have branded introductory logic courses "irrelevant" for the simple reason that the symbolism and procedures they learned appear to have little or no application elsewhere. In fact, the application of symbolic logic, until very recently, has been confined to advanced philosophy and

foundational studies in mathematics, and it is a rare individual who has the patience to ascend into these abstract realms. Moreover, these beginning courses are almost exclusively devoted to truth-functional logic which is representative, at best, of only a tiny segment of our actual reasoning patterns and is unable to give a reliable account of something as pervasive as the ordinary conditionals. If you inquire, you will discover that the majority of students who enroll in introductory logic expect, at the outset, that they will learn to *reason* better or will enlarge their capacity for thinking *logically*. But, as the course draws to a close, there is a growing suspicion that too much time has been spent manipulating symbols in accordance with precise but mechanical rules. For those who are reasonably intelligent, the procedures seem relatively trivial. For others, the course content harbors only a remote connection with everyday reasoning. Perhaps a very small minority may have been excited by the possibilities opened up by the symbolism. The general result, however, is that frequently a student emerges from the course feeling that his *reasoning* skills have been only marginally improved at best and bearing a slight bitterness towards those who promised him that in taking such a course his ability to think *logically* would be significantly increased. He may conclude that his advisors were, no doubt, operating with a somewhat antiquated conception of logic; but this is small consolation.

As a consequence, the past three to five years have witnessed a major reaction to the dominance of symbolic logic in the introductory logic curriculum. A reform-movement has arisen bent upon acquainting the student with a broader range of issues--topics that the ordinary person, or the educated nonlogician, has traditionally classified under the headings of "logic" and the "science of reasoning." Philosophy departments around the country, faced with declining enrollments, have responded to this movement's message by instituting many of the adjustments it has called for, and with some success. Alternative introductory courses have sprung up that promise to offer a broader exposure to the nature and methods of "critical thinking," "rationality," "informal logic," etc., and to provide the student with tools that are more immediately applicable in his everyday thinking.[1] Many, attracted to this attempt at curricular reform, have urged that the employment of symbolic logic be minimized or, judging from some recent texts and syllabi, omitted altogether.

By and large, this movement is a welcome one for reasons I give below, and we can only lament the fact that it is overdue. At the same time, it engenders some significant problems, basically pedagogical in nature. For instance, the move away from symbolic logic is bound to be frustrating to a great many logicians who are now called upon to withhold, from beginning students, what they may regard as the most significant methodological innovation occurring within their field in the past two millenia. One may reflect, in comparison, that no sane person would urge that mathematics retreat from symbolic expression and conduct its introductory courses in, say, everyday English under titles such as "informal algebra," "informal calculus," and so on. Formal notation is virtually indispensable in assimilating and communicating the knowledge that has been amassed by this science. Why should the case be any different with logic? There is the additional fact that the new language of logic has found its way into other domains of inquiry, into diverse fields such as ethics, mathematics, linguistics, computer science, and even theology. In light of these developments, one might expect that just the opposite tendency would be in vogue wherein students are encouraged to study symbolic logic as a prerequisite for studies in other fields just as instruction in mathematics has become an essential basis for subsequent work in the natural sciences.

To deal with this apparent anomaly concerning historical expectations and the current pedagogical fashions, we are forced to inquire: Just what is the role of precise formal language in beginning logic courses and what, in general, is the relevance of symbolic logic to contemporary university study?

My position here is that symbolism should remain a central factor in introductory logic and that, contrary to the growing climate of opinion, it can play a vital role in the advancement of human reasoning and, hence, in a liberal education.

What is Symbolic Logic?

The circumstances which have given rise to the reform movement stem, in part, from confusions about what logic is and, thus, what an introductory logic course should be designed to accomplish. These confusions have no theoretical importance--that is, resolving them will not produce any new results within logic. Their impact is practical, constituting an example of a recurring pedagogical problem concerning the *scope* of a given discipline, a difficulty that is consequent upon the artificial divisions among the various fields of theoretical inquiry. My concern here, however, is with the example, not with the general problem.

Consider, first, logic itself. Traditionally, this branch of inquiry has been characterized as the science of correct reasoning or, alternatively, as the science of valid argumentation and implicational relationships. Within it there are numerous subdivisions--for example, deduction and induction, syntax and semantics, truth-functional logic and quantificational theory, and so forth. Symbolic logic is *not* another division of logic; it is, fundamentally, the same science of logic availing itself of more refined formal techniques than traditionally have been used. By analogy, what some call "mathematical physics" is not a special branch of physics; it is simply physics utilizing mathematics. The comparison to physics is pertinent, for just as a more powerful mathematical language has been crucial in the development of physics over the past 300 years, so, too, precise formal notation has underlain the advances of logic during the past century. Long before these comparatively recent periods, of course, symbolic inventions fostered the growth of mathematics itself.

The transformation of logic into symbolic logic has not been accidental, but a natural outgrowth of the way in which the field has been conceived for centuries. Like that of mathematics, the subject matter of logic is exceedingly abstract, and both disciplines have been viewed as "formal" sciences whose principles are often cited as paradigmatic examples of the power of pure reason. This is foreshadowed in standard characterizations of logic: for instance, Alonzo Church's statement that logic is "concerned with the analysis of sentences or of propositions and of proof with attention to the *form* in abstraction from the *matter*."[2] Now the concept of "form" is one of the central pillars of logic, and it constitutes the theoretical basis for symbolization. Its relevance to correct reasoning may be construed in various ways, but a common notion seems to be that valid arguments are those which possess special validating forms, so that the process of determining whether an argument is or is not valid becomes tantamount to locating some such form. Invalid arguments are those that lack a validating form. Moreover, inference rules are conveniently stated in terms of the forms of propositions that constitute arguments since each rule can be viewed as authorizing derivation of a proposition of a particular form, given premises of specified forms. It soon emerges from this perspective, that the primary concern of the logician is not so much with valid arguments as with their validating forms. Valid arguments, after all, abound; forms are the real objects of inquiry, for in understanding them the logician is able to examine a potentially infinite array of arguments and to formulate both inference rules and correlated general principles upon which the authority of rules is based. In a sense, forms constitute the keystone of the entire enterprise, a fact which prompted Whitehead to remark that "Aristotle founded the science of logic by conceiving the idea of the form of a proposition, and by conceiving deduction as taking place in virtue of such forms."[3]

As arguments are composed of propositions (or sentences), it is to be expected that argument forms are determined by reference to the forms of propositions, with the initial stages of logical investigation given to the isolation and expression of relevant propositional forms. At this level, two important linguistic practices have been invoked: (i) the canonical paraphrase of sentences, or more exactly, *sentence-types*, with its characteristic aim of minimizing syntactical and lexical ambiguity, and (ii) the use of variables (or schematic letters) to portray both propositional forms, thus, argument forms, and generalizations. These two techniques have become essential ingredients in the invention of formalisms, though neither is the unique property of symbolic logic; the use of canonical paraphrase and the variable to express abstractions is a typical procedure of scientists in the effort to achieve greater clarity and generality. The two practices are not even newcomers to the study of logic since they were already employed by Aristotle in his study of propositional forms.

Symbolism, characterized by strict rules, is the typical vehicle for displaying form, and its relevance in logical investigations can now be more readily discerned. Thus, determining whether a sentence(s) expresses something (i.e., a proposition) which *implies* something expressed by another sentence depends upon knowing just *what* is being expressed in each case. If forms are the actual "implication-making" attributes they are alleged to be, then essential to the task of propositional clarification (and, hence, to the task of discerning implicational ties) is the delineation of the exact forms of propositions under consideration. Success in this is greatly enhanced by the availability of precise notation incorporating both accurate and unambiguous grammatical structure as well as devices for indicating both generality and propositional types. It is at this point that canonical paraphrase and the variable emerge as invaluable aids. The refinement and extension of such linguistic techniques has permitted examination of a broader spectrum of argument forms and of the properties possessed by rigorously constructed formal systems, as this century has witnessed.

We are now in a better position to appreciate Leibniz's observation quoted at the outset of this paper. Reasoning is a rule-governed activity, and if a given subject matter is "amenable to reasoning," it harbors implicational connections which, if uncovered, can be reflected in appropriate inferential rules. Since rules are centered on propositional forms, and as the latter lend themselves to symbolic portrayal, it follows that the subject matter in question *can* be represented symbolically. Informativeness and accuracy in this regard depend upon the degree to which the subject matter is understood, and, of course, the achievements of arithmetic and geometry are difficult to approximate. But logic has made tremendous strides forward, and largely because it has developed more comprehensive perspectives on propositional form.

To many thinkers this sounds exciting, and it *is* exciting. Symbolic innovation has given new impetus to logic. Why has the inclusion of symbolic logic in the beginning logic curriculum met with such limited success and with the dreaded epithet of "irrelevant"? Having taught logic for the past five years, I am convinced that the reason is not, primarily, that formal mechanisms have rendered the subject too difficult for the average college freshman or sophomore. The standard moves in truth-functional logic and elementary quantification theory are not more difficult than the calculations required in elementary algebra (and may even be easier). The main reason lies elsewhere. Basically, introductory symbolic logic has been far too limited in scope to be of much interest to the student, and this is because it has failed to incorporate a large enough segment of the ways people in fact reason--moreover, *correctly* reason. Logicians would do well to pay attention to psychologists like Wason and Johnson-Laird who have argued that no existing formal calculus is able to model the ways in which people actually reason and infer.[4] There are a large variety of plausible inferential patterns common to our everyday thinking which are not even approximated by introductory

symbolic logic. For example, in freshman classes in mathematics and natural science there occur patterns of apparently correct reasoning that extend far beyond what is studied in beginning logic. Even the basic algebraic principles, listed as *rules* in mathematics texts, (for instance, "you may multiply or divide both sides of an inequality by a positive number and obtain an equivalent inequality") are not rules of inference studies in propositional or quantificational logic, and there is a conspicuous absence of inferences exhibiting those abstract patterns sanctioned by the latter. It is not surprising to discover that students find the content of a standard introductory logic course minimally applicable at best.

In part, these difficulties result, as I have already suggested, from a confusion about what logic is, or, about what its proper subject matter is. Even in philosophical circles this study is conceived in two different ways. Interpreted broadly, logic is the science of correct reasoning. As such, *any* instance of valid or plausible argumentation falls within its purview. Interpreted narrowly, logic becomes the study of specific *sorts* of valid argument patterns--that is, patterns that can be represented wholly by means of variables and appropriate "logical" constants, e.g., truth-functional connectives and quantifiers. It is from this latter perspective that logic is conveyed to beginning students. But here the confusion emerges, extending all the way to graduate level courses in logic: Not only are there valid argument patterns that exist beyond the boundaries of logic as narrowly conceived, there is not even a consensus about where these boundaries are to be drawn. For example, does logic include set theory? What about the formal study of the alethic and the temporal modalities or at an even greater extreme, the semantics of formal systems dealing with such notions as knowledge, belief, or the normative concepts? Are these studies also branches of "logic"? If *so*, then to what criteria can we appeal in distinguishing between logic and nonlogic, and why have introductory logic courses been so restricted in scope? If *not*, then why do universities offer courses in modal logic, epistemic logic, and deontic logic? Why are there books with titles like "The Logic of Perfection" or "The Logic of Society"?[5] And why did one of my classmates in graduate school receive permission to write a master's thesis on the "logic of emotion"? Why conceal the fact that epistemic logic, say, is just good old epistemology dressed in formal attire striving for acceptance as an exact science? In plain fact, the terms "logic," "logical," and "logically" are notoriously vague and ambiguous in contemporary philosophical English; as a result, there is a great deal of confusion and disagreement concerning what should and should not be taught under the label of "logic" not only at the beginning, but also the advanced levels.

In spite of this quagmire which is, as I have indicated previously, a pedagogical problem, some may cling to a narrower interpretation of logic by confining it to the study of the argument patterns traditionally investigated in standard propositional and predicate calculi. But something must be said in order to render this position respectable and to make it more than just a verbal stipulation about how to use the term "logic" --a stipulation which, in fact, violates common usage. One tactic is to claim that the mentioned patterns virtually *exhaust* all valid or correct reasoning and that other forms of argumentation are "enthymematic," with their plausibility deriving from correlated logical arguments, but devoid of genuine validity of their own. This view clashes with the initial evidence, however, for it forces us to concede that most of the mathematical inferences in, say, textbook calculus or physics, or relatively mundane arguments like

This is scarlet,

∴ This is extended,

are *invalid* as they stand. The view appears to ignore, thus, a host of implicational connections and, as such, is ultimately indefensible.[6]

Another strategy is to construe logic as the study of inferential patterns that are applicable irrespective of the subject matter being reasoned about.[7] In one sense this suggests the broad conception of logic as the study of principles governing inference and validity in general. On the other hand, it lends itself to a more restricted interpretation wherein logic is limited to those *argument forms* applicable to any possible subject matter, e.g., as the rule *modus ponens* relates to all propositions regardless of what these propositions are "about." This criterion of universal applicability is also unsatisfactory. For one thing, many patterns studied in recognizable branches of logic are not applicable to just any propositions in the way *modus ponens* is (for example, certain patterns of monadic first-order predicate logic are inappropriate for propositions concerning relations or for arguments involving higher-order generalizations). For another, there seem to be many argument patterns which are not set forth by means of the usual logical constants and yet which exhibit a generality and applicability akin to that of logical forms. Thus, maxims like "If x is a part of y and y a part of z, then x is a part of z" and "The result of adding a thing x to two other things, y and z, is three things" hold independently of what x, y, and z are and, so, are good candidates for being universally applicable. However, it appears that such forms extend beyond what most logicians would classify as logic in the narrower sense.

There is also the familiar interpretation of logic as the study of arguments which are valid in virtue of their form or, equivalently, to statements which are true in virtue of their form.[8] Unfortunately, this attempt at demarcation is not as simple as it appears, though I can only hint at the difficulties here. It is extremely hard to devise a general criterion whereby "form" can be distinguished from "nonform"--i.e., from *matter* or *content*--that is not wholly arbitrary and, thus, devoid of proper motivation. Characterizing form by appeal to the notions of logical truth or logical necessity is, for present purposes, circular. Doing so by means of special logical constants is, likewise, precarious. Not only is there disagreement over which constants are to be regarded as "logical" and which are not, as the mentioned proliferation of logics indicate. But even if we settle this matter, how can we be certain that the ensuing logical forms exhaust the class of forms relevant in assessing argument validity? Within the traditional mode of introducing the concept of form--that is, by explaining implicational linkage--there is good reason to include admittedly nonlogical or "material" structures as being forms, e.g., those specified by "x is greater than y" or "x is extended."[9] If so, it becomes arbitrary to characterize logic in terms of logical form, especially since there are plausible arguments which are not logically valid and since common usage embodies the broader sense of the term "logic." On the other hand, construing form in terms of argument validity *per se* is tantamount to abandoning the narrower interpretation of logic.

I do not wish to deny that delimiting an area of study within what I am calling the broader conception of logic may be fruitful, or to contest that it is theoretically worthwhile to isolate special classes of constants, forms, and inference rules.[10] My only reservation is with employing the term "logic" to refer exclusively to this domain of inquiry and the adjective "logical" to signify only these particular items, for it is basically such parochial usage that underlies the pedagogical confusion of which I am speaking.

Proposals

The suggestions offered here will be brief and fragmentary. It is not my intention to describe, in detail, what an introductory course in logic should or should not contain, but simply to say a few words on behalf of symbolic logic.

First, it seems wise to use the term "logic" in the broader sense--that is, as the science of correct reasoning *per se* or, alternatively, as the general study of implication. This would capture more accurately the meaning of the term in ordinary English and its use by nearly everyone outside the circle of professional philosophers and mathematicians. The same goes for the adjective "logical" and the adverb "logically." In conjunction with this,

the examinations of special types of argument patterns and propositional forms should be appropriately labeled, e.g., as "truth-functional logic," "first-order predicate logic," "class-logic," "modal propositional logic," and so forth. Then, when someone tells us he is doing *logic*, we can take him to mean that he is undertaking the study of correct reasoning or implication in general. And, if he is investigating a specific family of argument patterns (say, those of tense logic), we will know, roughly, the sorts of patterns or forms with which he is occupied.

Secondly, introductory logic courses ought to promote an awareness of the main features of correct reasoning and impart critical thinking skills appropriate to *all* patterns of valid argumentation. This must involve improving a student's capacity in at least the following areas:

(1) in discerning implicational relationships (which includes awareness of the general properties of implication and validity, understanding strictures on evidential support, and distinguishing between correct and incorrect arguments);

(2) in expressing propositions in clear and precise language; and

(3) in organizing ideas systematically.[11]

These skills are interrelated; to determine whether a given assertion implies another, one must be clear about what is being asserted in each case, and the discovery of implicational linkages is integral to systematization. Together, the three skills constitute the core of the tendency to develop a consistent, coherent, and lucid perspective on any issue of concern. Of course the study of argument forms in truth-functional logic and elementary quantification theory may be useful in increasing such abilities, but the beginning logic course should not confine itself to these forms and must not, above all, lead the student to believe that they are the only modes of valid argumentation. This being said, however, it remains that a logic course ought to direct a student's attention to underlying patterns of argument and propositional forms, for it is in this way that he will be enabled to apply what he has learned about reasoning to a variety of novel situations.

Thirdly, and here I come to the crux of the argument, it has been observed that an understanding of propositional forms is essential in developing both insight into implicational connections and skill in clarifying propositions and, further, that such forms are prime candidates for exact symbolic representation embodying variables and canonical paraphrase. It would seem to follow that if introductory logic courses are to improve a student's abilities in areas (1)-(3), the employment of precise symbolism is an extremely relevant practice inasmuch as such notation is the surest and most convenient means for conveying and facilitating a grasp of propositional forms. This holds not only in regard to the abstract patterns studied in truth-functional logic but also with respect to modes of argumentation concerning any subject matter insofar as it is "amenable to reasoning" and, hence, formally representable.[12]

We return, thus, to Leibniz's optimistic vision of a *characteristica universalis* and his supposition that any idea that could be reasoned about would submit to symbolic presentation and precise syntactical rules. Though this has long been the case for mathematics and the mathematical sciences, *there is no intrinsic reason* why it should not hold for nonquantitative ideas as well. If anything, the study of contemporary logic and philosophy should convince us that the principles of any theoretical discipline are subject to being recast in a formal mold. For the skeptical, I urge that they page through some of the recent works in linguistics and ethics, or in the fields of legal reasoning and computer logic, or even in those abstruse sciences of metaphysics and theology. The developments reflected therein suggest that symbolic logic will become an increasingly important part of university

education in areas outside the logic and mathematics curricula and that the introductory logic course will, consequently, emerge as an indispensible preparation for subsequent study in many fields. Apart from this, it may very well be the case that some college students' only exposure to rigorous thinking will occur in the beginning logic courses, and I cannot refrain from concluding that the ability to grapple with ideas at this level is a virtual prerequisite for an educated person in this scientific era.

NOTES

[1]Several descriptions of beginning courses adopting the broader approach occur in *Informal Logic Newsletter* vol. i, no. 3, May 1979, ed., J. Anthony Blair and Ralph H. Johnson (University of Winsdor, Winsdor, Ontario).

[2]Alonzo Church, *Introduction to Mathematical Logic* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1956), p. 1.

[3]A.N. Whitehead, "The Organisation of Thought," *Proc. of the Aristotelian Society*, vol. 17, 1916-17. Hans Reichenbach, in *The Rise of Scientific Philosophy* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1968), p. 216, makes a similar observation.

[4]P.C. Wason and P.N. Johnson-Laird, *Psychology of Reasoning: Structure and Content* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1972), pp. 244-245.

[5]Cf., Charles Hartshorne, *The Logic of Perfection* (Lasalle, IL: Open Court, 1962), and Laird Addis, *The Logic of Society* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1975).

[6]Many philosophers have stressed that there are numerous instances of plausible reasoning extending beyond the valid forms recognized by the standard propositional and predicate calculi--for instance, Wilfrid Sellars, "Inference and Meaning," *Mind* (1953) and Rolf George, "Enthymematic Consequence," *American Philosophical Quarterly* (January 1972). I have argued for this position in my doctoral dissertation, "Foundations for a Theory of Propositional Form, Implication, Alethic Modality, and Generalization" (Indiana University, 1978).

[7]This characterization is discussed in W. and M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon, 1962), pp. 737-742, and Susan Haack, *Philosophy of Logics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 3-10.

[8]Cf., W.V.O. Quine, *Philosophy of Logic* (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1970), p. xi, though he uses the phrase "grammatical structure" in place of "form."

[9]In other words, if the technical notion of form is introduced solely by way of explicating argument validity, there is no reason to suppose that logical forms are the only propositional forms. In the work cited in footnote 6, I have defended the posit of material forms with the framework of a general theory of propositional form. Other philosophers have also used the term "form" or the phrase "propositional form" in this extended sense--for example, B. Russell, *Mysticism and Logic* (New York: Anchor, 1957), p. 107; Lewis and Langford, *Symbolic Logic* (New York: Dover, 1959), p. 264; and H.N. Castañeda, *Thinking and Doing* (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel, 1975), chap. 3.

[10]In conjunction with this point, the reader may compare an interesting view of logic expounded by Ian Hacking in "What is Logic?" *Journal of Philosophy*, LXXVI, 6 (1979).

[11]The areas listed in (1)-(3) are only some of the skills appropriate to logical thinking. For a broader discussion see, for example, Robert Ennis, "A Conception of Rational Thinking," *Philosophy of Education* (1979).

[12]It is likely that an effective use of symbolic logic at the introductory level assumes a certain level of intellectual maturity on the part of college freshmen and sophomores. My *conjecture* is that this is a safe assumption, provided that the majority of students have been schooled in the elementary grammar and mathematics traditionally offered at the secondary level.

JOHN DEWEY'S ALLEGED SUPPORT OF EXPERTISM

Pyong Gap Min
Georgia State University

INTRODUCTION

Recent attempts to revise the traditional interpretation of progressive liberal reform in the twentieth century have led to a new interpretation of Dewey.* Revisionist scholars such as Michael Katz, Edgar Gumbert, Walter Feinberg, and Clarence Karier interpret Dewey as an advocate of welfare state capitalism interested mainly in social control. As will be shown later, one of the major claims involved in this interpretation is that Dewey supported expertism.

This paper is intended to show the difficulties of the claim that Dewey supported expertism. The first section of the paper will analyze Dewey's basic philosophical approach to suggest the difficulties of the charge that Dewey was committed to the middle class or the expert rather than to the masses. The second section will examine Dewey's notion of democracy to show that he was against any form of class rule. The third section will deal with the argument for the relationship between Dewey's emphasis on scientific method and expertism. Since Feinberg and Karier analyze and criticize Dewey's ideas in considerable detail, this paper will examine the claim about Dewey's support of expertism mainly in terms of their arguments.

THE CLAIM FOR EXPERTISM CONFLICTS WITH DEWEY'S BASIC PHILOSOPHICAL APPROACH

Dewey emphasized ordinary experience as the proper object of philosophy and attacked the intellectualistic tradition of philosophy. His basic philosophical approach reflects his commitment to the common man, and this fact suggests problems for the claim that Dewey depended upon the expert or the elite rather than upon the masses for social guidance. He firmly believed that philosophical discussions should be related directly to the basic human needs and desires which occupy much of the life of the common man. He asserted that philosophy should be concerned with "the ordinary empirical, relatively real, phenomenal world of everyday experience."[1] In his view, however, philosophers, in their treatment of truth and value, have not paid enough attention to ordinary experience.

> Human experience in the large, in its coarse and conspicuous features, has for one of its most striking features preoccupation with direct enjoyment, feasting and festivities: ornamentation, dance, song, dramatic pantomine, telling yarns and enacting stories. In comparison with intellectual and moral endeavor, this trait of experience has hardly received the attention from philosophers that it demands.[2]

Dewey's attack on the dualism of body and mind is also related to his inclination toward common people. He asserted that "A culture whose tradition rests on depreciation of the flesh and on making a sharp difference between body and mind, instinct and reason, practice and theory, may have wrought corruption of flesh and degeneration of spirit."[3] He also lamented the repression of the demand for recreation by the Puritan tradition:

> I sometimes think that recreation is the most overlooked and neglected of all ethical forces. Our whole Puritan tradition tends to make us slight this side of life, or even condemn it. But the demand for recreation, for enjoyment just as enjoyment, is one of the strongest and most fundamental things in human nature. To pass it over is to invite it to find its expression in defective and

> perverted form. The brothel, the saloons, the low dance-house, the gambling den, the trivial, inconsiderate, and demoralizing associations which form themselves on every street corner, are the answer of human nature to the negiect, on the part of supposed moral leaders, of this factor in human nature.[4]

According to Dewey, the separation of philosophy from practical material life since the Greek period was related to a class division in society. Philosophers' "exaltation of pure intellect and its activity above practical affairs," Dewey argued, "is fundamentally connected with the quest for a certainty which shall be absolute and unshakeable."[5] And he explained philosophers' search for certainty in terms of the emergence of a new intellectual class.

> After a distinctively intellectual class had arisen, a class having leisure and in a large degree protected against the more serious perils which afflict the mass of humanity, its members proceeded to glorify their own office. Since no amount of pains and care in action can ensure complete certainty, certainty in knowledge was worshipped as a substitute.[6]

Dewey emphasized practicality as one of the outstanding traits of scientific knowledge. Modern science demonstrated that knowing is not contemplation alone but also activity, observation, and experiment. It made knowledge, which had long been the privilege of the leisure class, accessible to lay people. Thus modern science abolished the distinction between the ideal and the material and the separation of the leisure class from the working class. In *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, Dewey wrote:

> Modern science took its first step when daring astronomers abolished the distinction of high, sublime and ideal forces operating in the heavens from lower and material forces actuating terrestrial events.[7]

Dewey drew from the nature of scientific knowledge a conclusion as to the practical role of the philosopher. That is, he maintained that a philosopher, unless he intends to isolate himself from the world of common sense and science, should be concerned mainly with connecting the advancement of knowledge with human purposes in its application.

> Knowing, from the experimental sciences, means a certain kind of intelligently conducted doing; it ceases to be contemplative and becomes in a true sense practical. Now this implies that philosophy, unless it is to undergo a complete break with the authorized spirit of science, must also alter its nature. It must assume a practical nature; it must become operative and experimental.[8]

Over the perennial philosophical issue as to whether empirical (scientific) knowledge is real or ideal, Dewey took the position of naive realism. A look at his version of naive realism will also reflect his respect for ordinary experience. He made a distinction between reality as a "denotative" term and reality as an "existential" term, and proclaimed the former as the pragmatic notion of reality.

> The chief characteristic trait of the pragmatic notion of reality is precisely that no theory of Reality in general, *überhaupt*, is possible or needed. It occupies the position of an emancipated empiricism or a thoroughgoing naive realism. It finds that "reality" is a *denotative* term, a word used to designate indifferently

> everything that happens. Lies, dreams, insanities, deceptions, myths, theories are all of them just the events which they specifically are. Pragmatism is content to take its stand with science, for science finds all such events to be subject matter of description and inquiry--just like stars and fossils, mosquitoes and malaria, circulation and vision. It also takes its stand with daily life, which finds that such things really have reckoned with as they occur interwoven in the texture of events.[9]

Dewey's notion of reality led him to reject the view that "knowledge is a disclosure of reality, of reality prior to and independent of knowing . . . ."[10] He believed scientific knowledge to be the result of observation of and inquiry into the events that happen in the common world. He therefore argued that science is not basically different from common sense. In his view, human factors are significant in both science and common sense.[11]

Marx emphasized economic factors as the determining force of historical development and thus liberated historical scholarship from the old tradition in which ideas, as against material life, and heroes, as against the masses, had been considered to be the moving force of history. Dewey, like Marx, depended upon the economic interpretation of history, which, in turn, was closely related to his respect for ordinary experience and his commitment to the common man. Dewey asserted that "Men's fundamental common concerns center about food, shelter, clothing, household furnishings, and the appliances connected with production, exchange, and consumption."[12] He held that material life was the basis of human activities, particularly in the primitive society, whose main concern was economic. In "Interpretation of the Savage Mind," he urged that "Occupations determine the fundamental modes of activity, and hence control the formation and use of habits."[13] In Dewey's view, "Economic history is more human, more democratic, and hence more liberalizing than political history" because "It deals not with the rise and fall of principalities and powers, but with the growth of the effective liberties through command of nature, of the common man for whom powers and principalities exist."[14]

We have noted thus far that Dewey's basic philosophical approach, his notions of scientific knowledge and reality, and his adoption of the economic interpretation of history are closely related to his respect for ordinary experience and his commitment to the common man. The above analysis suggests that the traditional interpretation of Dewey as a philosopher of the common man is well-grounded. Dewey's commitment to the common man and his suspicion of the leisure class, as reflected in his basic philosophical approach, show the difficulties of the claim that Dewey depended upon the expert rather than upon the masses for social guidance.

THE CLAIM FOR EXPERTISM DISTORTS DEWEY'S CONCEPT OF DEMOCRACY

The claim that Dewey was inclined toward elitism sharply conflicts with his notion of democracy. Dewey emphasized voluntary control as against coercive control as fundamental to democracy. Thus democracy is impossible without each individual developing democratic attitudes. Accordingly, democracy cannot be a reality without faith in every person's ability to control his behavior free from coercion and imposition by others. It was in this context that Dewey asserted that "Belief in the Common Man is a familiar article in the democratic creed."[15] The main reason Dewey considered Ralph Waldo Emerson a representative democratic philosopher was Emerson's commitment to the common man. Dewey wrote:

> Against creed and system, convention and institution, Emerson stands for restoring to the common man that which

> in the name of religion, of philosophy, of art and of morality, has been embezzled from the common store and appropriated to sectarian and class use.[16]

Dewey attacked the Platonic tradition in which intellectual power was believed to be the possession of the few.

> Democracy is an absurdity where faith in the individual as individual is impossible; and this faith is impossible when intelligence is regarded as a cosmic power, not an adjustment and application of individual tendencies. It is also impossible when appetites and desires are conceived to be the dominant factor in the constitutions of most men's characters, and when appetite and desire are conceived to be manifestations of the disorderly and unruly principle of nature.[17]

In Dewey's view, if the average individual is believed to be incapable of developing his own intellectual ability through education and experience, it follows that the coercive control and regulation of people by government is the only effective form of social organization. Thus he asserted that "Those who wished to justify the exercise of authority over others took a pessimistic view of the constitution of human nature . . . ."[18] Dewey was accused in his time, as he is now, of having an "utopian" faith in the possibilities of intelligence. He responded, however, to his critics by saying, "I am willing to leave to upholders of totalitarian states of the right and the left the view that faith in the capacities of intelligence is utopian."[19]

Thus it was Dewey's fundamental political concern to help create a democratic society in which every person leads his life free from arbitrary coercion and imposition by others. His effort to restore ordinary experience as the object of philosophical discussion was closely related to his concern with helping each individual develop intellectual ability to participate in free inquiry, discussion, and criticism of social and political affairs. In view of this, Karier's claim that Dewey "turned, not to the masses for social guidance, but to the knowledgeable expert" does violence to the central aspect of Dewey's notion of democracy.

THE ARGUMENT FOR THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN DEWEY'S EMPHASIS ON SCIENCE AND EXPERTISM

In connection with the relationship between Dewey's emphasis on scientific method and expertism, one can give two different arguments. One can argue either that Dewey *intended* to give experts the dominant power by emphasizing scientific method or that his emphasis on scientific method *in effect* came to give experts the dominant position though he was against the rule by experts. The first argument, which brings into question Dewey's motives, is easily refutable. For, as we will see below, Dewey intended science to be used critically to liberate the individual and to achieve the general welfare; and as we have observed in the previous section of this paper, he was against the control of the many by any clique of experts. The second argument seems to be stronger than the first, though neither argument is justifiable, as will be shown below.

In order to evaluate and criticize Dewey's position adequately, one needs to make the above distinction. Unfortunately, however, neither Feinberg nor Karier makes this important distinction. As a result, neither of them is clear as to whether by relating Dewey's emphasis on scientific method to expertism he questions Dewey's motives or he talks about the influence of Dewey's ideas. Probably both Feinberg and Karier are concerned with both Dewey's motives and the effects of his ideas when they relate Dewey's emphasis on scientific method to expertism. There are some passages in Feinberg's and Karier's works which seem to question Dewey's motives. To introduce some of them:

> In the last analysis, his concern for scientific intelligence is a statement of the need for experts in a highly complex technological society, and his appeal for democratic consensus is an attempt to create a citizenry that is able to see the wisdom of intelligence expertly exercised.[20]

> If Plato had his logic, Dewey had his scientific method. Dewey, in accordance with the new liberal ideology he helped construct, turned, not to the masses for social guidance, but rather to the knowledgeable expert.[21]

The following passages seem to suggest that Dewey's appeal for scientific method by implication has led to a society guided by bureaucratic experts.

> While all might participate in Dewey's conception of democracy and education, the function of knowledge and the expert was a powerful determiner of social policy.[22]

> Indeed, if we examine Dewey's reactions against capitalism and recognize that political, economic, and educational planning were to follow the lead established by industrial development, then his social and educational recommendations by implication require many more experts and specialists than laissez-faire capitalism.[23]

It is clear that in his motives Dewey wanted scientific method to be employed for the interests not of a particular class but of the public. For Dewey, science came to be the source of many social problems mainly because emphasis has been placed on its technical, material aspects over its intellectual, critical aspects. And in his view, some businessmen, financiers, and industrialists intentionally limited the use of science to those aspects that served their own interests at the sacrifice of the masses.

> The fact that we have limited its use so largely to technical matters is not a reproach to science, but to the human beings who use it for private ends and who strive to defeat its social application for fear of destructive effects upon their power and profit.[24]

He believed that science, if taken as a method of critical thinking, would help change the industrial and economic conditions under which one class took the material fruits of science at the sacrifice of the interests of the masses. Thus he emphasized the use of science as a method of critical thinking to liberate it from control by a particular class and to open the possibility for it to serve the interests of the public.

Of course, neither Feinberg nor Karier questions the view that Dewey tried to liberate science from control by economic power. What both question, however, is whether Dewey tried to liberate science from control by economic power for the interests of the middle class or for the interests of the masses. And in their view Dewey's emphasis on the scientific method was more concerned with the role and power of the middle class than with the interests of the masses. Thus they connect Dewey's plea for scientific method with his concern for the transfer of power from the capitalist class to experts. Karier seems to make the following statement mainly from this consideration:

> Dewey's confident faith in the coming development of industrial democracy rested, however, not so much on the great increase in the power of the state, but rather on the growing influence of the scientifically-oriented knowledgeable professional to use that power in the service of the needs of the larger community.[25]

The above interpretation, however, seems unwarranted. It conflicts with Dewey's concept of democracy, as analyzed in the previous section, which rejects the control of one class by another. Moreover, it is challenged directly by Dewey's attack on the idea of the rule by experts. Dewey himself knew the general tendency to believe that the new intellectual class, rather than the ignorant masses, could take a leading role in a new industrial state, replacing the calitalist class. And in the chapter entitled "The Problem of Method," in *The Public and Its Problems*, Dewey criticized the belief that the intellectual class could regulate affairs of a new industrial state without being an oppressive power to the masses.[26] He rejected the assumption that the rule by experts would protect the general interests of society for the following reasons:

> expertness is most readily attained in specialized technical matters, matters of administration and execution which postulate that general policies are already satisfactorily framed . . . . It is impossible for high-brows to secure a monopoly of such knowledge as must be used for the regulation of common affairs. In the degree in which they become a specialized class, they are shut off from knowledge of the needs which they are supposed to serve.[27]

He further said that "A class of experts is inevitably so removed from common interests as to become a class with private interests and private knowledge, which in social matters is not knowledge at all."[28] For Dewey, rule by experts is the "revival of the Platonic notion that philosophers should be kings . . . ."[29] He pointed out that "The world has suffered more from leaders and authorities than from the masses."[30]

The above analysis should settle the issue of whether Dewey pleaded for scientific method and industrial democracy to promote dominance of the middle class or the interests of the public. In *The Public and Its Problems*, which, according to Joe Burnett, reflects the author's mature social and political thought,[31] Dewey made clear his position that he was against expertism. So one cannot interpret Dewey's plea for scientific method and industrial democracy as derived from his concern for expertism, unless one, like some Marxist critics, believes that in his writings Dewey concealed his real intentions.

It has been shown thus far that the argument for the relationship between Dewey's emphasis on scientific method and his concern for expertism is not justified. Now we turn to the argument that his emphasis on science in effect helped create an expert society though his intention might have been different.

One significant question to be raised when evaluating the above argument is whether Dewey emphasized science mainly as particular techniques commonly employed by lawyers, doctors, bureaucrats, and other specialized workers, or not. If Dewey meant by science particular techniques to be used by specialized workers, we can hold him partly responsible for an expert society we are experiencing now. As will be shown below, however, Dewey did not emphasize scientific method as specialized techniques.

Unfortunately, both Feinberg and Karier seem to interpret Dewey's meaning of science mistakenly as either techniques, the industrial habits such as punctuality, speed, and industry, or the scioeconomic order of industrial society. And this misinterpretation seems to be the main factor which leads them to consider his emphasis on science as responsible for expertism. When they discuss Dewey's faith in science, they use the terms "science" and "technology" interchangeably and then relate both to techniques or to an industrial system. The following passages suggest that this is the case:

> His [Dewey's] alternative was to change *the position of the science and engineering establishments* [italics mine] for that of business establishment assuming perhaps that as the *interest of science was served* [italics mine] so too would be that of society at large.[32]

> There was, however, another sense to Dewey's use of the term "science," one that was associated better with scientific management and social coordination and Karier is quite correct in asserting that when push came to shove Dewey and other liberals were much more likely to opt for this kind of "science."[33]

> Order, coordination, and predictability are the general prerequisites of a technological society. When science and technology are viewed as the independent variable to which ethical judgments and social relations must conform, then technological considerations become supreme. All other values (community, participation, democracy) must be subordinate to coordination, and efficiency as they are dictated by the complexity of the machine.[34]

> Just as the older theology called for a new Adam, so too, Dewey's unbounded faith in science and technology led him to call for a new man. Such a man must work well within the corporate system where, almost in Orwellian fashion, positive freedom would mean control.[35]

In the above statements, both Feinberg and Karier describe a meaning of "science" which is not easy to find in Dewey's writings. The notion of science reflected in the above passage may be accepted by Feinberg and Karier, but it was not accepted by Dewey.[36] First of all, Dewey did not mean by "science" techniques used in particular fields. He emphasized scientific method mainly as an attitude of critical inquiry. In the following passage, Dewey made it clear what he meant by scientific method:

> The transition from an ordinary to a scientific attitude of mind coincides with ceasing to take certain things for granted and assuming a critical or inquiring and testing attitude. This transformation means that some belief and its accompanying statement are no longer taken as self-sufficing and complete in themselves, but are regarded as *conclusions*.[37]

In *Freedom and Culture*, Dewey also summarized the elements of the scientific attitude:

> Some of its obvious elements are willingness to hold belief in suspense, ability to doubt until evidence is obtained; willingness to go where evidence points instead of putting first a personally preferred conclusion; ability to hold ideas in solution and use them as hypotheses to be tested instead of dogmas to be asserted; and (possibly the most distinctive of all) enjoyment of new fields for inquiry and of new problems.[38]

Dewey characterized the scientific method as a positive toleration and identified it with the democratic method.

> It is of the nature of science not so much to tolerate as to welcome diversity of opinion, while it insists that inquiry brings the evidence of observed facts to bear to effect a consensus of conclusions--and even then to hold

> the conclusion subject to what is ascertained and made public in further new inquiries. I would not claim that any existing democracy has ever made complete or adequate use of scientific method in deciding upon its policies. But freedom of inquiry, toleration of diverse views, freedom of communication, the distribution of what is found out to every individual as the ultimate intellectual consumer, are involved in the democratic as in the scientific method.[39]

For Dewey the method of inquiry is preferable to other methods because it can avoid dogmatism by keeping conclusions open to criticism and testing. To emphasize a need to approach Dewey's pragmatic philosophy critically, Feinberg brings attention to the fact that Dewey himself advocated "the spirit of open inquiry."[40] Feinberg should, however, remember that for Dewey "the spirit of open inquiry" is the core of scientific method.[41]

As previously quoted, both Feinberg and Karier associate Dewey's meaning of science with managerial values such as efficiency, coordination, order, and predictability. Dewey, however, made clear that science is important not because of its managerial values. For example, in "Science and the Education of Man," he said:

> Scientific method is not just a method which it has been found profitable to pursue in this or that abstract subject for purely technical reasons. It represents the only method of thinking that has proved fruitful in any subject--that is what we mean when we call it scientific. It is not a peculiar development of thinking for highly specialized ends; it *is* thinking so far as thought has become conscious of its proper ends and of the equipment indispensable for success in their pursuits.[42]

> If we are to be governed by intelligence, not by things and by words, science must have something to say about *what* we do, and not merely about *how* we may do it most easily and economically.[43]

In *Experience and Education*, he also warned that scientific method should not be confused with techniques:

> But the meaning of the emphasis on scientific method has little to do with specialized techniques. It means that scientific method is the only authentic means at our command for getting at the significance of our everyday experiences of the world in which we live.[44]

Surely, the meaning of science as reflected in the above citations has little to do with specialized techniques employed by specialized workers such as lawyers, doctors, and biologists. Thus it would seem difficult to argue that Dewey's emphasis on science contributed to an expert society.

It may require a more complicated discussion than the one given above to determine whether Dewey's emphasis on science is partly responsible for an expert society. I do not pretend to have proven that Dewey is not responsible. As long as they claim that Dewey's appeal for scientific method is responsible for the problems of an expert society, the burden of proof is on Feinberg and Karier. Both seem to accept it as quite natural that Dewey's emphasis on scientific method has contributed to expertism. They have yet to prove it. And it does not seem to me that they will prove it convincingly.[45]

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

With regard to the relationship between Dewey and expertism, one can provide two different arguments. One can argue either that Dewey was committed to expertism or that his ideas have contributed to creating an expert society. Neither Feinberg nor Karier is clear enough as to whether Dewey was committed to expertism or whether his ideas indirectly helped to create an expert society.[46] Their criticisms suggest that they see Dewey as supporting expertism both in terms of his motives and in terms of his ideas. The foregoing analysis, however, shows that both arguments have difficulties.

The argument that Dewey was committed to expertism conflicts, first of all, with his basic philosophical approach which emphasized ordinary experience as the object of philosophical discussion and attacked the intellectualistic tradition of philosophy. It also distorts Dewey's meaning of democracy which does not allow for the rule of one class by another. Furthermore, Dewey himself attacked the general tendency to think that the intellectual class, rather than the masses, should play a dominant role in social reform.

The charge that Dewey supported expertism seems to be based mainly on his emphasis on scientific method for social reform. Dewey's major concern in his appeal for scientific method was, however, to liberate science from control by political and economic power so that it could be applied to the general interests. Thus the argument for the relationship between Dewey's emphasis on scientific method and his concern for expertism is not justified. Dewey emphasized scientific method not as particular techniques employed by specialized workers but as a critical mode of thinking. Thus the argument that Dewey's appeal for scientific method for social reform helped to create an expert society seems to be difficult.

As indicated in the beginning of this paper, the revisionist interpretation of Dewey is part of the recent attempts to reinterpret American liberals in the twentieth centruy. Revisionist critics interpret progressive liberal reform in terms of the transfer of power from the capitalist class to the intellectual class. Dewey, both theoretically and practically, took the most important role in progressive liberal reform. Thus revisionist critics easily apply the expertism thesis to Dewey. In my view, the thesis is reasonably applicable to some whom revisionist scholars consider to be liberal reformers, e.g., political liberals such as Herbert Croly and Walter Lippmann and the leaders of the efficiency movement such as David Sneeden and Charles Prosser. But it does not fit Dewey well. The approach to Dewey in terms of his class position may be useful to interpreting one or two pieces of his writings, but it is likely to be more detrimental than helpful to understanding the main direction of his thought.

NOTES

*This paper is a portion of my dissertation, entitled "An Analysis and Evaluation of the Revisionist Interpretation of John Dewey's Social and Political Philosophy as Represented by Walter Feinberg and Clarence Karier," submitted to Georgia State University in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Ph.D. program. I am indebted to Dr. Charles Thompson, Dr. Wayne Urban, Dr. Edgar Gumbert, and Dr. Robert Almeder for their helpful comments on this part of the dissertation.

[1]John Dewey, *Reconstruction in Philosophy*, enlarged edition with a new introduction (Boston: Beacon Press, 1968), p. 23.

[2]John Dewey, *Experience and Nature* (New York: Dover Publications, 1958), p. 78.

[3]John Dewey, *Individualism Old and New* (New York: Minton, Balch & Company, 1930), p. 28.

[4]John Dewey, *The Middle Works* vol. 2: *1902-1903*, ed. Jo Ann Boydston with an introduction by Sidney Hook (Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1976), p. 91.

[5]John Dewey, *The Quest for Certainty: A Study of the Relation of Knowledge and Action* (London: George Allen & Unwin, 1930), p. 10.

[6]*Ibid.*, p. 41.

[7]*Reconstruction in Philosophy*, p. 65.

[8]*Ibid.*, p. 121.

[9]John Dewey, *On Experience, Nature, and Freedom: Representative Selections*, ed. and with an introduction by Richard Bernstein (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, 1960), p. 59.

[10]*The Quest for Certainty*, p. 45.

[11]John Dewey and Arthur Bentley, *Knowing and the Known* (Boston: The Beacon Press, 1949), p. 281.

[12]John Dewey, *Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education* (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1966), p. 199.

[13]John Dewey, *Philosophy and Civilization* (Gloucester, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1968), p. 175.

[14]*Democracy and Education*, pp. 215-216.

[15]John Dewey, "Creative Democracy--The Task before Us," in *The Philosophy of the Common Man*, ed. Sidney Ratner (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1940), p. 223.

[16]John Dewey, *Characters and Events: Popular Essays in Social and Political Philosophy*, vol. 1, ed. Joseph Ratner (New York: Octagon Books, 1970), p. 75.

[17]John Dewey, *The Influence of Darwin on Philosophy and Other Essays in Contemporary Thought* (New York: Peter Smith, 1951), p. 59.

[18]John Dewey, *Freedom and Culture* (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1939), p. 29.

[19]"Creative Democracy," p. 224.

[20]Walter Feinberg, "Progressive Education and Social Planning," *Teachers College Record* 73 (May 1972): 485.

[21]Clarence Karier, "Liberalism and the Quest for Orderly Change," *History of Education Quarterly* 12 (Spring 1972): 70.

[22]*Ibid.*, p. 69.

[23]Feinberg, *Reason and Rhetoric: The Intellectual Foundations of 20th Century Liberal Educational Policy* (New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1975), p. 86.

[24]*Individualism Old and New*, p. 155.

[25]Karier, "Making the World Safe for Democracy: An Historical Critique of John Dewey's Pragmatic Liberal Philosophy in the Warfare State," *Educational Theory* 27 (Winter 1977): 20.

[26]In *The Public and Its Problems*, Dewey responded to Walter Lippmann who pleaded for elitism in his works *Phantom Public* and *Public Opinion*. Dewey criticized Lippman's proposal for the rule by elites also in his review of *Public Opinion*, *New Republic* 30 (May 3, 1922): 286-88; and "Practical Democracy: Review of *Phantom Public*," *New Republic* 45 (December 2, 1925): 52-54.

[27]John Dewey, *The Public and Its Problems* (Chicago: The Swallow Press, 1954), p. 206.

[28]*Ibid.*, p. 207.

[29]*Ibid.*, p. 205.

[30]*Ibid.*, p. 208.

[31]Joe Burnett, "John Dewey and Ploys of Revisionism," presented at the 1978 OVPES Meeting. I am indebted to Burnett's article in my preparation of this paper.

[32]*Reason and Rhetoric*, p. 259.

[33]Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr., "Training for the Welfare State: The Progressive Education Movement," in *Work, Technology, and Education: Dissenting Essays in the Intellectual Foundations of American Education*, ed. Walter Feinberg and Henry Rosemont, Jr. (Chicago: University of Illinois Press, 1975), p. 84, footnote 37.

[34]"Progressive Education and Social Planning," p. 488.

[35]"Liberalism and the Quest for Orderly Change," p. 72.

[36]Not only Feinberg and Karier, but also many other critics attack Dewey's meaning of science in terms of their understanding of what science is. For example, in *The Anti-Man Culture: Bureautechnocracy and the Schools* (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1972), p. 151, Charles Tesconi, Jr. and Van Cleve Morris claim that "Dewey's impact upon American education has thus contributed to a situation wherein schooling practices support the extension of scientific liberalism and, in turn, accommodate the imperatives of bureautechnocracy." And they argue that science cannot be human for the following reasons: "(1) science, by definition, is incapable of studying the individual; (2) science, by definition, converts the experienced world into a nonhuman form; (3) science brutalizes man" p. 179. They add that "As a mode of knowing, science is what the technical philosopher refers to as 'reductionistic.'" Anyone who is familiar with philosophy of science would agree that there are different meanings of science and that the definition given above by Tesconi and Morris has not been accepted by many people in the twentieth century. Moreover, anyone who is familiar with Dewey's naturalistic philosophy would not deny that Dewey himself fought against scientific reductionism as much as he fought against supernaturalism. For Dewey's criticism of the identification of scientific method with reductionism which was common to both the defenders and the critics of science in Dewey's time, see Dewey, "Anti-Naturalism in Extremis," in *Naturalism and the Human Spirit*, ed. Yervant Krikorian (New York: Columbia University Press, 1944), pp. 1-16; and Dewey, Sidney Hook, and Ernest Nagel, "Comments and Criticism: Are Naturalists Materialists?" *Journal of Philosophy* 42 (September 1945): 515-30.

[37]John Dewey, *Problems of Men* (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), p. 211.

[38]*Freedom and Culture*, p. 145.

[39]*Ibid.*, p. 102.

[40]Feinberg, "On Reading Dewey," *History of Education Quarterly* 15 (Winter 1975): 413.

[41]If Dewey had limited himself to a more neutral term, e.g., "inquiry method," to signify a critical way of thinking for problem solving, he might not have been misunderstood as much as he has been. In fact, Dewey's followers such as Jerome Bruner use terms like "inquiry method" and "discovery method" to emphasize the same attitude of thinking. There is, however, a particular reason why Dewey characterized a critical habit of mind as "scientific." For him, modern science, born in the seventeenth century, undermined the feudalistic, providential, hierarchial world view. The scientific revolution, carried to the Enlightenment in the eighteenth century, made great contribution to social and political reform. Dewey realized how powerful the scientific spirit was in attacking and undermining the religious and political dogmas, authority, and traditional customs in the Enlightenment. Thus he asserted that "it was during this 'modern' period that inquiry took the form of discussion . . . " (*Reconstruction in Philosophy*, pp. 18-19). According to Dewey, however, under the nineteenth century political and economic conditions (nationalism and capitalism), more of the technological and materialistic aspects than its critical, intellectual aspects came to be accepted. Thus Dewey emphasized the critical elements of science to restore its original meaning rather than to give it a new meaning.

[42]*Characters and Events*, vol. 2, pp. 774-75.

[43]*Ibid.*, p. 775.

[44]John Dewey, *Experience and Education* (New York: Collier Books, 1974), p. 88.

[45]Dewey's scientific method as a critical way of thinking differs from other modes of thinking, particularly from the artistic mode of thinking (though Dewey tried to show that scientific method does not basically differ from the creative thinking involved in art), and thus one might argue that Dewey's emphasis on scientific method, as one of his critics puts it, "relegates to inferior positions those people who don't display 'scientific' thought." An indication of this fact, however, does not seem to be a serious criticism of his position. Dewey recommended scientific method as an alternative to other methods such as revolution, authority, and dependence upon arbitrary institutions and personal prejudice to solve social problems. Thus one can attack Dewey's position effectively only when one shows that any other method is better than the method of inquiry for the solution to social problems. Surely, those who are more critical in thinking are likely to take a greater role in Dewey's democratic community. However, to criticize Dewey on this ground is to criticize him for not being a Marxist, for only the method of revolution theoretically can give all men an equal chance to participate in social change, though it has practically given power to a limited number of people.

[46]It is one thing to indicate the inadequacies of Dewey's ideas, and it is quite another to question his motives. Both Feinberg and Karier seem to reinterpret Dewey not to understand his philosophy but to understand the nature of current problems. However, even for a correct understanding of how we have got to where we are now, Feinberg and Karier need to make a distinction between the intentions of progressive liberal reformers and the adequacies of their ideas. The interpretations of Dewey offered by some

Marxist critics seem to be more plausible than the ones provided either by Feinberg or by Karier in that the former successfully separate Dewey's motives, his ideas, and the consequences of his ideas. In his critique of Dewey, George Novack, one of the outstanding socialist scholars in America, gives full credit to Dewey's efforts to eliminate the evils of capitalism, but he argues that Dewey could not achieve his intended goal of social reconstruction with his philosophy. For example, in connection with Dewey's educational theory, Novack says: "Dewey went wrong not in what he proposed for the school itself, but in his lack of understanding of the forces at work in American society and of the real relations between the educational and economic systems under capitalist rule." *Pragmatism vs. Marxism: An Appraisal of John Dewey's Philosophy* (New York: Pathfinder, 1975), p. 231. Even Novack's arguments against Dewey's ideas take a moderate form. He does not hold that Dewey's ideas have always been helpless in meeting political and social problems. In his view, Dewey's "bourgeois-democratic ideology" was a radical and progressive force when it was fighting against the religious, prescientific tradition, but it turned to the defense of its own entrenched power, losing its critical, radical elements, when capitalism entered its monopolistic state and the revolutionary working class began to attack capitalism (pp. 285-286). Richard LaBreque also aptly separates the efficacy of Dewey's ideas from his motives. In "What Is To Be Done? Pragmatism at the Crossroads," *Studies in Philosophy and Education* 8 (Winter 1974): 183-204, he points out that "the neorevisionists" such as Karier and Katz inadequately question Dewey's intent to destroy capitalism, and he claims that Dewey "sought to destroy capitalism, but that his theory and strategy remained inadequate to his purposes." 183.

A QUESTIONABLE PRESENCE: IS VALUES CLARIFICATION REALLY DEWEYAN?

Jo Ann Freiberg
Ohio State University

In the concluding sentences of the introductory chapter of *Values and Teaching*, Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon write that

> There is much similarity between the basic orientation of this value theory and the work of a number of authors. Those who desire to see some writings in a related view or to examine different implications of this general approach might consider Dewey's work--especially his 1939 essay *Theory of Valuation* and his *Moral Principles in Education* . . . .[1]

I have taken this advice, and the result is this paper. My purposes here are twofold. First, I wish to identify the *alleged* similarities between values clarification and Deweyan theory. Second, I intend to evaluate the degree to which these two theoretical approaches are indeed similar. In essence, this paper is an attempt to provide a Deweyan critique of values clarification.

In this paper I will limit my comparisons to three general areas. First, I will address the way in which some terms function differently for Dewey than for the values clarification theorists. Second, I will explore the relationship between the individual person and the social context in the two theories. Finally, I will compare the program goals and structure of values clarification with those of Dewey. Although additional comparisons could be made, these three issues are the central points of comparison made explicit by the values clarificationists.

The Claims

In the literature of values clarification (VC) one finds an alleged link between VC theory and that of Dewey. A few passages from that literature are sufficient to show that claimed link.

In *Values and Teaching* the authors attempt to answer oft asked questions regarding their theoretical approach. One such question concerns the relationship between values clarification and Kohlberg's cognitive developmental approach. In dealing with this question, the VC theorists explicitly link their work with that of Dewey:

> Some people have asked how our work in values clarification compares with the moral development research of Lawrence Kohlberg and his associates (see Kohlberg, 1973 & 1976). The two approaches seem to us different in some ways. For example, moral development is rooted in the work of Jean Piaget and research psychology. Values clarification comes more directly from John Dewey and the work of educators.[2]

It is clear from the above that Raths et al. see their work as "rooted" in Deweyan theory. This is even more apparent in the following.

> We started, of course, with the thinking of Dewey, and his belief that humans can reflect about values issues as well as other issues, and that they gain the most from their value-related experiences when they do so. Dewey was after a greater integration "of sense, need, impulse, and action" and reflection on current experiences was the route to that integration (Dewey, 1934).[3]

Not only do the values clarification proponents suggest that they share theoretical goals with Dewey, they claim also that they share the same fundamental definitions. In *Values and Teaching* two starting points are explicitly outlined. First, it is asserted

> we took over the criteria for the definition of value almost wholly from Dewey, as it is set forth in his book *Theory of Valuation* (1939).[4]

And,

> As one of the starting points, we took another idea from Dewey. Dewey said that character was the interpenetration of habits. We took this definition more or less as an axiom and asked what habits most closely related to values constituted a significant concept of character in terms of their interpenetration.[5]

The above passages from *Values and Teaching* seem sufficient to show that the VC theorists claim that their work rests on Deweyan thought. However, this connection to Dewey's thought is not demonstrated in *Values and Teaching*. Rather than engaging in such demonstration, the VC authors merely assert their Deweyan roots and suggest that their own theoretical foundation is to be found by reading Dewey.

Yet to read Dewey for this purpose is an exercise in frustration. It is not clear that the VC material is even compatible with Deweyan thought, let alone justified by it. To put this another way, the VC writers invoke Dewey's name but it is less than clear that they either understand or use carefully Dewey's thought. In the following section I will attempt to show that the dissimilarities between VC and Deweyan thought are at least as important as are the resemblances.

Terminology

The two starting points mentioned in *Values and Teaching* are developed in some detail by Raths in the essay "Freedom, Intelligence and Values."[6] Raths quotes liberally from Dewey in an effort to explain the values clarification theory. The definition of values, for instance, is taken from Dewey's *Theory of Valuation*.[7] Raths states:

> Dewey clearly indicates that his concept of values includes:
>
> 1. The idea of prizing, cherishing, and holding dear
> 2. The idea of reflection and making connections between the factors of the situation in one's existence to the end that intelligence is employed and that improved judgment is concluded
> 3. The idea that action in support of an approved value will be taken.[8]

What Raths does not do, however, is to explain how this terminology functioned for Dewey. And what I propose to do here is to show that although Raths quotes Dewey's terms, he employs those terms in a way Dewey did not intend. Dewey has the peculiarity of using common terms in an uncommon way, i.e., Dewey often redefined common terms for his own purposes. Raths's use of Dewey's terms in a common sense manner may make it appear that values clarification is based on Deweyan fundamentals when in fact this is not the case.

A brief comparison follows which shows how the two "starting points" of VC (definitions of value and character assumed to be those of Dewey) actually are not what Dewey intended.

The values clarification method involves a seven-step process which, if met, identifies values.

> Unless something satisfies all seven of the criteria noted below, we do not call it a value, but rather a "belief" or "attitude" or something other than a value. In other words, for a value to result, all of the following seven requirements must apply. Collectively, they describe the process of valuing.
>
> 1. Choosing freely.
> 2. Choosing from alternatives.
> 3. Choosing after thoughtful consideration of the consequences of each alternative.
> 4. Prizing and cherishing.
> 5. Affirming.
> 6. Acting upon choices.
> 7. Repeating.
>
> Those processes collectively define valuing. Results of this valuing process are called values.[9]

On the surface, this process does not seem incompatible with a Deweyan perspective. In Dewey's Theory of Valuation, "choosing," "prizing," and "acting" are all central to his analysis. But Dewey's concepts differ from those of the values clarification theorists, even though the same *words* are used.

For Dewey, to value is to *judge*, but the chosen values serve only as means for ends-in-view. They are not ends in themselves. Ends are defined by Dewey as being consequences *actually* reached, not those for which we are striving. And, once ends are arrived at, they immediately become means for attaining other ends-in-view attainable through the scientific process of inquiry which is completed only with the testing of hypotheses.

From the above relationship, it can be seen why Dewey claims that the concept of valuation has two distinct meanings. When Dewey attributes meaning to a concept, he implies that a pragmatic dispositional theory is used to "define" a term. In this way, meaning is not located until the hypothetical meaning is actually tested. Thus valuation may be viewed as being intrinsically valuable, or second--as being good or instrumentally valuable for achieving something else.[10] In this context, Dewey claims that the intimate connection of the notions of appraising and prizing ought to be accepted. For to separate the two and associate appraising only with means and prizing with ends

> suggests (though, of course, it does not prove) that ends framed in separation from consideration of things as means are foolish to the point of irrationality.[11]

The above descriptions suggest some of the crucial differences between VC and Dewey. Dewey's "value" is an intermediary component of a continual life process of judging. This process takes place within the larger social setting--the community--and is "wrapped up" with any number of other important concepts. The terms which Raths uses, (i.e., value, choice, prizing) are in fact the terms used by Dewey in *Theory of Valuation*. But understanding Dewey's theory rests upon a combination of these terms with additional ones. Raths does not deal with these other all-important notions of desire, interest, effort, likes, and dislikes. Without showing how these additional concepts

apply, Raths cannot succeed in claiming to be using some of Dewey's terms correctly. Dewey's concepts are highly interconnected, and to use a partial set of Deweyan terminology serves to present a theoretical picture of a different sort than Dewey created. At the very least, Raths merely fails to demonstrate compatibility with Dewey. In order to illustrate that the use of these terms in the two theories is incompatible, it is necessary to examine how both Raths and Dewey put these terms to work in actual practice.

Individual and Social Contexts

Unlike Dewey, when Raths explains values and the process of valuing, he seems not to recognize the importance of the larger social setting. Consequently, his portrayal of the valuing method is a contrived seven-step process which lacks the richness and complexity of valuing in a Deweyan sense. For example, Dewey's method of intelligence, unlike Raths's process of valuing, does not come to an end point. There is no such thing as a step seven. Rather, ends are means for obtaining ends-in-view. The process is not at all a simplistic one because valuing takes place within a complex social context.

Choosing, prizing, and acting for Dewey are contingent upon the goals of experiencing individual growth *within* a social environment which is similarly progressing. These processes function as means to achieve ends-in-view. The important distinction for Dewey between ends and ends-in-view seems not to be recognized in the values clarification literature. Self-knowledge appears to be the program goal of VC. The role of the teacher is not to direct students into more adequate modes of valuing (as necessitated by the social context, given a Deweyan perspective) but rather it is to help each individual acknowledge his own values and accept those of others.

> The teacher communicates an acceptance of students' expressions of values, although not necessarily agreement with what is expressed. The teacher may emphasize this acceptance in value discussions by nonjudgmental messages saying that a student has been heard, understood, and respected: "I hear what you say, Billy, and I appreciate how you feel."[12]

Locating or recognizing a value is the goal of values clarification. In values clarification, unlike Deweyan theory, one value bears no relationship to other values. In other words, holding particular values need not be considered within a larger social spectrum. A value has intrinsic worth because it is personally chosen.

> It is important to note that our definition of values and valuing leads to a conception of these words that is highly personal. It follows that if we are to respect a person's life, we must respect his experience and his right to examine it for values.[13]

Unless this claim is clarified or elaborated or qualified, it seems clear that it does not reflect a Deweyan perspective.

Dewey would be much more apt to take the opposite position and argue that unless the value were part of a larger framework, it could not be a value. The individual, or social/moral being, only functions within the context of a social environment. For Dewey, the democratic community is judged to be superior to the mere association of persons grouped together. Such a democratic community is created by recognizing and agreeing upon a variety of interests that are commonly shared. It is out of this agreed-upon community of interests that values emerge. Thus without the community, there can be no values in a Deweyan sense. Throughout *Moral Principles in Education*[14] Dewey repeatedly expresses the need for children to leave the realm of egoistic desires and

interests and become socially aware. He advocates that children acquire moral habits which serve to help them function cooperatively with others. For Dewey, morality is impossible except in social settings, and in VC these settings seem to be regarded as irrelevant.

The second definitional starting point of the values clarification theory regards the use of the word "character." In both *Values and Teaching* and "Freedom, Intelligence and Values," the authors quote Dewey's definition of character as "the interpenetration of habit." What is not adequately presented (in fact, is omitted) is Dewey's further definition of habit. And this definition is critical to Dewey's definition of character. In the definition of "habit" we find a prime example of Dewey's altering the use of a commonly understood concept. For Dewey, "habit" is equated with "will." Habits are positive dispositions to be nurtured and developed. Habit is not mere repetition of any behavior. Dewey distinguishes between behaviors which ought to be discouraged and those which ought to be nurtured. Part of making this kind of determination rests on identifying shared interests.

We do not find this distinction in VC. Given the VC literature, the thief, the drug pusher, or the bully can satisfy all seven conditions and thus identify "values." And, if we follow the VC advice, the teacher would have no business other than to shield the "valuer" from others' comments. To the follower of Dewey, however, these "interests" would not be habits of any worth. Indeed the Deweyan might well regard it prudent to help thieves or drug pushers recognize the limitations of their identified "values" by placing those values within the larger social setting. The teacher's role in such a situation is to direct the child into socially more adequate avenues.

The above example illustrates the way in which values clarification theorists have borrowed Deweyan terms but have used those terms in a different way. The unwary reader of values clarification literature may come to believe or may assume that the labels are used by Dewey in the same way. As shown, this is not the case.

From the above analysis, I have attempted to show that values clarification theorists have borrowed and changed the meaning of Deweyan terminology without recognizing important differences. Another way in which they have done this is by committing a common fallacy--that of accent. A clear example of the fallacy of accent is found in discussion of the relationship between the individual person and the social community. Let me now turn to this problem.

To Dewey, theoretical description cannot be separated from the social environment in which it operates. In *Moral Principles in Education*, Dewey recognizes the distinction between the psychological and social aspects of moral education. Individual concerns are associated with the psychological aspects, but these considerations must be integrated into the larger framework in order to acquire meaning.[15]

The social environment is not given this importance in VC. The VC approach seems to champion the *psychological* aspect of the process of valuing and does not take into account the social. Thus there is a wide gulf between the two approaches.

Dewey carefully analyzes the terminology within the theoretical backdrop of the social environment. The VC theorists, using the same *terms*, ignore that environment. For instance, when Raths lists the "eight categories as possible habits of behavior that connect to Dewey's definition of character,"[16] he makes no mention of the fact that to Dewey these individual characteristics are to be evaluated within the larger *social* community. Without the focus on the social, the VC list appears highly relativistic *and* incompatible with Deweyan thought.

> To want a world for children in school where they can express (1) purposes of their own, (2) interests of their own, (3) attitudes of their own, (4) aspirations of their own, (5) beliefs of their own, (6) feelings of their own, (7) thinking that is theirs, and (8) activities that they enjoy, is indeed to champion a life for these children. To seek and promote a life that contains these eight is indeed to reveal a value orientation.[17]

This is but one example of many in Raths's essay in which important individual characteristics are emphasized apart from the larger social setting. In contrast, Dewey carefully reiterates throughout his philosophy that only by placing the individual within a social setting is it instructive to evaluate the particulars of educating persons in any area, much less morally.

Throughout the Values Clarification essays, reference is made to the individual and to personal choices. Notice in the following passage the degree to which the individual is emphasized and the social perspective is lacking:

> Values clarification takes the position that we assist people in moving toward integration when we invite them to reflect on personal choices, prizings, and actions when considering (1) aspects of their own lives (interests, attitudes, beliefs, feelings, and so on) and (2) personal or social issues (such as stealing, jealousy, tidiness, and rule making). The goal of values clarification may be said to be to assist people in integrating their current lives and in learning skills that will serve them similarly in the future. Explicit is the judgment that, given the complex nature of current society, many individuals and groups can use that kind of assistance.[18]

In context, this particular passage is intended to show how values clarification is Deweyan. But it can be Deweyan only if one *assumes* the existence of the larger social framework. And nowhere in the VC literature is such an assumption discussed. It is as though the values clarification theorists read only the passages on the individual in Dewey and skipped over every reference to the social side and its importance in Deweyan theory.

There is at least one other aspect of the individual which is treated in antithetical ways in the two theories. Dewey views the individuals' dilemmas, problems, and the like as being experiences necessary to the positive process of growth. Without such experiences a person will find no need to explore and acquire an expanded set of useful solutions which will help him grow. Disequalibria is thus viewed in a positive light by Dewey. But in values clarification we find:

> The theory recognizes that many people today have difficulty "pulling themselves together." Decisions seem too complicated, pressures seem too varied, changes seem too unsettling. As a consequence, some people flounder in confusion, apathy, or inconsistency.[19]

This description and the program designed to meet the challenge would suggest that values clarification is not a program which surfaces naturally but is one created to meet a particular need, that it is especially for those needing to "pull themselves together." This is antithetical to Deweyan theory.

Program Structure and Goals

For Dewey, "Apart from participation in social life, the school has no moral end nor aim."[20] Because of the necessary relationship between the social and the moral, all school life for Dewey is also moral life. The child is educated morally not by receiving lessons in citizenship or the like, for this would only be learning ideas *about* morality. Truly moral ideas, according to Dewey, are acquired through participation in social/moral life. Such participation involves continued pragmatic response to encountered problems through which students continue to grow personally and thus help realize social progress. Dewey expressly opposes offering fragmented "units" as subject matter for any program of education. The school to Dewey is an embryonic social community and ought operate as a social community. In this view, both the child and the curriculum are conceived as organic wholes, and any attempt to separate the two militates against the possibility of realizing educational goals. Moral education can be neither taken out of any other subject nor added to an outlined curriculum. For Dewey, moral education is part of all educational programs and thus it is up to the teacher to direct students' potential for moral growth in positive directions.

Values clarification is an "additional" program which does not naturally emerge in a social setting. From a Deweyan perspective, VC appears to be an artificial construction serving only to deal with ideas *about* morality, not those moral ideas which "are acquired in such a vital way that they become moving ideas, motive-forces in the guidance of conduct."[21]

It is also important to note that the process of growth is the goal of education for Dewey. Growth never ends but is continually achieved by the child as he meets dilemmas, problems, and the like which need to be solved. Without encountering situations where the child experiences disequalibria, the growth potential cannot be adequately actualized. And with VC, as was mentioned above, the state of disequalibria is viewed negatively. It is a state from which the young are to escape by engaging in values clarification.

Conclusion

In the scope of this brief paper there is not space to explore additional points of contrast between the theories of Dewey on the one hand and those of Raths, Simon, and Harmin on the other. I have limited myself to attempts to show (through discussions of the VC treatment of Deweyan terminology, the role of the individual, and the program structure itself) that when the two approaches are critically examined, the initial claims to similarity wash out, or at the very least become highly questionable. What remain are two distinct theories more antithetical than compatible. Unless my interpretative readings of Dewey and the values clarification approach are grossly inaccurate, the claims of similarity made by the values clarification theorists ought to be seriously amended.

NOTES

[1]Louis E. Raths, Merrill Harmin, and Sidney B. Simon, *Values and Teaching*, 2nd ed. (Columbus, Ohio: Charles E. Merrill Publishing Company, 1978), p. 11.

[2]*Ibid.*, p. 296.

[3]*Ibid.*, p. 286.

[4]*Ibid.*

[5]*Ibid.*, p. 287.

[6]Louis E. Raths, "Freedom, Intelligence, and Valuing," in *Values Concepts and Techniques*, National Education Association (Washington DC: A National Education Association Publication, 1976), pp. 9-17.

[7]John Dewey, *Theory of Valuation* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1939).

[8]Raths, "Freedom, Intelligence, and Valuing," p. 12.

[9]Raths, Harmin, and Simon, *Values and Teaching*, pp. 26-28.

[10]Dewey, *Theory of Valuation*, pp. 24-25.

[11]*Ibid.*, p. 26.

[12]Raths, Harmin, and Simon, *Values and Teaching*, p. 48.

[13]*Ibid.*, p. 34.

[14]John Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1909; reprint ed., Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1975).

[15]*Ibid.*, p. 47.

[16]Raths, "Freedom, Intelligence, and Valuing," p. 15.

[17]*Ibid.*, p. 14.

[18]Raths, Harmin, and Simon, *Values and Teaching*, p. 296.

[19]*Ibid.*, p. 4.

[20]Dewey, *Moral Principles in Education*, p. 11.

[21]*Ibid.*, p. 2.

PART IV

RECORDS AND REPORTS

MINUTES OF THE ANNUAL MEETING
OF THE
OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

Stouffer's Cincinnati Towers
Cincinnati, Ohio
November 9-10, 1979

1. The meeting was called to order by David Engel at 11:15 A.M., November 10, 1979. The minutes of the 1978 meeting, as published in *Proceedings* of OVPES, were approved. An interim Treasurer's Report was presented by Eleanor Roemer, Treasurer, and approved.

2. Old Business

   A. John Carter, editor of *Proceedings*, introduced the issue of increasing costs involved in publishing the *Proceedings*. He recommended increasing library subscription. However, the contract with ERIC, which publishes the *Proceedings* "gratis," and which provides increased visibility, detracts from the need various libraries would have to acquire it. Richard Pratte suggested that the Executive Board, with John Carter's assistance, investigate ways to seek subscriptions from libraries.

3. New Business

   A. A motion for OVPES to contribute $150 to *Educational Theory* was made by Richard Pratte; a second to the motion was offered by Gerald Reagan. The motion passed.

   B. President Engel announced that the Nominating Committee was composed of the following members: David Denton, Chair; Clinton Collins; Bernard A. Gendreau; Philip G. Smith.

   C. David Denton made the motion to nominate the following persons as OVPES officers in 1980:

Richard LaBrecque	President
John Carter	President-Elect
Eleanor K. Roemer	Secretary-Treasurer
Everett Jarboe	Executive Board Member (to 1980)
David Engel	Executive Board Member as Immediate Past President
Paul Black	Executive Board Member (to 1981)
Jerome Popp	Executive Board Member (to 1982)
John Carter	*Proceedings* Editor
Richard Angelo	*Proceedings* Assistant Editor

   Robert Skovira gave the second, and the nominations were accepted. The Nominating Committee's slate of officers was unanimously elected.

   D. It was moved, seconded, and passed that the President appoint a conference coordinator for the annual meeting of the Society.

   E. There was discussion about the location of the 1980 meeting. David Denton was asked to investigate the possibility of meeting in Kentucky.

   F. Richard Pratte moved that: 1) a letter of appreciation be sent to Father Francis Brennan, Xavier University, to thank him for his welcome and the provision of coffee and pastries on November 10, and 2) a letter of appreciation be sent to David Engel for his tenure as OVPES President.

G. The motion to raise the dues to $5.00 for the regular membership was made, seconded, and passed. (Dues for graduate students will remain $2.50.)

H. The Society also voted to send letters of thanks to Dennis Senchuk, Chair, and the other members of the Program Committee: William A. McKenney and Robert Wilhoyte. As well, letters of commendation of their work on the Program Committee should be sent to their deans.

I. David Engel, continuing to preside in the absence of Richard LaBreque, adjourned the meeting at 12:00 P.M.

After the meeting the President of the society appointed Richard Angelo (Chair), Joseph DeVitis, and Richard Brosio to the Program Committee for 1980.

OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY

December 31, 1979 Treasurer's Report

BALANCE: January 1, 1979		1,309.90
Receipts		
Membership Dues Received Before the 1979 Annual Meeting:	111.50	
Sale of Proceedings:	185.00	
Monies Collected at the 1979 Annual Meeting:	302.50	
Contribution from Ohio State:	500.00	
Interest on Savings Account:	44.66	
TOTAL RECEIPTS:		1,143.66
Disbursements		
Cost of Announcements:	69.86	
Conf. of Phil. Society:	5.00	
Postage for Program Mailing (third mailing):	60.00	
Postage for Proceedings:	76.80	
Copyright fee for Proceedings:	14.00	
Cost of Printing Proceedings:	580.00	
Cost of 1979 Meeting Rooms:	0.00	
Cost of Annual Meeting Program:	20.23	
Coffee:	43.26	
Contribution to *Educational Theory:*	150.00	
Cost of guest speaker's hotel accommodations:	95.36	
Cost of president's hotel accommodations:	36.50	
TOTAL DISBURSEMENTS		1,151.01
NET BALANCE AS OF DECEMBER 31, 1979:		1,302.55

OHIO VALLEY PHILOSOPHY OF EDUCATION SOCIETY
LIST OF MEMBERS

Richard T. Alexander, Jr.
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

David Allen
Springville
Indiana 47462

Mildred Allred
1568 Meadowbrook Wy.
Temperance, MI 48182

Abdul Al-Rubaiy
Dept. Ed. Foundations
University of Akron
Akron, OH 44325

Richard J. Altenbaugh
901 C.L.
CAS Adv. Center
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Russell E. Ames, Jr.
Educational Psychology
Department of Education
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907

William E. Andersen
Dept. of Education
University of Sydney
N.S.W. 2006, Australia

D. Anderson
606 Teachers College
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, OH 45221

James Andris
Education Division
Southern Illinois University
Edwardsville, IL 62025

Richard Angelo
Taylor Education Building
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Bruce Baker
School of Education
Univ. of Missouri-Kansas City
Kansas City, MO 64110

Peter Baldino
College of Education
Youngstown State University
Youngstown, OH 44503

Robert H. Baldwin
44 Greenville Avenue
Clarion, PA 16214

Donald Barnes
College of Education
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Emmet Berkeen
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, KY 42101

Marvin Berlowitz
606 Teachers College
University of Cincinnati
Cincinnati, OH 45221

Eric Beversluis
Dept. of Philosophy
Leonard Hall
Capital University
Columbus, OH 43209

H.S. Bhola
School of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Lane F. Birkel
Teachers College
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Jule Bishop
121 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Paul Black
School of Education
Slippery Rock State College
Slippery Rock, PA 16507

Kermit Blank
University of Tennessee
Knoxville, TN 37916

John F. Bleyer
126 West Point Drive
Greensbrug, PA 15601

Steven Broidy
Dept. of Teacher Education
Southwest Missouri State University
Springfield, MO 65802

Richard Brosio
Teachers College 801
Annex 202
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Arthur Brown
Wayne State University
College of Education
Detroit, MI 48202

Dennis Brown
11117 Kirkwood
Tacoma, WA 98498

Glen Brown
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

Leon Brownlee
Foundations of Education
College of Education
Memphis State University
Memphis, TN 38152

William E. Brownson
746 Harvard Bend
Woodland, CA 95695

William H. Bruening
2317 Leroy
Fort Wayne, IN 46805

Roscoe V. Buckland
Berea College
Berea, KY 40403

Ruth Bunyan
University of Cincinnati
No. 38
Cincinnati, OH 45221

Joe R. Burnett
Dept. of Ed. Policy Studies
363 Education Bldg.
Urbana, IL 61801

Ronald Burnside
304 Eller Avenue
Englewood, OH 45322

John Calvert
1015 Hillstone, Apt. 1
La Grange, IL 60525

David N. Campbell
Dept. Ed. Foundations
School of Education
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Malcolm B. Campbell
Dept. Ed. Foundations and Inquiry
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Karen Carey
723 Melrose Avenue
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40502

John E. Carter
School of Education
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

J. Gordon Chamberlin
911 Ridgecrest Drive
Greensboro, NC 27410

Christopher Chweh
University of Pittsburgh
Johnstown, PA 15900

Ralph W. Clark
College of Education
East Tennessee State University
Johnson City, TN 37601

Stafford Clayton
Dept. of History & Phil of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Betsy B. Coffey
207 Hiawatha
Frankfort, KY 40601

Clinton Collins
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Phil Constans, Jr.
642 Cottonwood Drive
Bowling Green, KY 42101

Walden Crabtree
College of Education
University of Akron
Akron, OH 44325

Norman Deeb
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, KY 42101

W. DeHays
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

Wietse de Hoop
Special Ed.
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

David E. Denton
144 Taylor
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Richard L. Derr
School of Education
Case Western Reserve University
Cleveland, OH 44106

Joseph L. Devitis
R.R. #4
Courtright Rd.
Martin, TN 38237

Alan Deyoung
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

James Dickoff
Kent State University
Kent, OH 44240

Frank P. Diulus
Dept. of Behav. & Humanistic Studies
Buffalo State College
1300 Elmwood Avenue
Buffalo, NY 14222

Charles M. Dye
2999 Chamberlain Road
Akron, OH 44313

Findly Edge
Southern Baptist Seminary
Louisville, KY 40206

Lee Edgington
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Christopher J. Eisele
602 H. Allen
West Virginia University
Morgantown, WV 26506

Joseph A. Ellas, Dean
School of Education
300 College Park
University of Dayton
Dayton, OH 45469

David Engel
Dept. of Ed. Foundations
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

Donald W. Felker
822 N. Salisbury Street
West Lafayette, IN 47906

Joseph Ficht
47575 North Avenue
Mt. Clemens, MI 48045

George Finchum
College of Education
East Tennessee State University
Johnson City, TN 37601

Caucus P. Flesher
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

Gary J. Foulk
Dept. of Philosophy
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

Harold Franz
322 Miniosa Circle
Aiken, SC 29801

Gordon E. Frazier
School of Education
University of Hawaii
Honolulu, Hawaii 96822

Jo Ann Freiberg
Ed. Foundations
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Carol Gallagher
121 Johnston Blvd.
Lexington, KY 40503

Candy Garrett
Institute for Child Study
Bypass 46
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

John Geiger
Dept. of Foundations
School of Education
University of Dayton
Dayton, OH 45469

Bernard A. Gendreau
Philosophy Department
Xavier University
Cincinnati, OH 45207

John Georgeoff
Department of Education
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907

Leonidas Gibbs
1309 Woodlawn Avenue
Wilkinsburg, PA 15221

Patrick J. Gillespie
4533 Winterset Drive
University Station
Columbus, OH 43220

Richard Glasser
85-09 Radnor Street
Jamaica, NY 11432

Donald Greco
930 Woodstock Avenue
Toledo, OH 43607

Robert N. Grise
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

Russell Hamm
School of Education
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

Frank Hainer
617 Bigelow Street
Pittsburgh, PA 15207

Karen Hanson
Dept. of Philosophy Sye 026
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Terry Heiney
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

James Hendricks
Northern Michigan University
Marquette, MI 49855

Homer Hogle
309 Education Building
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Donald Holland
303 Peach
Dyer, TN 38330

Roger A. Hughes
School of Education - #233
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Bonnie Hume
Dept. of Education
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

Patricia James
Kent State University
Kent, OH 44240

Everett Jarboe
School of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Henry C. Johnson
2218 Rackley Bldg.
Penn State University
University Park, PA 16802

Ellis A. Joseph
Dean, School of Education
300 College Park
University of Dayton
Dayton, OH 45469

Tomis Kapitan
Dept. of Philosophy
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

Steve Kay
183 Park Avenue
Lexington, KY 40508

Steve Keleman
21314 Velicata Street
Woodland Hills, CA 91364

Frederick Krichner
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Joseph Kirchner
School of Education
Youngstown State University
Youngstown, OH 44503

J. Theodore Klein
Dept. of Philosophy and Religion
Urbana College
Urbana, OH 43078

Lawrence D. Klein
Dept. of Curriculum Research
School of Education
Central Connecticut State College
New Britain, CT 06050

Bruce Knecht
3526 Bowen
Toledo, OH 43606

Theodore Krause
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Richard LaBrecque
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Madge N. Lester
44 Marion Drive
Fort Thomas, KY 41075

Rev. F.W. Lewis
School of Education
Fairfield University
Fairfield, CT 06430

Richard A. Lindsey
Box 381
Middle Tennessee State University
Murfreesboro, TN 37130

Thomas Lopez
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Gilbert C. Lozier
Xavier University
Cincinnati, OH 45207

H. Glenn Ludlow
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Elizabeth Steiner Maccia
Dept. of History and Phil. of Ed.
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

George S. Maccia
Dept. of History and Phil. of Ed.
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

James R. Maguire
129 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Edward D. Makruski
2043 Tuka Avenue
Columbus, OH 43201

Robert Mason
Southern Illinois University
Edwardsville, IL 62025

William A. McKenney
Dept. of Ed. Foundations
Eastern Kentucky University
Richmond, KY 40475

Bernard Mehl
College of Education
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Drewey Mercer, Jr.
Cambellsville College
Cambellsville, KY 42718

John E. Merryman
I.U.P.
Uhler Hall
Indiana, PA 15701

Pyong Gap Min
302 Morrow Road, Apt. 59-A
Forest Park, GA 30050

Thomas J. Minter
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43619

Richard W. Money
Indiana University-Purdue University
Columbus Center
Indianapolis, IN 46205

Lloyd N. Mannin
Clark Technical College
570 E. Leffels Ln.
Springfield, OH 45505

Thomas D. Moore
School of Education
Kent State University
Kent, OH 44242

Ronald H. Nash
Dept. of Philosophy and Religion
Western Kentucky University
Bowling Green, KY 42101

Ross A. Norris
Dept. of Art Education
College of the Arts
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Deena Ohana
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

John J. O'Neil
Asst. Prof. of Philosophy
Boston State College
625 Huntington Avenue
Boston, MA 02115

Gene F. Osborn
800 N. Smith Rd., Apt. 9X
Bloomington, IN 47401

Ralph Page
2040A Orchard Street
Urbana, IL 61801

Daniel S. Parkinson
355 McGuffey Hall
Miami University
Oxford, OH 45056

Milton A. Partridge
Education Department
Xavier University
Cincinnati, OH 45207

Ben K. Patton
U.P.O. 805
Morehead, KY 40351

Joe Petrick
121 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio 43210

Louis Petrone
Dept. of Ed. Foundations
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

John Petry
3120 Domar
Memphis, TN 38118

Gene D. Phillips
Division of Education
Indiana University at Fort Wayne
2101 Coliseum Blvd., East
Fort Wayne, IN 46805

Thomas A. Phillips
School of Education
Indiana State University
Terre Haute, IN 47809

Trevor J. Phillips
Educational Foundations and Inquiry
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Jerome Popp
1809 Monticello
Edwardsville, IL 62025

Ralph L. Pounds
R.R. #2
Glouster, OH 45732

Richard Pratte
145 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Conrad Pritscher
Educational Foundations and Inquiry
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Richard Quantz
Miami University
Dept. of Educational Leadership
Oxford, OH 45056

Edward D. Quinn
Indiana University Southeast
4201 Grantline Road
New Albany, IN 47150

Keith L. Raitz
Dept. Ed. Foundations
School of Education
University of Louisville
Louisville, KY 40208

Gerald M. Reagan
145 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Irwin K. Rice
3507 Mount Ranier
Louisville, KY 40222

John M. Rich
Dept. of Cultural Found. of Ed.
School of Education
University of Texas
Austin, TX 78712

Wandar Rider
254 Buena Vista
Memphis, TN 38112

Rodney Riegle
123 S. Orr
Normal, IL 61761

Margaret Rivage-Seul
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Berea, KY 40404

Eleanor K. Roemer
School of Education
Bowling Green State University
Bowling Green, OH 43403

Bernard Rosen
Dept. of Philosophy
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

W. Gordon Ross
College Box 2270
Berea, KY 40404

R. Terry Russel
Christian Education Dept.
Scarritt College
Nashville, TN 37203

Rita S. Saslaw
College of Education
University of Akron
Akron, OH 44325

John Scahill
330 E. High Street
Lexington, KY 40507

Frederick M. Schultz
Dept. Ed. Foundations
College of Education
University of Akron
Akron, OH 44325

Roman Schweikert
Xavier University
Cincinnati, OH 45207

Linda P. Scott
Institute for Applachian Affairs
Eastern Tennessee State University
Johnson City, TN 37601

Dennis M. Senchuk
Dept. of History and Phil. of Ed.
Indiana University
1316 Nancy Street
Bloomington, IN 47401

Jonathon Shear
Inst. for Adv. Study
2540 Vera Avenue
Cincinnati, OH 45237

Samuel S. Shermis
Dept. of Education
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907

William R. Shunk
Dept. of Education
Purdue University
West Lafayette, IN 47907

Robert J. Skovira
Division of Education
University of Houston - Victoria Campus
2302-C Red River
Victoria, TX 77901

J. Bernard Smith
School of Education
Duquesne University
Pittsburgh, PA 15219

Philip G. Smith
School of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Philip L. Smith
145 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, Ohio 43210

Samuel R. Snyder
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, Ohio 43606

Michael H. Sokolow
English Dept.
E.O. Smith High School
University of Connecticut
Storrs, CT 06268

Sister Mary Michael Spangler
Ohio Dominican College
Columbus, OH 43219

Thomas E. Spencer
Teachers College
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Douglas Stanwyck
Dept. of Ed. Foundations
Georgia State University
Atlanta, GA 30303

Ira A. Steinberg
Dept. of Education
Oberlin College
Oberlin, OH 44074

W. Richard Stephens
President for Academic Affairs
Greenville College
Greenville, IL 62246

Marilyn G. Stewart
648 Lathrop
Columbus, OH 43206

Eric R. Straumanis
337 N. Pearl Street
Granville, OH 43023

William O. Swan
Youngstown State University
410 Wick Avenue
Youngstown, OH 44555

David Tavell
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Burnham Terrell
Dept. of Philosophy
395 Ford Hall
University of Minnesota
Minneapolis, MN 55455

Charles L. Thompson
School of Education
University of Tennessee
Knoxville, TN 37916

Jerry Thompson
1437 Central
Memphis, TN 38104

Jaap J. Tuinman
Institute for Child Study
Indiana University
Bypass 46
Bloomington, IN 47401

Brenda Tudor
1367 Mulford Road
Columbus, OH 43212

G.H.E. Udok
University of Pittsburgh
Pittsburgh, PA 15260

Beth Vail
Dept. of Elementary Education
Teachers College
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47306

Kurt Varga
121 Ramseyer Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Lorraine Walker
School of Nursing
University of Texas
1700 Red River Street
Austin, TX 78701

Richard L. Warren
Dept. of Social and Phil. Studies
College of Education
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506

Jacqueline Watson
College of Education
Indiana University
Bloomington, IN 47401

Janice F. Weaver
148 Pearl Croft Road
Cherry Hill, NJ 08034

Sally H. Wertheim
Dept. of Education
John Carroll University
Cleveland, OH 44118

Margaret S. Wheeler
Teachers College, 218-C
Ball State University
Muncie, IN 47304

Charles G. Wieder
Division of Art Education
340 Hopkins Hall
Ohio State University
Columbus, OH 43210

Robert Wilhoyte
College of Education
University of Toledo
Toledo, OH 43606

Roger A. Wilson
Banta F-127
Bloomington, IN 47401

Mary Yeazell
West Virginia University
Route 7, Box 149B
Morgantown, WV 26505

Bernadette Young
5090 Warwich Terrace
Pittsburgh, PA 15213

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